Ethics in Trouble: A Philosopher’s Role in Moral Practice and the Expert Model of National Bioethics Commissions
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Philosophers may contribute a lot to moral practice, even when they are not looking for a theory that might be ‘applied’ to contemporary moral concerns. Showing the background, the underlying and unmentioned premises of arguments brought forward in moral debates, is a recognised philosophical competence. The same holds for concept clarification or hermeneutic skills, the knowledge of historical development and the like. These competences can be used with a critical impetus or with a constructive one, for example, proposing new concepts and viewpoints for new thinking. Therefore, there is ethical expertise in the sense of moral philosophical expertise. However, there is no moral point of view, which has a special philosophical entitlement, and no philosophical criteria for the ‘true’ or ‘better’ moral theory. A philosopher holding a moral standpoint does not render the standpoint a philosophical one. Hence, there is no special philosophical moral expertise. In this chapter, I explain this position and consider its consequences for national bioethics commissions, which follow the expert model of ethics commissions. I conclude by proposing two alternative models, which fare better in terms of intellectual, moral and political integrity: the model of moral representatives, and the model of open civic participation. Ethics as a philosophical discipline is in trouble as soon as it forgets its intellectual limitations. Morality is in trouble, when philosophers support politically and morally unsound institutions.