Love as Union vs. Personal Autonomy
In: Love on Trial: Adjusting and Assigning RelationshipsSearch for other papers by Michael Kühler in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
The idea of love as a union between the lovers is one of the most prominent and contested accounts of (romantic) love. Critics argue that abandoning the lovers’ independent identities or selves poses a threat to personal autonomy. For, ‘becoming one’, the lovers would no longer be able to make decisions on their own, which, apparently, undermines their autonomy. Therefore, the notion of love as union should not be embraced but rejected. In my chapter I explore this criticism and, on the contrary, argue that love as union, while surely having tremendous impact on the lovers’ identities, poses no threat to their autonomy. Taking the criticism seriously, I assume a rather strong but still plausible interpretation of the union metaphor according to which the individual identities are subsumed to a shared we identity. Likewise, personal autonomy is understood ambitiously, aiming at the idea of an autonomous self. In this regard I consider two seminal and contrasting conceptions of autonomy: 1) an existentialist account according to which we can choose freely who we want to be, and 2) an ‘identity first’ account according to which the ability to make autonomous decisions depends on a ‘given’ self. In order to reject the above criticism, I argue that, on the first account, subsuming one’s identity to a shared we identity nevertheless has to be understood as voluntarily chosen and maintained by each lover with regard to who he or she wants to be. Thus, it continuously presupposes personal autonomy instead of posing a threat to it. On the second account, love as union functions as constituent of one’s ‘given’ self, defining it in terms of what one fundamentally cares about. Hence, it belongs to the basic presuppositions of being able to make autonomous decisions in the first place and, analogously, poses no threat to personal autonomy. Finally, the idea that love as union might pose a direct hindrance to the lovers’ autonomy, thereby avoiding the detour over their identities, is addressed and rejected shortly as well.