Virtuous Anger and Inappropriate Apology: When Actions Are Unforgivable
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Charles Griswold defends a conditional account of interpersonal forgiveness as the expression of a virtue. In this chapter, I attempt to apply Griswold’s account to some examples of actions that might be thought to be in principle unforgivable. Griswold does not give conditions for how to determine whether an action or injury is in principle unforgivable; he says that his account leaves open the possibility of such cases, but does not necessarily entail that there are such cases. I describe and consider two different sorts of candidates for unforgivable actions - one that might be said to be a case of warranted - or virtuous - anger, and one which might be said to involve an inappropriate apology. Finally, I consider whether what I have argued would be Griswold’s take on these examples is correct. I suggest that these examples might show that Griswold’s requirements for evidence of moral transformation, as well as his insistence on dialogue between the victim and perpetrator may be too strong. It seems that Griswold has overlooked the connection between the virtue of forgivingness and the virtue of charity.