Imputation and Preserving the Face of the Other: The Human Economy of Forgiveness
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Forgiveness entails two aspects: first, it involves an act of imputation, an assertion that an other has committed an offence and is culpable for it, and which thereby establishes a social debt; and second, an act of release, which involves a sacrifice of social debt and a gift to the other of revalidated social standing. This gift attempts to repair or preserve the face of the other, which potentially had been damaged in the act of offence. Although the offender is not the primary victim of the offensive or injurious action, s/he often is injured socially and/or interpersonally by the affects of that offense, particularly the guiltiness that stems from acknowledged or imputed culpability. Both aspects are crucial to forgiveness. Imputation gives the offended some measure of power in registering the other’s guilt, granting the situation of offense meaning that validates the experience of the offended. Imputation in this sense is an act of contained aggression and symbolic violence. But is does not function alone. If it is to refashion the social relations breached by the offense, it also must release the offender from the stigma of imputation, containing the exposure of the other to social and interpersonal forms of rancor and stigma due to guilt. In forgiveness, the offended takes on the responsibility of preserving the face of the other, the offended. He or she does so by foreclosing the power of the offense to define the offender and his or her position in the social field. As such, it is a sacrifice and a gift.