In this chapter I defend an ecological conception of justice obligations that is expansive and synoptic in its normative scope. This ecological conception systematically integrates our justice obligations in the social and natural domains by relying on an overarching view of justice, according to which obligations to entities with moral status are understood in terms of safeguarding their capacity for adaptation to social and/or natural environments conducive to their flourishing. An innovative feature of my theory is that it incorporates major social justice developments in political philosophy into a unified moral framework that can also deal adequately with justice obligations to the natural world. On the one hand, while recognising that we have cosmopolitan obligations to all human beings, I maintain that institutional environments such as political communities are essential for identifying the special obligations we have to fellow members of our communities. Adopting a social ecology approach, entitlements and protections of central importance to theories of social justice are justified in terms of their role in creating sustainable social and natural environments conducive to collective adaptation. On the other hand, recognising that moral consciousness developed from evolutionary processes that contributed to the adaptation of humans to their natural environment, I argue that a proper extension and understanding of morality and justice involve protecting the capacity of all beings with moral status, and not only humans, to flourish through successful adaptation. In short, principles of justice are understood as normative prescriptions promoting mutual survival and flourishing within a coevolutionary perspective. Finally, acknowledging that conflicting obligations are inevitable when implementing the conception of justice I propose, I employ the notion of degrees of intrinsic value to indicate how to prioritise our obligations to entities with moral status.


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