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Part 1 ends with an extended consideration of Camus’ longstanding friendship, then enmity, with Jean-Paul Sartre. David Sprintzen here does not however deal extensively with the famous 1952 debate between the two men in Les Temps modernes. The chapter instead introduces us to the important differences between the philosophers by reference to the complexities of Camus’s 1956 novella The Fall. In particular, Sprintzen addresses one of the central issues which sparked controversy between Camus and Sartre: the question of freedom. He does so by proposing to read The Fall as an indirect, critical commentary upon the central themes of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: a commentary which—following the author’s interpretation—leaves no room for a positive appraisal of Sartrean philosophy, especially regarding its moral consequences. The Fall for Sprintzen is not a simple satire on Sartre, but a portrayal of the possible, dangerous consequences of Sartrean existentialist humanism, a philosophy which Camus saw as too deeply oriented towards individual freedom, leaving too little room for relations with others that would encompass love, solidarity and compassion.