Chapter 10 A Case of Metalogical Explanation of Logical Normativity
In: Formal and Informal Methods in PhilosophySearch for other papers by Kordula Świętorzecka in
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Abstract
The presented paper contains a justification for the view that the concept of the normative nature of logic can be reduced to certain well-known metalogic properties of inference relation. We consider a class of propositional logics identified with corresponding consequence operation used to define an inference relation. An inference pair which is valid or generally verifiable guarantees the reliability of a given reasoning, which is an interpretation of this pair. To phrase the description of such reasonings in normative terms, we can say that they respect the norms of a given logic, or that the logic is normative with respect to them. Our approach gives quite a simple and clear meta-scientific explanation of the concept, which sometimes is a subject of misleading philosophical associations.