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Aristotle’s approach to the collecting and evaluating of philosophical views (doxai) received its theoretical grounding within a broad framework of his ideas on expertise, authority, and agreement. In spite of earlier collections, his approach was closely linked to his own philosophical investigations. In his Topics he provides some insight into the usage of his method, and the significance of “received opinions.” In this paper I examine his (and Theophrastus’) views and practice regarding such doxai-evaluations and I ask whether Hermann Diels’ term doxography is still suitable if we bring the dialectical claims into play. I will argue that the dialectical practice had taken the theoretical claims in Topics I.2 and I.14 further in order to make the assessments of earlier views into a sorting mechanism for preserving the useful and avoiding the erroneous. I end by showing that even the commentator Simplicius was partial to this method when undertaking his exegeses of Aristotle’s works.