Chapter 6 Sabotage of Critical Offshore Infrastructure: a Case Study of the Balticconnector Incident

In: Maritime Security Law in Hybrid Warfare
Authors:
Henrik Ringbom
Search for other papers by Henrik Ringbom in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
and
Alexander Lott
Search for other papers by Alexander Lott in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close

Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

$40.00

Abstract

This article assesses the regulatory regime with respect to deliberate damaging of subsea cables and pipelines. Based on the Balticconnector incident, which occurred in the Gulf of Finland in the fall of 2023, the article analyses the availability of enforcement measures for the affected coastal States, including boarding, inspection, and arrest of a ship, under the existing legal framework. The paper also briefly examines the scope of Article 113 of the LOSC for setting the jurisdictional background in relation to the severing of a submarine cable or pipeline and assesses other potential jurisdictional bases for enforcement actions. It is concluded that this represents another area in which LOSC is inconclusive, and the authors suggest that intentional sabotaging of other States’ critical underwater infrastructure calls for a flexible interpretation of the LOSC, taking into account its larger role in maintaining peace and security for the oceans.

Citation Info

  • Collapse
  • Expand

Metrics

All Time Past 365 days Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 1180 1171 53
Full Text Views 55 55 4
PDF Views & Downloads 91 91 3