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The following summaries aim to provide an overview of the most important positions of the groups considered in the present collection. The intention was not to give a complete and detailed account of the respective groups’ participation in the discussions, but rather briefly to inform the reader about their main positions and significant changes thereto in the course of the reform debate.

Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT)

Launched in May 2013, the ACT group builds upon the work of the “Small 5” (S-5).1 ACT is a cross-regional group of small and mid-sized countries working to improve the accountability, coherence and transparency of the Security Council by improving its working methods.2

The ACT Group promotes the limitation of the veto power of the permanent members in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and developed a “Code of Conduct” in this regard. As of 1 January 2019, the Code of Conduct had 119 supporters.3

Important Proposal

  • 23 October 2015, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, → 5.4.4.25.

Members4

The group started with the following members: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania and Uruguay. Until June 2015, Denmark, Ghana, Luxembourg, Maldives, Rwanda, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had also joined the ACT group.

African Group / African Union (until 2002: Organization of African Unity, OAU)

The African Group of UN member states consists of the member states of the African Union (AU). It represents the 54 African countries in the UN and therefore more than a quarter of all UN member states. Since August 2005, the African Union is also represented by the Committee of the Ten Heads of State and Government (“Committee of Ten”, C10) in the Security Council reform debate.5 The AU is in favour of increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent seats.6 The group vehemently calls for two permanent seats with all the privileges enjoyed by the present P5, including the right of veto,7 and five non-permanent seats8 for Africa. Furthermore, the AU demands to select itself the states holding these seats.9 The current Ezulwini Consensus (2005) differs from the earlier Harare Declaration (1997) in so far as it does not mention any more the proposal that the two permanent seats be “allotted […] in accordance with a system of rotation”. On the other hand, the statement in the Ezulwini Consensus that “the African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa’s representatives in the Security Council” also does not bar the way to such a rotation. Africa rejects both the concept of a third category of Council members (“semi-permanent members”) and the proposal for a pool of some 20 countries from which the states represented on the Council would be recruited on a rotational basis.10 According to the AU, a reformed Security Council should have at least 26 members.11

While the AU supports, as a matter of principle, the abolition of the right of veto, it argues that as long as this right exists, it must be extended to all new permanent members.12 Efforts, in particular of the G4, to convince the African states to be more flexible in the veto question have so far been unsuccessful.

Important Proposals

  • 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5, 3.2.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.10.

  • 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29, 3.3.36 and 3.4.2.21.

  • 8-10 June 1998, Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the procedure for rotation of the two permanent seats claimed by Africa, → 4.2.2.3.2.

  • 7-8 March 2005, “The Ezulwini Consensus”, → 4.2.2.3.26.

  • 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations, → 4.2.2.3.29.

  • 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.67, → 4.2.2.3.30.

  • 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24.

Members

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (not a UN Member State), Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

While the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) first opposed the idea of additional permanent seats,13 it later agreed to an expansion in both existing categories.14 Instead of demanding a seat for its own region, CARICOM supports an additional non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) across all regions.15 The Caribbean states are in favour of a review mechanism.16 In 1999, CARICOM supported a total number of Council members of 26, as advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement, and proposed to fill six to seven of the additional seats with two industrialized countries and four or five developing countries as permanent members. If it was not possible to find agreement on an expansion of the Council membership in both categories, CARICOM would have been content with an expansion in only the non-permanent category.17 In 2013, CARICOM adapted its proposal to one envisioning a Security Council of 27 members with the new seats allocated as follows: Two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for Africa (with the African Group being responsible for the nomination of Africa’s representatives); two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asia; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; one permanent seat for WEOG; and one non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States across all regions.18 In general, CARICOM is open to a Council with a membership of the mid to upper twenties.19

The members of CARICOM demand a limitation of the veto power and pursue the ultimate goal of its total abolition.20 However, as long as the veto exists, CARICOM is in favour of all permanent members having the same prerogatives and privileges.21 CARICOM wants to limit the veto to issues falling under Chapter VII,22 and to forbid the use of the veto when a Council decision pertains to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of international law.23 About half of CARICOM’s members are also supporters of the ACT Code of Conduct. The Caribbean countries further support the idea that a majority of the General Assembly or the Security Council may override a veto.24 In addition, permanent members should explain non-concurrent votes to the wider UN membership.25

Important Proposals

  • 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.17, 3.3.18, and 3.4.2.20.

  • 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14, 4.3.10, and 4.4.3.10.

  • 16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.3.2.

  • 16 February 2010, → 5.2.1.3.3.

  • 25 February 2013, CARICOM, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18.

Members

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (not a UN member state), Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Central American Countries

On matters of Security Council reform, the Central American Countries were united for only a short period in the 1990s as a group of six states. (Belize, which geographically also belongs to Central America, is a member of CARICOM and follows the policy of this group, or speaks for itself in the reform debate.)

In 1994, the Central American Countries hoped that a reform of the Security Council would lead to a greater participation in the work of the Council of all UN member states, including small states and those that never participated in the Council’s work. In their view, this aim could be achieved by increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent seats.26 In 1995 and 1996, the six countries stressed the importance of including developing countries in the permanent category,27 even though this category was intended to be gradually eliminated.28 Furthermore, the majority of the new non-permanent seats should be allocated to developing countries, and the ban on immediate re-election (Art. 23 para. 2 of the UN Charter) should be abolished.29 In 1997, the Central American Countries added that a reform should take into account the interests and aspirations of the Latin American and Caribbean region.30

In 1994, the six countries expressed their wish to abolish the right of veto and stressed that this right should not be granted to any state in any circumstance, whether they may be called permanent or semi-permanent members.31 This position was reaffirmed in 1995, when the Central American Countries clarified that the veto should be limited and ultimately abolished.32 In 1996 and 1997, the Central American Countries stated their support for a limitation of the veto to matters dealt with under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a first step towards its final abolition.33 While emphasizing in 1994 and 199534 that the veto should not be extended to new members, the countries refrained from restating this position in 1996 and 1997.35

Important Proposals

  • 14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13.

  • 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7 and 3.4.2.18.

  • 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

Members

Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.

Eastern European Group (Group of Eastern European States)

The states of the Eastern European Group only occasionally presented statements in the name of the whole region. A common position of the states belonging to the group was the call for at least one additional non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe: Any increase in the non-permanent membership should encompass an enhanced representation of the Eastern European region by granting them at least one additional non-permanent seat.36

Important Proposals

  • May 1998, Joint position paper of the States members of the Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership in the Security Council → 4.2.1.3.1.

  • 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16.

Members

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia (until 2019: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

Group of Arab States

The Group of Arab States, which has the same membership as the League of Arab States, is not one of the five regional groups of UN member states. The Arab states partly belong to the African Group, and partly to the Asia-Pacific Group. In 1998, the Arab states demanded two permanent seats for Asia. They claimed that new permanent members should be granted the same prerogatives and powers as enjoyed by the current permanent members, that they should be nominated by their respective regions and be elected by the General Assembly in periodic elections. They further called for expanding the Council membership to at least 26.37 The Arab states claim an adequate representation in the Security Council.38 To that end, they demanded from 1997 until 2015 two non-permanent seats,39 and since 2016 one40 such seat, for the group, as well as one permanent seat with full privileges if the number of permanent members is increased.41 The permanent Arab seat would rotate among the Arab states in accordance with the practice of the League of Arab States.42

Important Proposals

  • 9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30.

  • 27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1.

  • 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.3.17.

Members

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (suspended since 2011), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

Group of Four (G4)

The Group of Four, one of the most active and visible groups in the reform discussion, consists of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. The aim of each of these four countries is a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council.43 The four states support each other’s respective candidacy.44 The G4 is in favour of an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership.45 The G4 also supports an African presence in the permanent category of seats.46 The four countries have proposed to enlarge the Security Council by six new permanent and four to five new non-permanent seats. Of the permanent seats, two should be allocated to Africa, two to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean, and one to WEOG. The new non-permanent seats should go to Africa (one to two), Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.47 The Group of Four opposes the idea of new non-permanent seats with longer terms (as advanced, in particular, by the Uniting for Consensus group), because, in their view, adding only non-permanent seats would not solve the imbalance which exists in the current composition of the Council, would not sufficiently empower the developing countries and small states, and would not render the Council more accountable or effective.48 With regard to regional seats, the position of the G4 is that in the system of the United Nations, states represent themselves so that the focus should not lie on regional seats but rather on an equitable geographical distribution of seats.49 When allocating non-permanent seats to regions, the representation of small and medium size member states including SIDS should be taken into account.

The Group of Four stresses that new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and rights as the current permanent members, including the right of veto. However, the G4 offered that new members shall not exercise that right in a transitional period, i.e. until a review of a reform of the Council.50

Important Proposals

  • 6 July 2005, Draft resolution, UN Doc. A/59/L.64, → 4.2.1.1.37.

  • 7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4.

Members

Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.

Group of Ten

The “Group of Ten” consisted of nine smaller European countries plus Australia which joined for two proposals in 1997 and 1998. The group supported an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories and opposed special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.51 They wished to see a Security Council with no more seats than twenty-five.52

In 1998, the group presented ideas for restrictions of the veto, focusing on what issues should not be subject to the veto.53

Important Proposals

  • 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35.

  • 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

Members

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia.

GU(U)AM

GU(U)AM was founded in 1997 with a view to develop the cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe. Uzbekistan joined the group in 1999 but withdrew again in 2005. The GU(U)AM countries supported enlarging the Security Council in the permanent and non-permanent category.54 They demanded at least one additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.55

Important Proposals

  • 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25.

  • 7 April 2005, → 4.2.1.3.17.

Members

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine (and Uzbekistan from 1999 to 2005).

IBSA (India – Brazil – South Africa)

Established in 2003, IBSA is a coordinating mechanism between India, Brazil and South Africa.56 IBSA issued only one statement on the reform of the Security Council, in 2014. Otherwise, the three countries spoke individually in the debate, or, in the case of India and Brazil, as members of the Group of Four. South Africa has shared the common African position. It is also a member of the L.69 Group. The three countries are in favour of an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories. They all aspire to a permanent seat, and support each other’s respective candidature.57

Important Proposal

  • 26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23.

Members

Brazil, India and South Africa.

L.69 Group

The L.69 Group brings together a diverse set of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and is named after the General Assembly draft resolution A/61/L.69 of 200758 which at the time was also called the “India resolution”.59 The draft resolution sought, in particular, to urge the President-elect of the 62nd session of the General Assembly “to take immediate steps to facilitate results-oriented intergovernmental negotiations”. Although the draft was withdrawn, it contributed to start such negotiations. From 2008 onwards, the L.69 Group became more active as a coalition from the South, with India and St. Vincent and the Grenadines acting as its focal points.60 In 2012, the group drafted another resolution aimed at winning the African Group by promising the veto power for new permanent members. That draft also addressed in detail the allocation of new permanent and non-permanent seats (see below).

The L.69 Group today describes itself as “a diverse, pro-reform group of developing countries in favour of justice, sovereignty and equity in the reform of the Security Council both in process and in outcome”.61 The group favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing categories62 and demands a greater representation of the developing countries, including island and small states.63 The number of non-permanent seats should be increased to sixteen, with two new seats for Africa and one new seat each for Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, for the WEOG states, and for Small Island Developing States across all regions.64 In the permanent category, there should be two additional seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one for WEOG. Thus, the total number of seats would be twenty-seven.65 The group further advocates a coordination between regional groups to ensure a regular representation of small developing states in the non-permanent category.66 The 2007 draft called for a “provision for a review” of a reform.

The L.69 Group supports an abolition of the veto67 but asserts that if this cannot be achieved, for the time being all permanent members shall enjoy the same prerogatives and privileges, including the right of veto.68

Important Proposals

  • 14 September 2007, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1, → 4.2.1.1.51.

  • 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15.

Members69

The group was established when the following states joined as sponsors of the L.69 Draft in 2007: Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. On 30 November 2015, the spokesperson of the L.69 group declared to represent “a diverse group of 42 developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific, who are united by a common cause”,70 without specifying the respective countries.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

The Non-Aligned Movement is one of the most vocal, and with presently 120 member states also the largest group participating in the Security Council reform debate. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement represent nearly two-thirds of the UN members and 55% of the world population. Membership is concentrated in countries considered to be developing or part of the “Third World”. The Movement is led by a chair that rotates every three years during summit conferences. The positions, mandates and courses of action adopted by the Heads of State or Government or the Ministers of the Movement are articulated and carried out by the political body of the Movement, namely, its Coordinating Bureau (CoB), which is composed of the NAM member states and is based at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. The Coordinating Bureau meets on a monthly basis at the ambassadorial level. The Movement has established different working groups, contact groups, task forces and committees, among them the NAM Working Group on the Restructuring of the Security Council, coordinated by Egypt.

NAM holds that any expansion of the Security Council must prominently include the developing countries and countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.71 If agreement cannot be reached with regard to other categories of membership, only the non-permanent category should be increased for the time being. The Movement supports an enlargement of the Security Council by a minimum of eleven seats.72 NAM has proposed in 1995 to enlarge the Security Council to twenty-six seats, seven of which should be allocated to Asia, seven to Africa, five to Latin America and the Caribbean, four to the WEOG Group, and three to the Eastern European Group. In addition, the Movement is in favour of a periodic review of Security Council membership.73 While NAM has consistently confirmed its adherence to these positions, its most recent statements avoid concrete claims and remain rather vague (with the exception of an explicit “support for increased and enhanced representation for Africa in the reformed Security Council”74 ), which reflects a number of conflicting views in the large NAM group on the representation of regions and individual countries in an enlarged Council.

As early as 1992, the Non-Aligned Movement was of the view that the right of veto of the permanent members was undemocratic and therefore had to be reviewed in line with a reform aiming at a democratization of the UN and an increased transparency of the work of its bodies.75 The Movement promotes a curtailment of the veto and its eventual abolition.76 It proposes to limit the veto to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,77 to establish the possibility of overruling a veto by a vote of a certain number of Security Council members, or by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly. It also emphasizes that the veto power should be formally restricted, and that a voluntary limitation is not sufficient.78

Important Proposals

  • 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5 and 3.3.14.

  • 27 March 1996, → 3.4.3.22.

  • 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14, 3.3.37 and 3.4.3.44.

  • 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24.

Members

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, East Timor, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Nordic Countries

The Nordic Countries endorse an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories,79 while stressing the importance of ensuring that small states can regularly serve as members of the Council.80 In 1995, they proposed to increase the Security Council by five new permanent seats and underlined that the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members should be maintained.81 In the same year, they also supported an increase in membership to a number in the low twenties, preferably 23.82 The five countries are open to an interim solution in order to test new models, as long as it contains a clear review-clause.83

In 2007, the Nordic Countries stressed that the veto should not be extended to new members.84 Instead, it should be limited.85 The Nordic Countries support the Code of Conduct by the ACT Group as well as the Franco-Mexican initiative to restrain the use of the veto.86

Important Proposals

  • 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25 and 3.3.14.

  • 4 December 1997, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries, → 3.2.1.2.14, 3.4.3.48, and 3.4.4.5.

Members87

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, until 2011: Organization of the Islamic Conference)

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation represents the interests of the Islamic countries and demands an adequate representation of its member states and the Islamic Ummah in a reformed Security Council.88 The OIC further supports an increased representation of developing countries in the Security Council and an increased role of regional groups in determining their representation on the Council.89 The Secretary-General of the Organization, Mr. İhsanoğlu, also called for a seat in the Security Council for the OIC as an organization.90

Important Proposals

  • 28 September 2004, Final communiqué of the annual coordination meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (published on 11 October 2004), → 4.2.3.8.

  • 14 March 2008, Resolution of the Islamic Summit Conference on the Reform of the United Nations and expansion of the membership of the Security Council, No. 11/11-P(IS), → 4.2.3.15.

  • 25 May 2009, Resolution of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the reform of the United Nations and expansion of UN Security Council’s Membership, No. 30/36-POL, → 5.2.3.1.

Members

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

Overarching Group

The states participating in the Overarching Group united for one proposal in 2008 with the aim to break the impasse in the Security Council reform debate.

The group proposed an intermediate solution with a mandatory review of a Council reform after a fixed period of time. It suggested to enlarge the Security Council to 22 members. Of the seven new seats, two each should be allocated to Africa and Asia. One seat each should be reserved for Latin America and the Caribbean, for the WEOG Group, and for the Eastern European States. The draft proposal by the Overarching Group included several options regarding the time span these seats could be occupied by a single state, and how a holder of such a seat could be challenged by other states.91

According to the draft proposal, the use of a veto should require an explanation by the respective member of the Security Council, a written copy of which should be made available to all UN member states.92

Important Proposal

  • 20 March 2008, Overarching Group, Draft proposal, → 4.2.2.2.14 and 4.4.4.21.

Members93

Cyprus, Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom.

Permanent Five (P5)

The “Permanent Five” (P5) is the name with which the five permanent members of the Security Council (as designated in Article 23 of the UN Charter) are addressed collectively. It was first used in the academic literature. The P5 have not participated in the reform discussion as a group, and have not developed a common position on Council reform issues. Instead, each of the permanent members has always expressed its own views. However, in the course of the debate France and the United Kingdom found their views sufficiently similar to occasionally make common statements.94 All P5 have committed themselves to a modest enlargement of the Security Council in order to enhance the representation of developing countries.95 Furthermore, all five in principle hold on to the current structure of the right of veto.96

Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)

The first priority of the PSIDS is to improve the working methods of the Security Council.97 Apart from that, they support an increase in both categories of membership of the Council.98 The PSIDS stress that the Security Council should increase the number of non-permanent seats for small states, instead of making it more difficult for them to be elected to the Council.99

Important Proposal

  • 26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), → 5.2.1.3.1.

Members100

Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

Small Five (S-5/S5)

The focus of the “Small Five” was the improvement of the working methods of the Security Council. The group was active between 2005 and 2012 and was superseded by the ACT Group. The Small Five proposed to limit the veto in the following way: A permanent member using the veto should explain its use, and a written version of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council document. Permanent members should commit themselves to not casting a veto in cases of proposed Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law.101 Additionally, when casting a negative vote, a permanent member should have the option to state that the vote should not be considered as a non-concurring vote in the sense of Art. 27, para. 3 of the Charter.102

Important Proposals

  • 17 March 2006, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/60/L.49, → 4.4.4.18.

  • April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

  • 14 April 2011, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9.

  • 15 May 2012, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland, Revised Draft Resolution, UN Doc. A/66/L.42/Rev.2, → 5.4.4.10.

Members103

Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The countries of the SADC only issued one statement concerning Security Council reform in the name of the group, namely in 1999. They supported an expansion in both existing categories and fully subscribed to the Harare Declaration, i.e. to the creation of at least two permanent seats for the African continent (shared by African countries in accordance with a system of rotation), and to five non-permanent seats for Africa.104

The countries claimed that the exercise of the right of veto should be progressively curtailed until abrogated. However, if the veto was maintained, it should also be accorded to new permanent members in a reformed Security Council.105

Important Proposal

  • 16 December 1999, Namibia on behalf of SADC, → 4.2.2.3.7 and 4.4.2.3.

Members106

Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Uniting for Consensus (UfC or UFC)

The “Uniting for Consensus” group emerged from the so-called Coffee Club. It changed its name to Uniting for Consensus in 2005. Over the years, the group’s membership varied (see below). Its main feature is its strong opposition to new permanent seats and its emphasis on the need for consensus.

UFC favours an increase in elected seats.107 In its 2005 proposal, the group suggested to leave the existing five permanent seats as they are and to only increase the number of members in the existing non-permanent category to 20. The regional groups should decide over re-election or rotation patterns for the seats of their regions.108 The second major UFC proposal, presented in 2010, provided for a three-seat-structure, consisting of the five existing permanent seats, a new category of longer-term seats, and increased regular non-permanent membership. For the longer-term seats, two patterns were suggested, namely a term of three to five years, or a term of two years with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. Again, the regional groups were meant to decide about arrangements for re-election and/or rotation.109 The proposal also included special seats reserved for small states and medium-sized states.110 In 2017, the group slightly altered this proposal to include one seat reserved for, and shared by, Small Island and Developing States and small States.111 Since 2015, the group has supported an expansion of the Security Council of up to 26 members.112

The UFC countries support an abolition of the veto or at least a limitation of its scope to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.113

Important Proposals

  • 21 July 2005, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

  • 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, pp. 55-58, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6.

  • 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.2.25.

Members

The membership of the Group has varied over the years, but the countries officially supporting UN Doc. A/59/L.68 in 2005 appear to be the core group of members: Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey. In the past, Ghana, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar were also active in the group. China is an active participant during meetings at expert level, and Indonesia attends these meetings as well.114

1

Center for UN Reform Education, 21 Member States Launch New Initiative to Improve the Working Methods of the Security Council (12 May 2013).

2

Factsheet of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (June 2015).

3

Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the UN, List of Supporters of the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (as of 1 January 2019); → 5.4.4.25.

4

See footnote 1 above.

5

The C10 represents the five African regions, with two members each from West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, and North Africa (Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia). Sierra Leone serves as chair of the C10. See Lydia Swart, Reform of the Security Council 2007-2013, in Jonas von Freiesleben/Lydia Swart, Governing & Managing Change at the United Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013, Center for UN Reform Education, New York 2013, p. 44.

6

30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14.

7

30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14; 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5 and 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29; 7-8 March 2005, Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32.

8

29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5 and 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.2.2.3.29; 7-8 March 2005, Ezulwini Consensus, → 4.2.2.3.26; 5 July 2005, Sirte Declaration, → 4.2.2.3.29; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 17 May 2017, Malabo Communiqué 2017, → 5.2.2.3.24; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32.

9

29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.3.5; 8-10 June 1998, → 4.2.2.3.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.26.

10

29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.2.2.4.1.

11

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

12

30 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.14; 29 September 1994, African Common Position, → 3.4.2.10; 27 June 1997, Harare Declaration, → 3.4.2.21; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.2.7; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.32.

13

14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.17.

14

20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14; 16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of CARICOM, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.3.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.8; 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of CARICOM, → 5.2.1.3.24.

15

16 February 2010, Saint Lucia on behalf of CARICOM, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.3.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.8; 27 February 2018, Guyana on behalf of CARICOM, → 5.2.1.3.24.

16

20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 31. July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

17

20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.14.

18

25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18.

19

14 November 1995, → 3.3.18; 27 February 2018, → 5.3.27.

20

14 November 1995, → 3.3.18; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24.

21

20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.3.2; 25 February 2013, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.18; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.2.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24.

22

20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.10; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

23

16 March 2009, → 5.4.2.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 27 February 2018, → 5.2.1.3.24.

24

16 March 2009, → 5.4.3.2.

25

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

26

14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6.

27

13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52.

28

13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7.

29

13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52.

30

4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50.

31

14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13.

32

13 November 1995, → 3.4.2.18.

33

4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.41.

34

14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7 and 3.4.2.18.

35

1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.52 and 3.4.3.41; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

36

May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1; 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16; 21 February 2007, → 4.2.1.3.23; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8.

37

27 January 1998, → 4.2.2.3.1.

38

23 February 1994, → 3.2.3.6; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.31.

39

9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.3.19.

40

7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.21.

41

9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30; 12 January 2010, → 5.2.2.3.8; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.3.31.

42

9 July 1997, → 3.2.2.3.30.

43

25 September 2014, → 5.2.1.1.22.

44

21 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 25 September 2014, → 5.2.1.1.22.

45

21 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.36; 25 September 2018, → 5.2.1.1.43; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.45.

46

21 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.27; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.36; 25 September 2018, → 5.2.1.1.43.

47

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

48

7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4.

49

Ibid.

50

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, → 5.2.2.4.4.

51

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

52

27 March 1997, → 3.3.35.

53

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

54

14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25.

55

7 April 2005, → 4.2.1.3.17.

57

26 September 2014, IBSA, Joint Communiqué on IBSA Dialogue Forum, → 5.2.1.1.23.

58

→ 4.2.1.1.51.

59

See Swart, footnote 5 above, at 48.

60

Ibid., at 49.

61

Statement of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on behalf of the L.69 group, Ms. King, 25 June 2019, UN Doc. A/73/PV.92, p. 5.

62

See, e.g., the statements of 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51; 22 February 2010, Proposal for text-based negotiations on reform of the UN Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.38.

63

See, e.g., the statements of 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51; 2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

64

2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

65

2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

66

15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

67

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

68

2012, Draft Resolution, → 5.2.1.1.15; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.1.1.17; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

69

14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

70

30 October 2015, UN Doc. A/70/PV.43, pp. 4-5.

71

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5; 18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.2.1.3.6; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14; 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2.

72

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5; 27 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.14; 10 July 1998, → 4.2.1.3.2.

73

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.3.5.

74

5-6 April 2018, Baku Final Document, → 5.2.1.3.25, para. 119.10.

75

6 September 1992, → 2.23. NAM’s critique of the veto power is, however, much older. See the references in UN Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP.9 = UN Doc. A/50/47/Rev.1, Annex VII, → 3.4.3.22.

76

18-20 October 1995, Eleventh Summit Conference in Cartagena de Indias, → 3.4.2.17; 27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44; 10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1; 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 11 November 2010, → 5.4.2.4; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

77

27 June 1997, → 3.4.3.44; 10 July 1998, → 4.4.3.1; 30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24.

78

30 May 2006, → 4.4.3.24.

79

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.46.

80

7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37.

81

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

82

18 September 1995, → 3.3.14.

83

14 December 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.4.

84

14 December 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.4; See also their previous thoughts on this issue of 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.14.

85

4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.48 and 3.4.4.5; 20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24.

86

20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24.

87

See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.3.14.

88

28 September 2004, Final communiqué → 4.2.3.9; 14 March 2008, → 4.2.3.15; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 28 October 2013 → 5.2.3.8.

89

10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8.

90

15 September 2013, Speech at the International Affairs Institute by Mr. İhsanoğlu, → 5.2.2.3.15.

91

20 March 2008, Draft proposal, → 4.2.2.2.14.

92

20 March 2008, Draft proposal, → 4.4.4.21.

93

Jonas von Freiesleben, Member States Discuss Security Council Reform Again: A Never-Ending Process?, Center for UN Reform Education, 16 April 2008.

94

27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, Joint Statement, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.1.1.8.

95

23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2. See also the individual positions, e.g. for China: 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; for France: 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.29; for Russia: 15 November 1995, → 3.2.3.19; for the United Kingdom: 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8, and for the United States: 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30.

96

For a rare statement of the P5 as a group, see 23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2.

97

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1.

98

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1; 8 November 2013, Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.2.3.16.

99

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1.

100

Ibid.

101

17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 15 May 2012, Revised Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.10.

102

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 14. April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9.

103

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

104

16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7.

105

16 December 1999, → 4.4.2.3.

106

16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7 and 4.4.2.3. Madagascar is also a member of SADC since 2005, but the statement of 1999 predates its accession to the Community.

107

See, e.g., the statements of 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 1 May 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.2.25; 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 27 February 2018, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, → 5.2.1.2.13.

108

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1.

109

21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.2.2.2.11. This position was reaffirmed afterwards; see, e.g., the statements of 1 May 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.25) and 30 October 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.26). In 2018, the UfC Group advocated “longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate re-election” and an increase of the number of two-year non-permanent seats, “coupled with a more equitable distribution of seats among regional groups” (20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42).

110

21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.3.6.

111

8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42.

112

30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.26 and 5.3.18; 8 May 2017, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, → 5.2.2.3.23; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.2.42.

113

21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Ambassador Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.3.6; 26 May 2015, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6.

114

See Swart, footnote 5 above, at 51.