Annex II: Summary of country positions

In: Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019
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The summaries aim to provide an overview of the most important positions of the countries included in the present collection. The intention was not to give a complete and detailed account of the respective countries’ participation in the discussions, but rather briefly to inform the reader about their main positions and significant changes thereto throughout the reform debate. While the summaries of country positions were primarily based on individual statements made by the respective countries, the positions of the groups of which they were a member could not be disregarded, as this would have led to a fragmentary or even distorted account of the countries’ positions. This is especially true for countries that exhibited a particularly strong affiliation with a certain group or countries that only rarely expressed their individual position.

Algeria

Algeria is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Algeria did not present an original proposal itself but mainly supported the position of the African Union in recent years. Before the turn of the millennium, it endorsed the proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement to expand the Security Council by at least 11 new seats,1 and stressed the need to increase the number of seats for the African continent in all possible enlargement scenarios.2 In accordance with the African Common Position, Algeria demanded two (rotating) permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa in a reformed Security Council.3

While Algeria was initially opposed to granting the right of veto to new permanent members,4 it later adjusted its view to match the position of the African Union, according to which the veto should be abolished in principle, but that it must be extended to all new permanent members as long as it is retained.5 In addition, Algeria supports a regulation of the veto and a limitation of the subject areas to which it applies.6

Antigua and Barbuda

Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1993, Antigua and Barbuda proposed to enlarge the Security Council to a total of 25 members with a composition of eight permanent and 17 rotating members. Developing countries should be assigned four permanent and twelve non-permanent seats. The seats should be allocated in the following way: one permanent member and six non-permanent members for Africa; two permanent members and three non-permanent members for Asia; one permanent member and two non-permanent members for Eastern Europe; one permanent member and three non-permanent members for Latin America and the Caribbean; three permanent members and three non-permanent members for the Western European and Other States.7 In 1994, the country underlined that it is important for the Security Council to include small and poor states and not only large and wealthy states.8 In 1996 and 1997, Antigua and Barbuda declared that any expansion should include developing countries and that both the African and the Latin American and Caribbean Groups should be represented.9

Additionally, Antigua and Barbuda supported restricting the use of the veto.10 Subsequently, the twin-island state did not raise any further substantial proposals independently of the Caribbean Community or the Non-Aligned Movement.

Argentina

Argentina is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.11

Since 1993, Argentina has opposed new permanent seats. Only the non-permanent category should be enlarged.12 Argentina showed its willingness to consider a new category of seats, if there was a consensus to create such a new category.13 In its working paper on the so-called “cascade-effect” submitted in 1995, Argentina illustrated the permanent members’ influence in various UN institutions by filling leading positions with their nationals.14 The country supports the abolition of the permanent membership category altogether15 or the pursuit of an intermediary approach;16 the latter position being in line with the proposals of the Uniting for Consensus group.17

Argentina endorses an abolition of the veto power.18 However, until such elimination is feasible, the veto should be limited to decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter.19 The country considers informal restrictions of the veto insufficient and prefers an amendment of the Charter to guarantee a restriction.20 Nevertheless, Argentina supports the ACT Code of Conduct.

Australia

Australia is a member of the “Group of Ten”.21

In 1993, Australia proposed to expand the Security Council to a new total of 20 members,22 but subsequently adjusted the number to 2523 or 26.24 In 1996, Australia suggested an increase in the number of permanent members by five, thereby granting Germany and Japan as well as three developing countries a permanent seat, and further proposed to increase the number of seats in the non-permanent category to 15.25 While it opposed special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries,26 Australia supported removing the ban on re-election.27

According to Australia, new permanent members should not be granted the right of veto.28 Together with nine other countries, Australia drafted a proposal on how to limit the use of the veto.29 Furthermore, Australia strongly supports the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct on Security Council action in situations of mass atrocities,30 and the complementary French/Mexican political declaration on veto restraint.31

Austria

Austria is a member of the ACT Group and the “Group of Ten”.32

The country supports a small expansion in both existing categories33 but opposes special rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.34 Austria is in favour of a Security Council with up to 25 members35 and supports the interest of Japan and Germany in serving as permanent members, as well as parallel interests of qualified countries of the South.36 Austria also voiced its support for the creation of regional seats, notably with regard to the European Union.37

Austria advocates a limitation of the veto power, ideally limiting it to actions under Chapter VII, and does not wish to see an increase in the use of this instrument through an expansion of the Council’s permanent membership.38 Together with nine other countries, Austria drafted a proposal on how to limit the veto.39 It also supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Belarus

Belarus is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Belarus initially argued in favour of adding both permanent and non-permanent seats to the Security Council,40 with the consequence that an additional non-permanent seat should be allocated to each of the existing regional groups, including the Group of Eastern European States.41 In accordance with the Non-Aligned Movement, Belarus proposed that enlargement in both categories should entail at least 11 additional members42 and seats in the category of permanent members should be allocated to the countries of three developing regions, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.43 Belarus repeatedly stressed the importance of expanding the non-permanent category, advocating in particular the addition of another seat for the Eastern European regional group.44

In 1995, Belarus held the view that the right of veto should not be extended to new permanent members and that the veto power and other voting procedures of the Council should be thoroughly examined.45

Belgium

Belgium is a member of the “Group of Ten”.46

The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing categories, including new permanent seats for Germany and Japan.47 Belgium opposes special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries48 and prefers a Security Council of 2549 or 2650 members.

According to Belgium, the veto should be limited.51 New permanent members should not make use of the veto until the question of its extension to new permanent members has been decided upon in a review.52 Belgium encourages the voluntary limitation of the veto in cases of mass atrocity crimes.53 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Belize

Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1993 and 1994, Belize proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 2054 and 2355 seats respectively, including around nine permanent seats.56 These seats should be allocated based on the size of a country’s population and of its financial contributions to the budget of the United Nations. Accordingly, China and India would qualify as permanent members for fulfilling the first criterion, while Japan, Russia and the United States would qualify for fulfilling the second. This proposal also included the possibility for two adjacent states to hold a permanent seat together.57 Permanent seats were intended to become indefinite seats that could be held by a state for as long as it fulfilled the required criteria.58 In 1995, Belize altered its proposal, suggesting a new Security Council of around 33 members, including 10 to 13 permanent seats.59 A similar proposal with two alternatives was issued in 1996, returning to a Council of 20 to 23 seats, which should comprise special reserved seats for countries that contribute a large part of the UN’s funds.60 Belize elaborated on how the idea of shared seats could be organized in 1996.61 Belize supports a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States.62 Since 1996, Belize has not issued any additional proposals independently of the Caribbean Community and the Non-Aligned Movement.63

Belize considers the abolition of the veto desirable but not feasible. Hence, it favours a restriction of its use.64 In 1993, Belize proposed that no permanent member should be able to veto a decision in which the remaining permanent members unanimously consider it to have a personal interest.65 Alternatively, a minimum of two countries could be required to cast their vetoes in order for it to have an effect on a decision.66 Limiting the veto to areas exclusively under Chapter VII was initially viewed as too restrictive by Belize67 but has found its support in more recent years.68 According to Belize, if the veto is to be retained, new permanent members should enjoy the same rights and obligations as the present ones.69 Belize is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Bolivia

Bolivia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1996, Bolivia supported the creation of permanent seats for Germany and Japan as well as one each for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.70 However, the Latin American country later changed its position: It now opposes an extension of permanent membership and even supports the abolition of the permanent category (including the veto) altogether.71 The country prefers longer-term seats elected every four years to the two existing categories. According to Bolivia, the extended Security Council should consist of 25 members.72

Bolivia supports the limitation of the veto73 to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the final aim of its complete abrogation.74

Brazil

Brazil is a member of the G4, IBSA and the L.69 Group.75

The country has been in favour of expanding the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category.76 It proposed two additional permanent seats for major industrialized states as well as one for each of the main regions of the developing world.77 Brazil considers itself to be a legitimate candidate for such a permanent seat and also supports, as a member of the G4, the candidacies of Germany, Japan and India.78 As a member of IBSA, Brazil additionally endorses South Africa’s aspirations for permanent membership.79 It favours a size of the Security Council in the mid-twenties.80 Because it believes that only an expansion of the group of permanent members will adjust the Council to the political realities of the 21st century and ensure its long-term legitimacy and viability, Brazil opposes both non-permanent seats with longer terms81 and regional permanent seats, which it does not regard to be feasible.82

Brazil supports a limitation of the veto with the aim of its gradual elimination. It proposes to limit the veto strictly to matters covered by Chapter VII of the UN Charter83 and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.84

In Bulgaria’s view, additional permanent seats in the Security Council should be granted to states carrying considerable weight in the international political and economic arena, such as Germany and Japan.85 Enlargement of the permanent membership category of the Council must also include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.86 Furthermore, an additional non-permanent seat should be designated for the Group of Eastern European States, as the group’s membership more than doubled since the 1963 enlargement of the Council.87 Special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established.88 Bulgaria supports enlarging the Security Council to a size of up to 25 members.89

Concerning the veto power, Bulgaria advocates an informal limitation in order to ensure the Council’s effectiveness.90 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Canada

Canada is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.91

In its first proposal, Canada supported the idea of enlarging the Security Council in the permanent as well as the non-permanent membership category, and of lifting the ban on immediate re-election for non-permanent members.92 The country showed an early interest in new ideas, such as semi-permanent seats or rotational seats.93 Subsequently, Canada became opposed to new permanent seats94 and was a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.95

Canada opposes an extension of the veto power to new permanent members96 and supports its restriction to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.97 According to Canada, the permanent members of the Security Council should abstain from using their veto power in cases of proposed Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.98 To this end, Canada endorses the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican proposal.99

Chile

Chile is a member of the ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The country has been in favour of enlarging the Security Council with new non-permanent members as well as new permanent members (without the right of veto).100 In 1993, Chile supported seats for regional representatives serving longer terms of office.101 While Chile proposed to increase the membership of the Security Council to up to 24 or 25 members in 1993,102 the country later expressed that it remains flexible on the number of new seats and believes that establishing exact numbers or procedures might limit states’ negotiation ability.103

In 1993, Chile argued for a limitation of the right of veto and took the view that its use should be informally restricted.104 In 1998, the country was in favour of setting a time limit after which the veto should be abolished (e.g., the year 2030).105 Furthermore, Chile supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.106

China

The People’s Republic of China endorses an expansion of the Security Council by an equitable geographical distribution of additional seats.107 Since 1993, it has emphasized the importance of increasing the representation of developing countries108 as well as small and medium-sized countries.109 China declared that any reform plan not supported by the African countries will not have China’s backing.110 However, the PRC remained silent on the issues of the number of members of an enlarged Council, or the terms of office of new members. China has constantly underlined the necessity of consensus and patience.111 A quick fix would only cause further imbalance.112 According to China, the different issues of the reform are interrelated and must therefore be kept together; a package solution with the broadest possible consensus should be achieved.113

China opposes any attempt to restrict or curtail the veto power of the present P5.114

Colombia

Colombia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Uniting for Consensus Group.115

In 1993, Colombia supported an enlarged Security Council with additional permanent and non-permanent members.116 From 1994 on, however, Colombia has favoured a freeze of the category of permanent members and its gradually elimination, while at the same time supporting an increase in the number of non-permanent members.117 The country endorses the Non-Aligned Movement’s position that the Security Council should be expanded by a minimum of 11 members118 and is a co-drafter of the two drafts of the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group.119 Colombia is open to the possibility of an immediate re-election of non-permanent members120 and supports the creation of longer-term seats in line with the UFC position.121 It repeatedly expressed its openness to the creation of regional seats.122

Colombia is in favour of abolishing the veto, or at least restricting it,123 to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.124 It also suggests to replace the veto mechanism, either with a qualified majority or with a weighted vote.125 Another possibility promoted by Colombia is the establishment of a mechanism to reduce or neutralize the use of the veto or to increase the threshold required for a veto to take effect.126 Either way, Colombia opposes the extension of the right of veto to new Council members.127 Colombia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is a member of the ACT Group, the Central American Countries,128 the Small Five129 and the Uniting for Consensus Group.130

Costa Rica initially supported the 2 + 3 solution, which included adding Germany and Japan as well as one country from each developing region as permanent members.131 In 1993, it also suggested that non-permanent seats could be shared between several countries.132 Costa Rica investigated the so-called “cascade effect” and published its statistical findings in 2005.133 The country subsequently changed its position; it became a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.134 It is accordingly opposed to new permanent seats but supports non-permanent seats with longer terms.135

Costa Rica’s main objectives in reforming the Security Council are the regulation, limitation and eventual elimination of the veto.136 It has stressed the need to limit the use of the veto power in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights.137 Costa Rica also proposed to limit the application of the veto to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.138 The country endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration, and as a member of the respective groups the proposals made by the Small Five and by the ACT Group, respectively, aiming at restricting the use of the veto.139

Croatia

Croatia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.140 Croatia is in favour of granting Germany and Japan, as well as one country each from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, a permanent seat. However, in Croatia’s view the term “permanent” should not be taken literally, and the status of new permanent members should be reviewed every ten to fifteen years.141 Four new non-permanent seats should be created and assigned to Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe.142 As a member of the Group of Eastern European States, Croatia especially underlines the importance of an additional non-permanent seat for this region in any scenario of Security Council reform.143

Croatia favours the abolition of the veto power. If this is not possible, the country supports the so-called double veto requirement as a fallback position.144 Narrowing the veto’s scope to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is also advocated by Croatia.145 Croatia supports a code of conduct providing for a voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by the permanent members.146 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Cuba

Cuba is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1992, Cuba questioned whether the category of permanent membership and the veto mechanism still adequately reflected present-day realities.147 Subsequently, Cuba expressed its support for an expansion in both categories of membership, proposing that at least two new seats be assigned to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively.148 While initially suggesting an expansion of the Council to up to 23 members,149 Cuba more recently has supported a Security Council with 25 or 26 members in total.150 In 1995, the country suggested to expand the Security Council to 23 members by granting Asia three new seats, Africa two, Latin America and the Caribbean two, and Europe and Others one.151 An altered proposal was put forward in 2010: The membership of the Council should be enlarged to no less than 26 members.152 The enlargement should take place in both categories of membership. Among the new permanent members, at least two countries from Africa, two developing countries from Asia, and two countries from Latin America and the Caribbean ought to be included. The new permanent members of the Security Council should enjoy the same rights and powers as the current members.153 Cuba is opposed to an increase in the number of non-permanent members only,154 and to the creation of a new category of seats. However, it is open to the possibility of immediate re-election of non-permanent members.155 Cuba proposes that the seats of the present permanent members, as well as those of new ones, be periodically subjected to a vote. Hence, if the general membership was unsatisfied with the work of permanent members, it could dismiss them from the Security Council.156

The country favours the abolition of the veto157 but as long as this is not realistic, it supports its limitation.158 A first step, according to Cuba, should be to limit the use of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.159 The country proposes that a veto could be overruled by either an affirmative vote of a certain number of Security Council members, or by a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly, using the Uniting for Peace procedure as well as a progressive interpretation of Articles 11 and 24 (1) of the UN Charter. Cuba regards the concept of voluntary “self-restraint” as insufficient and is opposed to it being considered as an option. In case of a retention of the veto, Cuba endorses its extension to all new permanent members.160

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The country favours an enlargement in the non-permanent category first, as it considers an agreement on the expansion of the permanent category to be unlikely.161 However, if the permanent category were to be expanded, North Korea would strongly oppose a Japanese permanent membership.162

The country supports an abolition of the veto power.163

Denmark

Denmark is a member of the ACT Group and the Nordic Countries.164

In 1993, Denmark stressed the importance of introducing a rotation system for regional groups.165 Subsequently, Denmark repeatedly argued for an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories,166 with both developing and developed countries as new permanent members.167 Denmark is a supporter of the G4 proposal.168 The country also expressed its openness to other solutions, provided they contain a clear review clause.169 It abstains from designating an exact number of seats, but considers a number in the mid-twenties to be suitable for a reformed Security Council.170

Initially, Denmark was opposed to granting the right of veto to new permanent members.171 In 2005, however, Denmark became a co-sponsor of the G4 draft which entailed an extension of the right of veto to new permanent members, but included an obligation not to use it before a reform has undergone a review.172 Despite its continued support for the G4 proposal, Denmark explicitly opposes the extension of the veto to new permanent members.173

Denmark has consistently supported restraint in the use of the veto.174 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Ecuador

Ecuador is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The country supports the creation of longer-term seats on the Security Council or the possibility of an immediate re-election for non-permanent members.175 Furthermore, Ecuador endorses an expansion of the Security Council in both existing categories.176 With regard to the assignment of permanent seats, Ecuador demands that one country from each region of the developing world (Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean) be appointed.177 If no agreement can be reached on the subject of permanent membership, only the number of non-permanent seats should be augmented.178 More recently, Ecuador has focused more on the issue of the right of veto, opposing in particular its expansion to new permanent members.179

Ecuador argues strongly in favour of an abolition of the right of veto.180 According to Ecuador, a restriction of the use of the right of veto, such as the limitation of the veto to cases under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, should only be considered if no consensus in favour of its abolition can be reached.181

Egypt

Egypt is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The country supports an enlargement in both existing categories. It also suggested in 1993 to create a new category of seats, which would grant “each region one or more seats without veto power to rotate between the major Powers of that region”.182 While Egypt opposed the extension of the right of veto in 1995,183 it more recently has repeatedly stressed that new permanent members should have the same prerogatives as the present permanent members.184 Egypt is a strong supporter of the African Common Position.185 Egypt has repeatedly announced its readiness to serve as a permanent member.186 Overall, the Security Council should be increased to at least 26 members.187

The country supports a limitation of the veto with the aim of its ultimate elimination, however, as long as the veto is retained, all permanent members should have the same prerogatives and privileges.188

Fiji

Fiji is a member of the L.69 Group,189 the Non-Aligned Movement and the Pacific Small Island Developing States.190

In 1993, Fiji emphasized that new permanent members should not have the right of veto and all permanent members should be jointly responsible for most of the financial needs of the Organization’s regular budget, as well as for all its peace-keeping activities.191 Three years later, in 1996, Fiji proposed to increase the number of non-permanent seats from 10 to 17 by granting four new seats to Africa and Asia, one to Eastern Europe, one to Latin America and the Caribbean and one to Western Europe and Other States. Within those regions, seats should be distributed equally among the existing subregions. Each subregion should decide on the allocation of its seat, however, an equitable rotation system was considered to be a preferable option by Fiji. Additionally, two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan should be created, as well as one each for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.192 Subsequently, Fiji did not raise any further substantial proposals independently of its groups. Fiji was one of the co-sponsors of the L.64 draft in 2005193 and of the L.69 draft in 2007.194

Fiji seeks to abolish the veto. However, taking into account the current realities of international relations, it would support, as an initial step, the proposal that the scope and use of the veto should be limited and apply only to measures taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.195 Moreover, if a permanent member uses the veto power outside the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it should be subject to the right of appeal by another permanent Council member. The final decision would be made in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote.196

France

France supports a moderate increase in the two existing membership categories of the Security Council.197 In 1994, the country announced its support for Japan and Germany as new permanent members.198 In addition, France has supported permanent seats for developing countries.199 With regard to the non-permanent membership, France took a flexible stance, provided that the total number of Council Members would not exceed twenty.200 In subsequent years, the French Republic declared its willingness to compromise, eventually agreeing to an upper numerical limit of twenty-five seats.201 Of the additional seats, five should be permanent.202 France repeatedly held that new permanent members should have the same prerogatives and responsibilities as the existing ones, but also expressed its openness to other formulas.203 In 2001, France made more specific suggestions concerning the allocation of additional seats, endorsing India’s candidacy for a permanent seat while reiterating its support for Germany and Japan. The remaining permanent seats should represent Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, while additional non-permanent seats should be assigned to Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as to Central and Eastern Europe.204 By the time of the 60th session of the General Assembly, France was convinced that Brazil would be the preferable representative for Latin America, leaving only the African seat without a nomination.205 France’s support for a permanent seat for Germany, Japan, India and Brazil has been consistent ever since.206 In 1995, France did not consider regional permanent or semi-permanent seats to find broad support.207 It reiterated its opposition to proposals for regional representation in 2015, asserting that admission to the United Nations was granted to individual states.208 In 2008, France proposed an interim solution in cooperation with the United Kingdom. This solution envisages a new category of seats with longer and renewable mandates.209

France maintains that the right of veto of the current permanent members should not be altered.210 Instead of amending the UN Charter, France appeals to the permanent members to voluntarily and collectively suspend their veto power when mass atrocities are under consideration by the Council,211 and has pledged never to use its own veto power in such cases.212 In 2015, France, together with Mexico, proposed a voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that they would refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities.213 France also supports the ACT Code of Conduct.

Georgia

Georgia is a member of the Eastern European Group and the GU(U)AM countries.214

Georgia supports the addition of new permanent as well as non-permanent members to the UN Security Council. In the category of permanent members, Georgia endorses the candidacies of Germany and Japan. In addition, Georgia promotes the creation of four new non-permanent seats; one each for Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe.215 The number of seats on a reformed council should be in the low twenties216 or at 25.217 Georgia is a co-sponsor of the G4 draft.218

According to Georgia, the right of veto should be restricted in cases where a veto would block Security Council action aimed at preventing or ending crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Furthermore, permanent members should not be able to cast a veto in situations in which they are involved themselves.219 Georgia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Germany

Germany is a member of the G4220 and also participated in the Overarching Group.221

Germany announced its aspirations for a permanent seat on the Security Council as early as in 1992.222 Throughout the reform discussion, Germany has endorsed an expansion in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership, consistently presenting itself as a suitable candidate for permanent membership.223 Germany has also supported additional permanent seats for Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.224 In 1994, Germany temporarily suggested that if no agreement was possible with regard to permanent seats for these regions, they should be given more non-permanent seats with the possibility of re-election. However, Germany subsequently expressed its opposition to the introduction of semi-permanent seats.225 As a member of the Group of Four, Germany supports the candidacies of Japan, Brazil and India for permanent membership.226 According to Germany, the number of seats on a reformed Security Council should be in the mid-twenties.227 In October 1996, the country elaborated on this by stating that “the overall size of a future Security Council should be between 23 and 26, preferably 24”.228 The G4 draft resolution of 2005 envisioned a Council with twenty-five members.229 Germany repeatedly proposed a periodic review clause.230

According to Germany, the right of veto should be gradually limited, and permanent members of the Security Council should formally explain their decision to veto a draft resolution.231 Germany is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration. With regard to new permanent members, Germany emphasizes that they should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members. However, they should not make use of their right of veto before the question of its extension has been decided upon in a review.232

Ghana

Ghana is a member of the ACT Group, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1993, Ghana proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 25 members, with permanent seats for the Permanent Five, Japan and Germany, as well as two for Africa, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Asia. The 14 non-permanent seats should be distributed in the following way: four to Africa, three to Asia, three to Latin America and the Caribbean, two to Western Europe and two to Eastern Europe.233 Subsequently, Ghana aligned its position with the African Common Position and the Non-Aligned Movement.234

Ghana endorses a restriction of the veto and suggests to limit it to situations that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter235 or to create the possibility of it being overridden by a set number of votes in the Security Council.236 Ghana supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a member of the Central American Countries237 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1993, Guatemala sought to increase the number of non-permanent seats of the Security Council and to create new permanent seats.238 In 2013, the country reiterated its position and suggested the addition of up to five new permanent in addition to five new non-permanent members.239

Guatemala supports the abolition of the veto240 or its limitation in case of a lack of consensus.241 As a member of the Central American Countries, Guatemala vehemently argued against the extension of the right of veto between 1994 and 1997.242 This is contrary to its initial position in 1993, when Guatemala was opposed to the creation of new permanent seats without the right of veto.243 More recently, Guatemala has not taken a firm stance with regard to the prerogatives of new permanent members.244 It endorses the ACT Code of Conduct and the French/Mexican initiative.

Hungary

Hungary is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.245

Hungary favours an expansion of Security Council membership in the permanent as well as the non-permanent category.246 Permanent seats should be allocated to Germany and Japan, as well as Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.247 The Eastern European Group should be assigned an additional non-permanent seat.248 After initially opposing special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries,249 Hungary is now open to the idea of longer-term seats, provided that such an idea finds consensus.250 The country’s preferred size of a reformed Security Council shifted from between 20 and 25 seats in 1995251 to a maximum of 27 in 2015.252 It supports up to 6 new permanent members as well as a maximum of 6 new non-permanent members.253

With regard to the right of the use of the veto, Hungary favours limiting its use254 and supports all initiatives facilitating timely and decisive action aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocities by the Security Council, including those calling for the Permanent Five to voluntarily agree on refraining from using the veto.255 As a member of the ACT Group, Hungary supports the group’s Code of Conduct, as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

India

India is a member of the G4, of IBSA, the L.69 Group256 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The country favours an enlargement in both existing categories of Security Council membership.257 India suggests that a set of criteria should be determined according to which countries are selected for permanent membership.258 India believes it deserves a permanent seat, judged against any possible set of criteria,259 and endorses the aspirations for permanent membership of the other three members of the G4.260 As a member of IBSA, India also supports South Africa’s candidacy for permanent membership.261

In India’s view, new permanent members should have the same rights and responsibilities as the present permanent members.262 If it is not possible to abolish the veto power, the best option according to India is to dilute that right by extending it to new permanent members.263 However, such members should not make use of their right of veto before the question of its extension will have been decided upon in a review.264 India also supports the idea that the UN General Assembly is able to override a veto.265

Indonesia

Indonesia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Indonesia is in favour of adding new permanent members to the Security Council.266 The political and economic weight of developing countries, particularly of those with the largest populations, should be taken into consideration in the enlargement process.267 A Security Council with approximately 26 members is regarded as optimal by Indonesia.268 Because of its potential to garner the broadest possible political acceptance, Indonesia supports an intermediate approach.269 According to Indonesia, any decision on the expansion of Security Council membership is inappropriate if Asia is underrepresented and if the realities prevailing in Asia are not fully taken into account.270

Indonesia opposes the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.271 The country shares the view of many other states that the right of veto should be reviewed regularly272 and eventually eliminated.273 No veto should be permitted in the election of the Secretary-General and permanent members ought to explain the reason for employing the veto at the time the relevant draft resolution is considered, with a copy of the explanation being circulated as a Security Council document.274 Indonesia supports the French/Mexican political declaration and the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct.

Italy

Italy is a leading and a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.275

Initially, Italy promoted an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members.276 In 1993, the country proposed to create a third category of ten seats for those twenty states which make the greatest contributions to the work of the United Nations. These states would share revolving seats in pairs of two, which would guarantee their semi-permanent presence on the Security Council. Each of them would alternate a two-year term in the Council with a two-year period of absence from it.277 This proposal was adapted in the following years in order to include more countries in the semi-permanent category: now three countries instead of two should share a seat. Each of them would remain for two years on, and for the four following years off the Council. Furthermore, the electoral procedure was progressively refined.278 While Italy in its 1993 proposal had stated that it felt entitled to a permanent seat in the case of an enlargement in the permanent category,279 it subsequently changed this position, opposing both an enlargement in the permanent category280 and an extension of the veto power to new Council members.281 Instead of additional European states as new permanent members, Italy supported a seat for the European Union.282 In 2009, Italy proposed to rotate an EU seat between WEOG and the Eastern European Group, with the elected country representing the interests of the entire EU.283 Italy is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus group284 and has been one of its strongest voices from the beginning. Thus, Italy has continued to endorse the creation of a third category of seats with longer terms,285 and favours an enlargement of the Council to a maximum of 26 members in total.286

From early on in the discussion, Italy opposed an extension of the veto power beyond the present P5.287 Regarding an abolition of the veto as unrealistic, Italy favours a limitation of its use. The country suggested to limit the area of its application or to create a requirement of at least two vetoes to prevent a draft resolution from being adopted.288 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Japan

Japan is a member of the G4.

The country favours an increase in both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council.289 It considers itself to be a legitimate candidate for a permanent seat and also supports the aspirations of the other members of the Group of Four to the same end.290

Japan endorses a limitation of the veto power and supports the proposal that a veto must be justified by a Council member using it. With regard to new permanent members, Japan holds that any discrimination in status between existing and new permanent members must be avoided.291 Japan supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct, both of which aim at restraining the veto in cases of mass atrocities.

Jordan

Jordan is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Small Five.292

In 1993, Jordan supported an increase in non-permanent seats in addition to the creation of permanent seats for Japan and Germany as well as for Asia, Africa and Latin America.293 The country has since been supporting an increase in both existing categories.294 In 1997, Jordan claimed a permanent seat for the Arab Group.295

Jordan is opposed to an unregulated use of the veto power, and as a member of the Small Five and the ACT Group supports its limitation.296 The country also endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In 1994, Kazakhstan proposed an enlargement of the Security Council, in the course of which Germany and Japan as well as one representative of the group of developing countries should become new permanent members. In addition, the non-permanent membership of the Council should be increased by including three more states – one each from the three regional groups of developing countries (Asia, Africa and Latin America).297 Kazakhstan was also open to a new category of semi-permanent seats.298 In 2011, Kazakhstan supported an increase in the number of seats in the permanent membership category by six seats; two each for Africa and Asia, and one each for Latin America and the Caribbean and WEOG. The same proposal also included the addition of five new non-permanent seats, to be allocated to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Asia (two seats).299 In 2015, Kazakhstan endorsed the candidacy of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for permanent membership, alongside permanent African representation.300

The country wants to limit the veto in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide301 and is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Kenya

Kenya is a member of the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The country is in favour of an increased regional representation in both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council and stressed the need for Africa and Latin America to be represented in the permanent category.302 Initially, Kenya stated that it would welcome a regular re-qualification of permanent members by way of a review,303 and that the minimum number of seats in a reformed Security Council should be twenty-five.304 However, in recent years, Kenya has fully endorsed the position of the African Union, which demands an increase in the number of Security Council members to at least 26 as well as the allocation of a minimum of two permanent and five non-permanent seats to Africa.305

Kenya supports the abolition of the veto and suggests to limit it by restricting its use to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by requiring at least two vetoes cast, and by enumerating issues on which the veto cannot be applied.306

Latvia

Latvia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

Latvia advocates an expansion of the UN Security Council in both categories of membership.307 The Eastern European country is a co-sponsor of the G4 Draft308 and backs the aspirations of the G4 for a permanent seat.309 Latvia calls for an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States.310 A Security Council with 25 members is viewed as preferable by Latvia.311

With regard to the veto, Latvia holds the view that the right of veto should not be extended, but made more transparent in its current form.312 The country supports the ACT Code of Conduct, which aims at limiting the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the similar France/Mexico joint political declaration.313

Libya

Libya is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Libya has supported the African Common Position, which calls for two permanent seats as well as five non-permanent seats for Africa.314 The country also has supported permanent representation of the Arab states in the Security Council.315

Furthermore, the country demanded an abolition of the veto, or at least its restriction.316 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein is a member of the ACT Group, and was active in the Small Five Group.317

The principality supported in 1995 a limited increase in the number of members in both existing categories of membership.318 Later, Liechtenstein issued a proposal for long-term seats with renewable terms of eight or ten years with the possibility of immediate re-election. This proposal entailed the creation of six new long-term elected seats which should be allocated as follows: two to Africa, two to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean, and one to Western European and Other States.319 Liechtenstein’s proposal was also open to an additional two-year non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.320 New permanent seats were not envisaged in that proposal.321 According to Liechtenstein, the Security Council should be expanded to have at least twenty-one members.322

In line with the groups to which it belongs, Liechtenstein actively supports a limitation of the veto power323 and proposals seeking to restrict its use, such as the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Lithuania

Lithuania is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

Lithuania is in favour of an expansion of the membership in both categories,324 allocating one additional two-year non-permanent seat to the Eastern European Group.325 In 1999 Lithuania proposed to enlarge the Security Council to around 24 members, with new permanent seats for industrial and developing countries,326 reviewing its concrete proposal, made seven years earlier, that the Council could be expanded to include Japan, Germany and India as new permanent members. In addition, Lithuania supports the G4 draft resolution.327

With regard to the veto, Lithuania calls for a curtailment and eventual abolition of the right of veto.328 Permanent members of the Council should voluntary abstain from using the veto in cases of massive human rights violations, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.329 In this regard, the country welcomes the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the requirement of a veto cast by at least two permanent members in order to make the veto effective.330 It also endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Madagascar

Madagascar is a member of the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Madagascar supports the African Common Position331 and that of the Non-Aligned Movement.332

Furthermore, Madagascar is in favour of limiting the use of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until a complete abolition is possible and welcomes the idea that the use of the veto should require an explanation.333 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Malaysia

Malaysia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It participated in the Overarching Group.334

In 1992, Malaysia called for an increase in the number of non-permanent seats by eight, three of which should be allocated to Asia, three to Africa, and the remaining two to Latin America.335 A year later Malaysia called for an increase of ten, of which four should be distributed to Asia, four to Africa, and the remaining two to Latin America. Furthermore, the country was prepared to consider the possibility of creating semi-permanent seats without the right of veto that could be held for five or six years.336 In 1996, Malaysia issued an adapted proposal according to which eight new permanent seats should be added to the Security Council, two of which would be occupied by Germany and Japan, while the remaining six seats should be assigned to the three developing regions, namely two each to Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. These seats were intended by Malaysia to represent the respective regions, and their allocation to specific states was to be determined by a regional mechanism. In addition, Malaysia proposed the creation of seven new non-permanent seats, amounting to a total of 30 Security Council seats.337 More recently, Malaysia supported an expansion of both categories of membership, not further specifying whether the allocation of the additional permanent seats was to be determined by a regional mechanism.338

Malaysia supports an abolition of the veto.339 However, until the veto can be abolished, the country suggests the following measures: firstly, the establishment of general criteria for the identification of actions of a procedural nature, as stated in Art. 27, para. 2 of the Charter; secondly, the identification of questions of “vital importance”, as stated in General Assembly Resolution 267 (III);340 and, thirdly, the introduction of the requirement of a second veto in order to block a decision.341 In 2015, Malaysia even proposed the requirement of a third veto,342 and three years later it suggested that an effective veto should require a negative vote cast by at least two permanent members and supported by three non-permanent members.343 Malaysia further believes that the veto should be restricted in cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.344 If the veto power is maintained, Malaysia agrees to its extension to new permanent members.345 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Maldives

The Maldives is a member of the ACT Group, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The Maldives has recognized the necessity of enlarging the Security Council in both categories.346 It is strongly of the opinion that small and developing countries should also be able to participate in the global policy process, and demands a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States.347 With regard to new permanent members, the Maldives supports Japan348 and India349 due to their capacities and commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

According to the Maldives, the right of veto is a key issue, which needs to be addressed appropriately.350 Detailed positions towards its abolition, restriction or extension to new permanent members have not been issued by the Maldives, but the island state supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Malta

Malta was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement until 2004 when it joined the European Union, and is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.351

In accordance with the UFC position, Malta opposes an increase in the number of permanent members.352 Initially, it was open only to a maximum of ten new seats.353 More recently, Malta has aligned itself with the Uniting for Consensus Group and has supported that group’s proposal for the addition of non-permanent seats with longer terms.354

Malta rejects the right of veto and its extension to additional Council members. Initially, it considered the question of the veto to be best solved by its falling into disuse,355 but subsequently changed its opinion to support the proposals of the Non-Aligned Movement and UFC.356 Malta is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Mauritius

Mauritius is a member of the African Union, the L.69 Group,357 the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Southern African Development Community.

In 1993, Mauritius proposed an expansion-scheme, according to which the Security Council should be enlarged to twenty-one seats with a total of twelve permanent members. The new permanent members were not intended to have veto powers and should be elected in the following way: one from the Americas, two from Western Europe, two from Africa, and two from Asia. The number of non-permanent seats should be reduced to nine.358 Subsequently, Mauritius did not issue any new suggestions but supported the proposals of the groups of which it is a member.359

Mexico

Mexico is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.360

The country opposes an increase in the number of permanent members and instead supports the creation of additional non-permanent seats as well as longer-term seats or a more frequent rotation of seats.361 In 1995, Mexico issued a proposal which included a seat that would rotate between Germany and Japan every two years. Another new seat would be shared by the Eastern and Western European countries in the same way. Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean would each be allocated one additional seat.362 In 1996, Mexico raised serious questions about the practicability of regional permanent seats.363 Mexico is a founding member of UFC364 and has supported the group’s proposal for an increase in non-permanent seats with longer terms.365

Since 1993, Mexico has consistently sought to limit the veto.366 In this regard, the country has proposed to exclude actions under Chapters VI, VIII and XXX from the application of the right of veto, and to delete the Charter provisions requiring the permanent members to agree to every Charter amendment.367 In 2015, Mexico, together with France, proposed a voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to the effect that they would refrain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities.368 Mexico is also a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Monaco

Monaco is not a member of any group.

In 1994, Monaco proposed to increase the number of non-permanent members to twenty and to allocate each region four of the additional seats, with two seats to be held by regional powers for at least five years, and two by other countries for one year only.369 This position was adapted in 1996 when Monaco issued a new proposal: Of the ten new seats, five should be permanent seats, while the other five should constitute a new category of seats with longer terms, namely between six and twelve years. The ten non-permanent members should continue to be elected every two years.370 More recently, Monaco supported long-term seats with terms between eight to ten years.371 The principality is open to an expansion of Security Council membership to a number in the twenties.372

According to Monaco, the veto should be self-regulated by the permanent members.373 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Mongolia

Mongolia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Mongolia favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both existing cate- gories374 and supports the aspirations of Germany,375 Japan376 and India377 for permanent seats, as well as permanent membership for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.378 Mongolia is opposed to the creation of a third category of seats and the abolition of the ban on immediate re-election for non-permanent members.379 In 2009, Mongolia proposed to enlarge the Security Council to 24 or 25 members, with six new permanent members and four or five additional non-permanent members.380

Mongolia believes that the veto power should ultimately be abolished and that as a first step it should be restricted to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.381 It also supports the proposal to require a state that vetoed a draft resolution to explain its reasons to the General Assembly.382 In 1993, the country opposed the extension of the veto to new members383 but later changed its view. While still viewing the veto as anachronistic, Mongolia now prefers its extension to new permanent members as long as it continues to exist.384 Mongolia is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Netherlands

The Netherlands participated in the Overarching Group.385

In 1993, the Netherlands proposed to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council and to allocate each regional group one additional non-permanent seat. One seat in each regional group could be granted an immediate re-election.386 In 2015, the country supported an increase in permanent, non-permanent and long-term seats.387

The Netherlands encourages a voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by permanent members388 and endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration as well as the ACT Code of Conduct.

New Zealand

New Zealand is a member of the ACT Group.

In 1993, New Zealand was in favour of increasing the number of non-permanent seats and creating new permanent seats without the right of veto. The country was also open to the abolition of the ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members.389 New Zealand supported a limited increase in the number of members of the Security Council, which should not have more than twenty-one seats.390 Twenty years later, New Zealand reaffirmed its opposition to an extension of the right of veto to new members of the Council and underlined its support for an intermediate solution with longer-term seats.391 In 2005, New Zealand declared that any expansion of the Security Council must include Japan.392 In 2017, New Zealand proposed to raise the number of non-permanent members to fourteen, and to add six new longer-term seats without the right of veto, but with extended terms of up to five years as well as the possibility of immediate reelection.393

New Zealand is opposed to the veto, both in terms of current permanent members and future members,394 and supports its abolition and limitation.395 The country backs the French proposal for a voluntary self-restriction of the use of the veto396 and supports the ACT Code of Conduct.

Nigeria

Nigeria is a member of the African Union, the L.69 Group,397 the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In 1992, Nigeria stressed the need to increase the number of permanent members and to establish a permanent representation of Africa, stating that it was qualified to become a permanent member.398 One year later, Nigeria proposed to add two new permanent seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, one for Western Europe and one for Eastern Europe, and to increase the number of non-permanent seats by nine.399 In 1996, the country expressed its opposition to the creation of a third category of seats.400 Nigeria has been a strong supporter of the African Common Position.401

Until the veto is ultimately abolished, Nigeria believes that its use should be rational and selective and confined only to issues arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.402 If the veto is retained, it should be extended to new permanent members of the Council.403 The country is also in favour of the requirement to explain a veto in written form.404

North Macedonia (until 2019: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

North Macedonia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

North Macedonia supports an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council in both the permanent as well as the non-permanent category. In the non-permanent category, North Macedonia suggests a total number of 15 seats to be allocated in the following way: five to Africa, four to Asia, two to Western Europe, two to Eastern Europe, and two to Latin America.405

According to North Macedonia, a Security Council reform should go along with a limitation of the use of the veto.406 In this context, North Macedonia proposed a voluntary self-restriction of the permanent members.407 The country is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Norway

Norway is a member of the ACT Group and one of the Nordic Countries.408

Norway supports a balanced expansion of the Security Council in both categories of seats.409 In 1996, the country suggested to create five new permanent seats, namely one for Africa, one for Asia, one for Latin America and two for industrialized countries, as well as several additional non-permanent seats.410 According to Norway, the regional groups should decide about the allocation of these seats.411 Although Norway favours an increase in both permanent and non-permanent seats, it is open to an interim solution with a review clause.412 The country supports a balanced enlargement with a total number of Council members in the mid-twenties.413

Norway is opposed to an extension of the right of veto to new members414 and prefers that the current permanent members abstain from their veto rights. It favours a voluntary self-restraint of the permanent members in their use of the veto.415 To this end, Norway supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the French initiative.416

Pakistan

Pakistan is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Uniting for Consensus Group.417

Since 1993, Pakistan has opposed an addition of new permanent seats to the Council.418 The country endorses the Non-Aligned Movement’s focus on an expansion in the non-permanent category.419 In 2001, it proposed an expansion of only the non-permanent membership to the size of the Economic and Social Council, which would mean a total of 54 non-permanent members.420 Pakistan is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group421 and, in line with the group’s position, is open to the interim solution of removing the ban on immediate re-election,422 notwithstanding its preference for regular two-year non-permanent seats.423 As a strong supporter of the Uniting for Consensus Group, Pakistan continues to promote its first proposal of 2001.424 The country also expressed its openness to the creation of regional seats, notably with regard to the representation of the African continent,425 not the European Union.426

Pakistan considers the veto to be undemocratic427 and seeks to formally restrict it with a view to its eventual abolition.428

Panama

Panama is a member of the Central American Countries429 and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Initially, Panama supported an increase in the number of seats of both categories, but opposed the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.430 However, in 2007, it issued a proposal for the addition of six new seats, one of which should be allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean, one to Western European and Other States, two to Asia and two to Africa. These new members would be elected for terms of five years with the possibility of re-election. If a state were to be elected four times consecutively, it would acquire the status of a permanent member.431 In 2015, Panama proposed the following: “By the United Nations Centennial in 2045, we envision a Security Council consisting of 24 members, all on equal standing, elected for three-year terms, with the opportunity for consecutive re-election.” This should be reached in two stages: The first stage would introduce five semi-permanent seats without the right of veto to accommodate the G4 and one African country, as well as one additional non-permanent seat each for the Arab states and the Eastern European Group and two for Small Island Developing States. The second stage would initiate the three-year election cycles for all positions in the Security Council in 2030.432 In 2016, Panama updated its proposal to include a total of 26 seats.433

Panama favours the abolition of the veto and has opposed its extension to new members of any category.434 Until the abolition is feasible, the veto should be limited.435 Panama supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Peru

Peru is a member of the ACT Group and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Peru supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.436 In 1993, it suggested to create two new permanent seats for countries of global importance and to add one non-permanent seat for each developing region.437 Peru is in favour of establishing an intermediate category of seats with a long mandate, which would eventually become permanent.438 In Peru’s view, a number of Security Council seats in the mid-twenties would enable the Council to have a fair and equitable geographic distribution of seats.439

Peru seeks to eliminate the veto.440 As a first step, it favours a restriction of its use. The country supports the introduction of a double veto requirement and the elimination of the possibility of using the right of veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and in situations of gross violations of human rights.441 According to Peru, the veto should be restricted to decisions made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and permanent members should be obliged to explain and properly sustain their decision to exercise the veto in a public session of the Council. Peru further proposes that non-procedural decisions only require affirmative votes by two permanent members instead of all five of them.442 Peru supports the French and Mexican initiative as well as the ACT Code of Conduct.

Philippines

The Philippines is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 2002, 2004 and 2007, the Philippines expressed its support for an expansion in both categories of seats,443 and endorsed Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership in 2004.444 In its proposal of 2009, which it later reiterated, the Philippines promoted the creation of eight new permanent and eight new non-permanent seats, which should be assigned to the members of the regional groups on a rotational basis with five year terms and no veto powers for new permanent seats, and two year terms for non-permanent seats. The Philippines envisioned two permanent seats for the African Group, two for the Asian Group, two for the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one each for the Eastern European Group and WEOG. Of the new non-permanent seats, two should be allocated to the African Group, two to the Asian Group, two to the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and one each to the Eastern European Group and WEOG.445 After a term of five years, the respective regional group should decide whether a state should enjoy permanent status or whether it should be succeeded by another state. The Philippines proposed this scheme to be pursued until all regions have decided on the respective member states to serve as full permanent members.446 In its more recent statements, the Philippines returned to its original position, supporting an increase in both existing categories of membership.447 The country’s upper numerical limit for Security Council membership was thirty-one in 2009,448 and twenty-seven more recently.449

The Philippines opposes the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members until the issue is decided upon in a review.450 Viewing the abolition of the veto as desirable but unlikely,451 the Philippines seeks to limit its use to certain substantive matters, which do not include subjects such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, violations of human rights and terrorism. The country also proposes to provide the General Assembly as well as the Security Council with the power to override a veto.452 The Philippines supports the French-Mexican initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct.

Poland

Poland is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

Poland demands an augmented representation of Eastern European countries in the Security Council,453 namely in the form of one additional non-permanent seat.454 Early in the reform discussions, the country expressed its support for Germany and Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership in the Security Council as well as for an enhanced representation of developing countries in both categories of membership.455 In 1996 and 1997, Poland stated its willingness to expand the Security Council to a number of between twenty-one and twenty-five, respectively.456 The country is a co-sponsor of the G4 draft resolution of 2005.457

Poland supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct, both of which aim at restricting the veto.

Portugal

Portugal is a member of the ACT Group and the “Group of Ten”.458

The country supports an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories,459 but opposes the extension of the veto to new permanent members.460 In 1993, Portugal suggested an increase in non-permanent membership by one seat per region. Additional permanent seats should only be granted to countries that are in a position to assume the responsibilities entailed by that status and that could contribute to a reinforcement of the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.461 In 1997, Portugal stated that an essential condition for permanent membership should be the full acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.462 In the same year, the country expressed it support for Germany and Japan’s aspirations for a permanent seat,463 and twenty years later did the same with regard to Brazil and India.464 Portugal opposes special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries.465 It is a co-sponsor of the 2005 G4 draft resolution.466 According to Portugal, the upper numerical limit for the size of the Council should be twenty-five.467

Together with nine other states, Portugal proposed several limitations of the use of the veto.468

Qatar

Qatar is a member of the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Qatar supports an increase in the number of both permanent469 and non-permanent members.470 In 1993, the country issued a detailed proposal concerning Security Council reform, which included a rotating European seat to be shared by the three current European permanent members and Germany. Similarly, a rotational seat for Japan and India should be added. Qatar’s proposal envisioned a Security Council with a total of six permanent seats, of which two should be rotational seats for Europe and Asia, and the remaining four should be assigned to the United States of America, China, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, Qatar proposed to extend the number of non-permanent seats to fifteen; regional groups should also be able to hold a non-permanent seat.471

Qatar wishes the veto power to be curtailed and eventually eliminated.472 The veto should be limited to matters falling under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.473 It should not be expanded for any reason whatsoever.474 The country supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct.475

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.476

While being opposed to new permanent members,477 South Korea has expressed its openness to the creation of semi-permanent seats.478 With regard to regional seats, however, the country was more critical.479 The Republic of Korea favours a periodic review for all permanent members.480 As a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group,481 the Republic of Korea has consistently promoted the group’s common position.482

The country views the veto as being undemocratic and contrary to the principle of sovereign equality. However, it also believes that an abolition is not feasible for the time being.483 In 1996, Korea supported proposals designed to limit the veto power to Security Council decisions under Chapter VII;484 it subsequently expressed its support for the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct. The Asian country opposes an extension of the veto to new permanent members.485

Romania

Romania is a member of the Group of Eastern European States, and participated in the Overarching Group.486

The country favours an enlargement of the Security Council in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership.487 Romania supports Germany, Japan,488 Brazil and India as candidates for permanent membership, and promotes a permanent African representation.489 It firmly promotes the creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the Group of Eastern European States.490

With regard to the veto, Romania supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration as well as the ACT Code of Conduct, which both aim at restricting the veto informally.

Russian Federation

Although the Russian Federation belongs to the Group of Eastern European States, that group has consistently participated in the Security Council reform debate as the “Group of Eastern European States eligible for non-permanent membership of the Security Council”, thereby excluding Russia.491

At the time of the 49th session of the General Assembly, Russia supported the proposal for a limited expansion of the membership of the Security Council, namely up to twenty seats.492 In the ensuing years, Russia agreed to modestly increase the size of the Council, however, not exceeding the low twenties,493 while occasionally returning to its initial preference of a maximum of twenty seats.494 Three sessions later, Russia expressed its openness to a number of specific ideas which were on the negotiation table, such as an expansion of the Council in both categories and the idea of rotating membership, should this be the wish of the respective regional groups, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America.495 Russia stressed that any expansion should include both developed and developing countries.496 Throughout the reform discussions, Russia has expressed its endorsement for the aspirations for permanent membership of Germany,497 Japan,498 India499 and Brazil,500 as well as for a permanent African representation.501 However, more recently Russia has not explicitly expressed its support for the aspirations of the Group of Four. Further, the Russian Federation began to emphasize the need for a consensus-based support of Council reform in the UN.502 Russia also expressed its willingness to discuss an interim solution or intermediate approach.503

The Russian Federation rejects all restrictions of the right of veto of the permanent members, and maintains that the present status of the permanent members must remain unchanged.504 The question of extending the veto power to new permanent members should not be discussed until an agreement has been reached with regard to the specific composition of an enlarged Council. Russia therefore called for the discussion on the veto to be postponed to a later stage.505 Russia dismisses the France/Mexico joint political declaration aimed at limiting the veto in cases of mass atrocities.506

Samoa

Samoa is a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States.507

In 1993, Samoa supported a limited expansion of the non-permanent category and the addition of new permanent members without the right of veto.508 More recently, it expressed its support for the G4 draft resolution of 2005 and endorsed a permanent seat both for Germany and Japan.509 As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, Samoa demands one non-permanent seat for small states.510

Samoa disapproves of the concept that one permanent member can block the Council’s decisions and resolutions511 and therefore is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and a supporter of the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

San Marino

San Marino is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.512

San Marino strives to improve the access of small states to the Security Council513 and opposes an enlargement in the permanent category of membership.514 The country welcomes the creation of longer-term seats as a third category of membership.515 San Marino is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group516 and has constantly supported the positions of this group.517

San Marino is opposed to the veto, viewing it as contrary to the way modern international society is organized.518 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Singapore

Singapore is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and was one of the “Small Five”.519

Throughout the 1990s, Singapore supported an addition of new permanent seats with the right of veto to the Security Council, but suggested a set of criteria the respective states should meet.520 Although it supported the G4 draft resolution of 2005,521 Singapore has opposed the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members.522 Singapore initially did not endorse the creation of a new category of semi-permanent seats because this would make small countries third-class countries.523 However, in recent years, Singapore has expressed its openness to new categories of seats. If semi-permanent seats were to be created, Singapore would support a method according to which states would have to commit themselves to the category of seats to which they wish to belong for a certain period of time. This would make it easier for smaller states to obtain a non-permanent seat, as larger states would choose to compete for a semi-permanent seat.524 According to Singapore, small states must always be represented on the Security Council. The country suggests that if the Council does not include a small state, one of the Council members shall be appointed to act as a representative of the small states in consultation with the members of the Forum of Small States.525

In order to minimize a misuse of the veto, Singapore proposed in 1994 that at least two vetoes should be required to block a draft resolution after an expansion of the Council’s permanent membership.526 As a member of the Small Five, Singapore supported the idea of limiting the veto in the cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law.527 It has endorsed the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct. Furthermore, Singapore demands an explanation of a use of the veto to all member states.528

Slovakia

Slovakia is a member of the Group of Eastern European States.

Slovakia supports an enlargement of the Security Council membership in both the permanent and the non-permanent category.529 The country is also open to discuss the possibility of a third type of membership, provided that this would lead to more representation and efficiency.530 In an enlarged Council, Slovakia demands a better representation of the Eastern European states531 by way of an additional non-permanent seat for this group.532 Furthermore, the Arab533 and African534 presence in the Security Council should be strengthened. The Slovak Republic favours a maximum of twenty-five members of the Security Council.535

Slovakia views the veto as a crucial issue in the reform of the UN Security Council. Although the right of veto should be extended to new permanent members, its role and application should be reduced. The use of the right of veto should be limited, and Slovakia urges permanent members to provide a formal explanation when exercising it.536 Slovakia supports a limitation of the use of the veto to matters under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as an agreement about what matters are deemed procedural.537 The country promotes a veto culture of zero tolerance in mass atrocity situations. It endorses the France/Mexico joint political declaration and is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Slovenia

Slovenia is a member of the ACT Group, the Group of Eastern European States and the “Group of Ten”.538

In 1993, Slovenia advocated a reform of the system of regional groups in order to adapt the Security Council to the contemporary political reality. Like other Eastern European countries, Slovenia has supported an increase in the membership of both categories and emphasized the importance of adequate geographical representation in the Council. It also expressed the view that new permanent members should have a status equal to that of the current permanent members of the Council.539 In later statements, Slovenia actively supported the claim for two regional permanent seats for countries of the African Union, as proposed in the African Common Position.540 Furthermore, in 2005 Slovenia promoted the allocation of a permanent seat to the Eastern European region in case the number of permanent seats is increased.541 After initially opposing the creation of a third category of seats,542 Slovenia made the following proposal in 2008: There should be six additional permanent members representing all regions of the world. Further, a new category of non-permanent membership with a more frequent rotation should be created, while the remaining members would be elected according to the principle of equitable geographical distribution.543 This idea was further explained in 2010 and 2011.544 More recently, Slovenia, which is still in favour of expanding the Security Council in both existing categories, has advocated the creation of an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group as well as additional seats for Africa.545

Slovenia supports a limitation of the veto.546 As a member of the ACT group and a supporter of the France/Mexico joint political declaration, the country promotes a restriction of the veto in cases of atrocities and encourages maximum self-restraint in the use of the veto in all other cases.547

South Africa

South Africa is a member of the African Union, of IBSA, the Southern African Development Community (SADC),548 the L.69 Group549 and of the Non-Aligned Movement.

South Africa has not issued an own proposal for Security Council reform. It endorses the African Common Position.550 In 1997, South Africa stated that the number of seats should be at least twenty-six.551 In 2004, the country declared its readiness to serve as a permanent member.552 As a member of IBSA, South Africa endorses the aspirations of Brazil and India for permanent membership.553

With regard to the veto, South Africa claims that it should be extended to new permanent members.554 However, the country has voiced concerns over situations in which individual member states use the veto to serve their own narrow national interests while ignoring the overwhelming voice of the international community.555

Spain

Spain is a member of the Uniting for Consensus Group.556

In 1993, Spain supported a limited increase in the number of new permanent members without the right of veto and expressed its openness to an intermediate solution.557 Subsequently, in 1996, the country preferred an expansion only in the non-permanent category and presented ideas for the introduction of semi-permanent seats.558 It became a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group559 and has supported the group’s positions ever since.560 In 2008, the country spoke in favour of establishing mechanisms that guarantee the representation of transregional groups.561 Spain favours a moderate enlargement of the Council to a total of twenty-one to twenty-five members.562

In 1995 and 1996, Spain sought to limit the veto to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.563 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Sudan

Sudan is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1993, Sudan supported a permanent seat for the non-aligned states.564 The country has favoured regional seats565 and, in line with the African Common Position, it claims for Africa two permanent seats with the same powers as the current permanent members, as well as five non-permanent seats.566

Sudan is in favour of abolishing the right of veto567 and seeks to restrict its use to matters arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until a final abrogation is possible.568

Sweden

Sweden is a member of the ACT Group and one of the Nordic Countries.569

Being in favour of an equitable representation of all regions, Sweden supports an expansion of the Security Council in both categories of membership.570 With regard to new permanent members, Sweden opposes an extension of the right of veto571 and promotes the installation of a review clause.572 In 1993, Sweden also expressed its openness to new categories of seats, such as intra-regional rotations of members.573

Sweden argues for a gradual limitation of the veto, holding that its use should be formally or informally restricted until the decision-making process of the Security Council is factually veto free.574 As a member of the ACT Group, Sweden endorses the ACT Code of Conduct as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration for an informal restriction of the veto in situations of mass atrocities, crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.575

Switzerland

Switzerland is a leading member of the ACT Group and was a member of the “Small Five”.576

The country favours the introduction of a new category of intermediate seats577 and strongly opposes the extension of the veto power to new permanent members.578 Switzerland supports a periodic review579 and suggested that a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly should have the possibility to replace elected permanent members whose contributions to the work of the Organization were no longer fulfilling the expectations of the large majority of member states.580 With regard to size, Switzerland supports a reasonably small Council with an additional six or seven seats, amounting to a total of twenty-one to twenty-two seats.581

As one of the leading members of the Small Five and the ACT Group, the improvement of the working methods of the Council (including the veto) has been a top priority for Switzerland. It therefore asks the veto-wielding powers of the Security Council to explain their use of the veto582 and to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and in situations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.583 Switzerland endorses the ACT Code of Conduct as well as the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Syria

Syria is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In accordance with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, Syria stresses that an expansion of the Council in both existing categories of membership must ensure an equitable representation for developing countries.584 In 1993, it suggested to grant one permanent seat to each developing region.585 If permanent membership of the Council is increased, Syria demands a permanent seat for the Arab states to rotate among them according to the criteria used within the group.586 Furthermore, two non-permanent seats should also be allocated to the Group of Arab States.587 In 2016, Syria emphasized that the criteria of neutrality and objectivity must be observed when it comes to the election of states to the Security Council.588 With regard to size, Syria supports a Security Council of at least twenty-six members.589

The country strongly supports abolishing the veto or at least restricting its use.590

Thailand

Thailand is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but has declared that in the context of Security Council reform discussions it “belongs to no specific group”.591

In 1993, Thailand supported an increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members, and expressed its openness to an introduction of other categories of membership.592 In 2000, Thailand reiterated its support for an expansion in the existing categories, endorsing a permanent seat for Japan.593 Thailand is also open to an interim or intermediate solution.594 In 2014, it suggested to introduce longer-term seats that could be transformed into permanent seats if the countries occupying them demonstrated their respective “capacity and commitment”.595 According to Thailand, the numerical size of the Council should be in the mid-twenties.596

With regard to the veto, Thailand suggested that permanent members pledge publicly to use the veto only in regard to actions decided under Chapter VII of the Charter597 and to explain the rationale behind their decision when casting a veto.598 Thailand supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration and ACT Code of Conduct.599

Tunisia

Tunisia is a member of the African Union, the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The country supports an enlargement of both the permanent and the non-permanent membership of the Security Council.600 Tunisia advocates rotating permanent regional representation601 and claims two permanent seats602 and five non-permanent seats603 for Africa, in accordance with the African Common Position. Furthermore, Tunisia endorses permanent seats for Germany and Japan.604 The country also supports the position of the Group of Arab States.605

Tunisia is in favour of an abolition of the veto.606 If an abolition is not possible, the veto power should be limited to decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.607 Tunisia also supports the introduction of at least a double veto requirement.608 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Turkey

Turkey is a member of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the Uniting for Consensus Group.609

In 1993, Turkey proposed to raise the number of non-permanent seats to fifteen and to establish ten new semi-permanent seats rotating within groups of states according to predetermined objective criteria.610 Although the country later called for an enlargement only in the existing non-permanent category, it has also been open to the possibility of creating longer-term non-permanent seats.611 Turkey opposes an increase in the number of permanent members612 or an extension of the right of veto.613 It is a founding member of the Uniting for Consensus Group,614 the proposals of which it has endorsed ever since.615 Turkey has expressed its support for a Security Council with at least twenty-five members.616

Turkey favours an abolition of the veto and supports the initiatives to restrict its use in cases of mass atrocities.617 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct and supports the France/Mexico joint political declaration.

Ukraine

Ukraine is a member of the Group of Eastern European States and of the GU(U)AM Group.618

In 1993, Ukraine suggested the creation of a new, third category of membership, with seats being shared by two or three important states from each regional group which would take turns in serving on the Council.619 In 1995 and 1996, Ukraine suggested a Security Council with at least twenty-five members.620 At the same time, Ukraine developed the formula “2+8” for an enlargement of the Council. Two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan should be created,621 along with eight new non-permanent seats. The latter could be distributed as follows: four seats for Asian and African countries, two seats for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, one seat for WEOG, and one seat for the Eastern European countries.622 According to the Ukrainian plan, each of these eight non-permanent seats would rotate among three or four states so that states making a substantial contribution to the financing and peace-keeping activities of the UN, and countries representing the majority of the world’s population, could assume more responsibility in the Security Council.623 Ukraine is a co-sponsor of the G4 draft resolution of 2005.624 It also calls for an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group625 and has recently stated “that there is merit in exploring the option of allocating a non-permanent seat in the future Council to the Small Island Developing States”.626

Ukraine seeks to abolish627 or at the least restrict the use of the veto.628 As a first step, permanent members should voluntarily abstain from using the veto in cases of mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale.629 The veto should not be permitted in the event of acts of aggression against a UN member state.630 Furthermore, the use of a veto should require an explanation.631 Ukraine is a signatory of the France/Mexico joint political declaration and the ACT Code of Conduct.632

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Security Council, participated in the Overarching Group.633

In 1996, the United Kingdom expressed its support for a modest enlargement of the Security Council, endorsing Germany and Japan as new permanent members.634 Three years later, the United Kingdom elaborated its position, stating that an enlargement should aim at achieving a better representation for developing countries in the Council by granting them three permanent seats.635 In 2003, the United Kingdom announced its support for the aspirations of India and Brazil with regard to two of those seats.636 The UK did not propose a specific country for the African seat.637 The support of the United Kingdom for permanent seats for Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and “Africa” has been consistent ever since.638 While the United Kingdom supports a modest expansion in both categories of membership, it has repeatedly emphasized the importance of not compromising the Council’s efficiency and effectiveness.639 Recognizing that the reform process was in a deadlock, the United Kingdom expressed its openness to an interim solution, and together with France suggested the creation of a new category of seats with longer and renewable terms.640

The United Kingdom opposes any formal restrictions of the veto power.641 However, the United Kingdom has been vocal in its support for the ACT Code of Conduct, committing itself not to vote against credible Security Council draft resolutions that seek to prevent or respond to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes.642 The United Kingdom opposes an extension of the right of veto beyond the current permanent members.643

United States of America

The United States supports a modest expansion in both categories of membership, and has done so since the issue of Security Council reform was put on the agenda in 1992.644 While the United States initially supported a Japanese and a German permanent seat,645 it later withdrew its endorsement for Germany646 and instead expressed its support for an Indian seat.647 The United States repeatedly emphasized the need for an increase in the representation of Asia, Africa and Latin America, either through an addition of non-permanent648 or of permanent seats.649 The United States also expressed its openness to the possibility of a re-election of non-permanent members on several occasions.650 While in 1997 the United States considered the possibility of creating rotational permanent seats,651 it has since held that an expansion of permanent members must be country-specific, rather than region-based.652 Throughout the 1990’s, the United States insisted on an upper numerical limit of twenty653 to twenty-one654 members. It subsequently agreed to a number slightly higher than 21.655 Recently, the United States has reiterated its support for a moderate expansion of the Council in both categories,656 emphasizing that such an expansion should neither diminish the Council’s effectiveness nor its efficiency, and that permanent membership presupposes the ability and willingness of a country to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.657

In 1978, the United States considered possible a very modest voluntary limitation of the right of veto in certain areas of Security Council work, as defined by the permanent members themselves.658 However, throughout the reform debate since 1992, the country consistently opposed any alteration of the current veto structure, including an elimination or an extension659 of the right of veto.660

Uruguay

Uruguay is a member of the ACT Group.

The country supports an enlargement of both the permanent and the non-permanent category but opposes the extension of the veto power to new permanent members.661

Uruguay proposed that the veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly.662 As a member of the ACT Group, Uruguay supports the ACT Code of Conduct and the France/Mexico joint political declaration on limiting the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocities.663

Venezuela

Venezuela is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Venezuela favours an enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council and suggests increasing the size of the Council to approximately twenty-six members.664

Venezuela wishes to abolish the veto but supports its extension to all members of the Security Council (both permanent and non-permanent) until this goal can be achieved. Furthermore, the veto should be limited to specific cases decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A requirement of two vetoes to block a decision should be established.665

Yemen

Yemen is a member of the Group of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In 1993, Yemen supported an increase in the membership of the Security Council as well as a review of its permanent membership and suggested the inclusion of regional organizations in the non-permanent membership through representation by the current chairperson or president of their supreme organs.666 More recently, Yemen refrained from issuing own proposals, instead aligning itself with the positions of the Group of Arab States and the Non-Aligned Movement. The country acknowledged, however, the aspirations of Germany and Japan to become permanent members.667

Yemen also expressed its support for the abolition of the right of veto.668 It is a signatory of the ACT Code of Conduct.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a member of the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Southern African Development Community.

In 1995, Zimbabwe expressed its wish to abolish the permanent category of membership in the long term and to subject all members of the Security Council to election, admitting that such a proposal would not be able to gain the support of the current permanent members.669 The country claims that Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean should each have at least two permanent seats with the same rights and privileges as held by the present permanent members. Additional non-permanent seats should also be allocated to each of those regions.670 Zimbabwe’s position is in accordance with the African Common Position.671

Zimbabwe supports an abolition of the veto672 or at least a limitation of its use, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which aims to limit the veto to matters decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.673

1

16 December, 1999, → 4.3.4.

2

26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.2.

3

16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.4; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.32; 8 November 2011, → 5.2.2.3.11.

4

13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.5.

5

See, e.g., the statements of 8 November 2011, → 5.2.2.3.11.

6

13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.5 and 3.4.3.11; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.37.

7

For more details see 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

8

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17.

9

7 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.45; 1 October 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.20, pp. 7-10.

10

7 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.45; 1 October 1997, UN Doc. A/52/PV.20, pp. 7-10.

11

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

12

See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22. Argentina subsequently confirmed this position. For a recent statement, see, e.g., 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.41, pp. 28-29.

13

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2.

14

18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12.

15

21 September 2011, → 5.2.1.2.7 and 5.4.2.5.

16

12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.2.10.

17

21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11. This position was reaffirmed later; see, e.g., the statements of 1 May 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.25) and 30 October 2015 (→ 5.2.2.2.26).

18

21 September 2011, → 5.4.2.5.

19

16 November 2000, → 4.4.3.12; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.15.

20

31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.15.

21

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

22

20 July 1993, → 3.3.1.

23

27 March 1996, → 3.3.23; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35.

24

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

25

27 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.34.

26

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

27

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2.

28

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

29

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

30

23 October 2015, ACT Group, Code of Conduct, → 5.4.4.25.

31

30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.21.

32

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

33

23 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.10; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.57.

34

18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.4.3.

35

See, e.g., the statements of 13 November 1995, → 3.3.16; 4 December 1997, → 3.3.40.

36

4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.57.

37

13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.3.6; 23 September 2004, → 4.2.2.3.24.

38

4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.47.

39

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

40

15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.6.

41

15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.3.20; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.1.3.5; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.3.6. Note that, on 15 November 2012, Belarus stated: “We take note of the underrepresentation of the Eastern European Group among the non-permanent members of the Security Council and reaffirm our stated position on enhancing the representation of that Group among the permanent members of the Council” (15 November 2012, UN Doc. A/67/PV.38). However, Belarus never before and never since spoke in favour of a new permanent seat for the Eastern European Group.

42

16 November 2000, → 4.3.14.

43

16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.8; cf. 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.21.

44

15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.8; 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.21; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.3.6.

45

15 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.8.

46

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

47

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

48

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

49

18 September 1995, → 3.3.14; 27 March 1997, → 3.3.35; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

50

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

51

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

52

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

53

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

54

4 October 1993, → 3.3.2.

55

13 October 1994, → 3.3.10.

56

4 October 1993, → 3.2.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.8.

57

4 October 1993, → 3.2.3.2.

58

13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.8.

59

18 September 1995, → 3.2.3.12 and 3.3.14.

60

3 July 1996, → 3.2.3.23.

61

1 February 1996, OEWG, → 3.2.3.20.

62

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

63

The members of the Caribbean Community, including Belize, submitted their positions for the Framework Document (→ 5.1.12) and the 2015 Negotiation Text (→ 5.1.13) as a group under their respective country names and not under the name of the community. However, these positions were recorded in the present work as those of the Caribbean Community, and not as positions of every single state.

64

7 December 1993, → 3.4.3.6; 18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12.

65

4 October 1993, → 3.4.3.5.

66

7 December 1993, → 3.4.3.6; 3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28.

67

3 July 1996, → 3.4.3.28.

68

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

69

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

70

30 September 1996, → 3.2.1.1.44.

71

13 November 2009, → 5.2.1.2.5; 3 March 2010, Proposal, → 5.2.2.2.16; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

72

3 March 2010, Proposal, → 5.2.2.2.16; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

73

10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5.

74

30 September 1996, → 3.4.3.30.

75

See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

76

See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.9; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.1.1.57; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.27.

77

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

78

21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27.

79

26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23.

80

16 December 1999, → 4.3.5; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

81

4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.4.1.

82

29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.4.9; 24 March 2009, → 5.2.2.4.2.

83

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.9 and 4.4.3.7; 16 December 2002, → 4.4.2.9.

84

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

85

30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.11.

86

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

87

30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.11.

88

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

89

27 March 1997, → 3.3.35.

90

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3; 17 November 2000, → 4.4.4.12.

91

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

92

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

93

13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.13.

94

16 December 1999, → 4.2.3.1; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29.

95

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.2.

96

30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.35; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.5.

97

30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.35; 16 December 1999, → 4.4.3.8.

98

12 November 2007, → 4.4.4.20.

99

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.45.

100

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12, 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.11.

101

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.3.1.

102

20 July 1993, → 3.3.1.

103

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

104

23 November 1993, → 3.4.4.1.

105

26 June 1998, → 4.4.2.1.

106

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.47; Chile confirmed this position on 8 November 2017 in UN Doc. A/72/PV.43, p. 1.

107

20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.3.7; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.16.

108

20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.3.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20.

109

See, e.g., the statements of 14 November 1995, → 3.2.3.18; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.17; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8; 1 February 2018, → 5.2.3.18; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20.

110

18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.17.

111

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20.

112

4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 14 October 2002, → 4.2.3.6; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.20.

113

4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.28; 4 March 2010, Position of China on the Security Council reform, → 5.2.3.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.16.

114

23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2.

115

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

116

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

117

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.2.5 and 3.2.2.2.9; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

118

4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22.

119

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11 and 5.4.3.6.

120

13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.9; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

121

13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.2.2.2.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

122

16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.14; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.3.35.

123

13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.12; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22; 18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26; 13 November 2009, → 5.4.3.4; 21 January 2010, Position of the UfC Group, → 5.4.3.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

124

4 December 1997, → 3.4.2.22; 18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.2.10 and 5.4.3.4; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

125

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2.

126

18 November 2008, → 4.4.3.26.

127

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.12.

128

See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

129

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

130

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

131

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 24 September 1996, → 3.2.2.1.7.

132

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2.

133

24 June 2005, → 4.2.1.2.10.

134

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

135

See, e.g., the statement of 8 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.12 and 5.2.2.2.41.

136

14 October 2002, → 4.4.2.8.

137

11 December 2006, → 4.4.4.19.

138

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2.

139

30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.21; 8 November 2017, → 5.4.4.60.

140

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.50; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.4; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

141

30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.50.

142

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.4.

143

28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

144

16 December 1999, → 4.4.2.4.

145

30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.38.

146

5 May 2015, Framework document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

147

23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.2.1.

148

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.46; 18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6.

149

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5.

150

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5; 30 October 2015, → 5.3.20.

151

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

152

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.3.5. In 2015, Cuba changed this to “approximately 25 or 26” (30 October 2015, → 5.3.20).

153

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41. In 2005, Cuba suggested two to three permanent seats for developing countries of these regions (11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.46).

154

20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.17.

155

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41.

156

20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1.

157

See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3, 18 February 2010, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.41; and 20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.17.

158

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

159

11 November 2005, → 4.4.3.23.

160

18 February 2010, Proposals, → 5.4.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

161

4 March 2010, Position paper, → 5.2.1.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.14.

162

11 October 1995, → 3.2.3.15; 25 September 1999, → 4.2.1.3.3; 22 September 2005, → 4.2.3.13; 4 March 2010, Position paper, → 5.2.1.3.4; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.14.

163

11 October 1995, → 3.4.2.16.

164

See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

165

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2.

166

18 September 1995, → 3.3.14; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

167

4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

168

10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11.

169

4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11.

170

4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.3.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text (Rev.3), → 5.1.8.

171

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2.

172

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

173

4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.11; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

174

4 March 2010, Position on Reform of the United Nations Security Council, → 5.4.4.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

175

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6.

176

1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.10.

177

1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51.

178

1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.51; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.10.

179

For a more recent statement, see 7 November 2016, pp. 4-5.

180

1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.11.

181

1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.40; 1 October 2012, → 5.4.2.6.

182

27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.1.8 and 3.2.2.3.3.

183

14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.18.

184

12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.37; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.40; 12 November 2009, → 5.4.3.3; 21 February 2012, → 5.2.2.3.13.

185

18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.40; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.2.3.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.22.

186

14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.12; 24 September 2004, → 4.2.2.3.25.

187

12 November 2009, → 5.3.3.

188

11 November 2010, → 5.4.2.4; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.3.22.

189

14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

190

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1.

191

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1.

192

1 November 1996, → 3.2.1.1.53.

193

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

194

14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

195

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.42.

196

1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.42; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.49.

197

See, e.g., the statements of 31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.1.19; 23 September 2003, → 4.2.1.1.23; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 11 June 2009, → 5.2.1.1.3; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.19; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25.

198

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.22.

199

See, e.g., the statements of 13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.22; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.29; 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.61.

200

13 October 1994, → 3.3.9; 30 October 1996, → 3.3.33.

201

5 December 1997, → 3.3.42; 16 December 1999, → 4.3.6.

202

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.10.

203

March 1996, Non-Paper, → 3.2.1.1.32; 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.61; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.10; 16 March 2009, → 5.4.4.1.

204

31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.1.19.

205

12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.1.50; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25.

206

See, e.g., the statements of 12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.1.50; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.2.2.17; 8 November 2011, → 5.2.1.1.14; 7 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.19; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.25; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.47.

207

13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.4.4.

208

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

209

27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, Joint Statement, → 5.2.1.1.8.

210

See, e.g., the statements of 16 December 1999, → 4.4.1.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.14.

211

24 September 2013, → 5.4.4.11; 4 October 2013, → 5.4.4.12; 7 November 2013, → 5.4.4.14; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.4.66.

212

28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.18.

213

30 September 2015, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, → 5.4.4.21.

214

14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25.

215

20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.3.7.

216

20 December 1999, → 4.3.11.

217

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13.

218

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

219

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13.

220

See, e.g., the statement of 1 May 2018, Joint Statement by the G4 Countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) delivered by H.E. Ambassador Koro Bessho at the Informal Plenary Meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform.

221

Jonas von Freiesleben, Member States Discuss Security Council Reform Again: A Never-Ending Process?, Center for UN Reform Education, 2008.

222

23 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.2.

223

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

224

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.17; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33.

225

28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.3.14.

226

21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

227

10 May 1996, → 3.3.26; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.30.

228

29 October 1996, → 3.3.30.

229

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

230

23 May 1996, → 3.2.1.1.42; 2 July 1996, → 3.2.1.1.43.

231

21 April 1998, → 4.4.4.1; 22 April 1998, → 4.4.4.2; 31 March 2000, → 4.4.4.8.

232

25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.33; 23 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.39; 23 May 1996, → 3.4.3.23; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 26 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, → 5.2.2.4.4.

233

4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9.

234

5 December 1997, → 3.2.2.3.33; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.10; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.3.29.

235

4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.36.

236

14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.19; 30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.36.

237

See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

238

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

239

8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.21.

240

20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50.

241

20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50.

242

14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.3.7; 4 December 1997, → 3.4.3.50.

243

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

244

8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.21; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.33.

245

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

246

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.46.

247

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

248

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation, Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.46.

249

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

250

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

251

18 September 1995, → 3.3.14.

252

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

253

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

254

18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.13.

255

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

256

14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

257

See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 21 February 2012, Intergovernmental Negotiation, → 5.2.1.1.16.

258

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.19; 27 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8.

259

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.19.

260

21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27.

261

26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23.

262

27 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8; 9 March 2016, → 5.2.1.1.30.

263

23 March 1999, → 4.2.1.1.3.

264

25 March 1996, → 3.2.2.4.8; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7-8 March 2017, India on behalf of the Group of Four, → 5.2.2.4.4.

265

23 March 1999, → 4.4.3.2.

266

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

267

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

268

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

269

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.40; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.54.

270

12 July 2005, → 4.2.3.12.

271

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

272

26 July 1993, → 3.4.3.3.

273

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.40; 6 February 2018, → 5.4.4.61.

274

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

275

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

276

27 September 1991, → 3.2.1.1.1; 24 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.3.

277

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2; 29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8.

278

29 June 1994, Italy, → 3.2.2.2.8; 2 July 1997, → 3.2.2.2.26.

279

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2.

280

13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.7; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20; 19 February 1999, → 4.2.1.2.2.

281

29 June 1994, → 3.2.1.2.4; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.7.

282

23 September 1998, → 4.2.1.2.1; 19 February 1999, → 4.2.1.2.2; 31 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.3. Italy had already mentioned the idea of an EU seat in September 1992, → 4.2.1.2.1.

283

31 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.3.

284

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

285

3 September 2009, → 5.2.2.2.7; 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36.

286

30 October 2015, Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, → 5.3.18.

287

29 June 1994, → 3.2.2.2.8; May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.20; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.39; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.1.2.6; 1 May 2015, → 5.2.2.2.25; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.29; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.36.

288

29 June 1994, → 3.4.3.8.

289

See, e.g., the statements of 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.48; 21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27.

290

21 September 2004, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Joint Press Statement, → 4.2.1.1.27.

291

22 March 1999, → 4.4.4.5.

292

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

293

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

294

27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.31; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.45.

295

3 October 1997, → 3.2.2.3.31.

296

17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 23 October 2015, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, → 5.4.4.25.

297

23 March 1994, → 3.2.1.1.16.

298

23 March 1994, → 3.2.2.2.6.

299

23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

300

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

301

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

302

14 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.24; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.21.

303

14 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.24; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.10; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.21.

304

14 October 1994, → 3.3.13; 13 November 1995, → 3.3.17; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.32.

305

20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.9; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30. See also 7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.42, pp. 23-24.

306

29 October 1996, → 3.4.3.33.

307

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

308

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

309

12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.22.

310

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.3.18; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.13.

311

11 July 2005, → 4.3.18.

312

12 December 2006, → 4.2.1.3.22.

313

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.42.

314

4 October 1991, → 3.4.2.2; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

315

See, e.g., the statement of 7 November 2016, UN Doc. A/71/PV.43, pp. 14-15.

316

26 July 1993, → 3.4.2.4.

317

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

318

6 October 1995, → 3.2.1.1.27.

319

26 February 2010, Elements for a General Assembly Resolution on the Enlargement of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; also reiterated in 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

320

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.31.

321

26 February 2010, Elements for a General Assembly Resolution on the Enlargement of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.2.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.37; 29 January 2019 → 5.2.2.2.43.

322

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.31.

323

17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3; 22 June 2009 → 5.4.4.4.

324

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6.

325

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

326

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6.

327

28 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.4; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.38.

328

28 September 1992, → 3.4.3.1; 16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.6.

329

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

330

28 September 1992, → 3.4.3.1; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

331

17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.16; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.2.3.18; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

332

17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.16.

333

17 November 2000, → 4.4.3.13.

334

von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above.

335

23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1.

336

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.3.2; cf. 23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1.

337

3 July 1996, → 3.2.2.3.19.

338

12 November 2014, → 5.2.1.1.24.

339

23 November 1992, → 3.2.1.3.1; 20 July 1993, → 3.4.2.3; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.2.11; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018 → 5.4.3.15.

340

14 April 1949, → 2.1.

341

13 November 1995, → 3.4.3.15.

342

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

343

20 November 2018 → 5.4.3.15.

344

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.15.

345

12 November 2014, → 5.4.3.12.

346

23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.5; 9 October 1995, → 3.2.3.13; 30 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.32; 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.53; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.11; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.21.

347

12 November 2014, → 5.2.1.3.7; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.11.

348

30 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.32; 13 November 2009, → 5.2.3.3.

349

13 November 2009, → 5.2.3.3.

350

23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.5.

351

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

352

13 October 1994, → 3.2.3.9; 26 September 1997, → 3.2.1.3.15; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.30.

353

13 October 1994, → 3.3.11.

354

See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

355

1 November 1996, → 3.4.4.4.

356

See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.4.3.22.

357

14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

358

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1.

359

See, e.g., the statements of 14 July 2005, → 4.2.2.3.30; 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

360

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

361

E.g. 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.10; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.39.

362

18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.16.

363

22 April 1996, → 3.2.3.22.

364

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

365

10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.39.

366

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 13 October 1994, → 3.4.3.10; 13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 26 May 2010, First Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.6; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

367

13 May 1996, → 3.4.3.24.

368

30 September 2015, Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities, → 5.4.4.21.

369

20 May 1994, → 3.2.2.2.7.

370

17 June 1996, → 3.2.2.2.22.

371

5 March 2010, Memorandum on the Security Council Reform, → 5.2.2.2.17; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

372

5 March 2010, Memorandum on the Security Council Reform, → 5.3.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

373

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation text, → 5.1.13.

374

4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.15; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.40.

375

10 October 1995, → 3.2.3.14; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55.

376

10 October 1995, → 3.2.3.14; 12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55.

377

12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55.

378

12 October 2004, → 4.2.1.1.34; 14 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.55; 12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4.

379

14 November 2007, → 4.2.2.4.3.

380

12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4.

381

20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.11; 12 October 2004, → 4.4.3.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.3.13.

382

20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.11.

383

4 October 1993, → 3.2.2.1.3.

384

12 November 2009, → 5.2.1.1.4 and 5.4.4.5; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.40.

385

von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above.

386

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.1.

387

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

388

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 28 September 2015, → 5.4.4.19.

389

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; the position was reaffirmed on 8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.23.

390

20 July 1993, → 3.3.1.

391

8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.23.

392

10 November 2005, → 4.2.3.14.

393

3 April 2017, → 5.2.2.2.35.

394

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.3.14.

395

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1.

396

8 November 2013, → 5.4.4.15.

397

See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

398

30 September 1992, → 3.2.1.1.5.

399

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

400

1 November 1996, → 3.2.2.4.11.

401

16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.15; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.2.3.31. For a newer statement supporting the African Common Position, see UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 25-26.

402

1 November 1996, → 3.4.3.39.

403

1 November 1996, → 3.2.2.3.28; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.15 and 4.4.4.9.

404

16 November 2000, → 4.4.4.9.

405

5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.3.18.

406

5 December 1997, → 3.4.3.52.

407

24 August 1998, → 4.4.4.4.

408

See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

409

Cf. the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35; 5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform, → 5.2.1.1.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37.

410

25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35.

411

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.3.1; 25 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.35.

412

5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council Reform, → 5.2.1.1.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

413

5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.3.13; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

414

5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.4.4.7.

415

5 March 2010, Position of Norway on the UN Security Council reform, → 5.4.4.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

416

30 September 2015, → 5.4.4.23.

417

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

418

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.2.2, 14 October 1994, → 3.2.1.2.6, 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.9, 4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1, 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11.

419

14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.9; 18 June 2001, → 4.2.1.3.12.

420

18 June 2001, → 4.2.1.3.12 and 4.3.15.

421

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1.

422

26 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.4; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.2.6; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.2.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11.

423

4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1.

424

4 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.1; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11.

425

12 November 2007, → 4.2.2.3.38; 4 March 2009, → 5.2.2.3.2; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.2.11.

426

4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.29.

427

20 December 1999, → 4.4.2.5.

428

20 July 1993, → 3.4.3.2; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.2.5; 21 July 2005, → 4.4.3.22; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

429

See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, Honduras on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.2.1.6 and 3.4.2.13; 4 December 1997, El Salvador on behalf of the Central American Countries, → 3.2.1.1.58 and 3.4.3.50.

430

14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6.

431

8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7.

432

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

433

7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.12.

434

14 October 1994, → 3.2.2.1.6; 13 November 1995, → 3.4.2.18; 8 February 2007, → 4.2.2.2.7.

435

8 February 2007, → 4.4.2.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

436

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 2 March 2010, Position on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, → 5.2.1.1.9; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

437

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6.

438

2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.2.1.1.9; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.9.

439

2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.3.7.

440

2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.4.3.8; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

441

2 March 2010, Position …, → 5.4.3.8; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

442

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

443

14 October 2002, → 4.2.1.1.21; 27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.30; 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.54.

444

27 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.30.

445

14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals concerning Equitable Representation on and Increase of Membership in and on Working Methods of the Security Council, → 5.2.2.3.1; 8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

446

8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7.

447

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39.

448

8 December 2009, Resolution, → 5.2.2.3.7; see also 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

449

7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39 and 5.3.23.

450

7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.39.

451

14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals concerning Equitable Representation on and Increase of Membership in and on Working Methods of the Security Council, → 5.4.3.1; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.2.13 and 5.4.4.50.

452

14 February 2009, Specific Reform Proposals …, → 5.4.3.1; 8 December 2009, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.3.5; 10 May 2010, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

453

29 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.9; 12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.9; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

454

30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.9.

455

29 October 1996, → 3.2.1.3.9; 12 June 1997, → 3.2.1.3.13.

456

29 October 1996, → 3.3.31; 12 June 1997, → 3.3.36.

457

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

458

Cf., e.g., the statements of 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35, and 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

459

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 8 November 2013, → 5.2.1.1.20.

460

8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5.

461

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

462

4 December 1997, → 3.2.3.31.

463

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

464

8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5.

465

27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54; 8 November 2013, → 5.2.2.4.3; 8 November 2017, → 5.2.2.4.5.

466

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

467

27 March 1997, → 3.3.35; 6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

468

25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

469

27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3; 3 October 1995, → 3.2.1.1.26; 30 September 1999, → 4.2.1.1.5; 20 July 2006, → 4.2.1.1.48.

470

27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3; 2 October 1997, → 3.2.1.3.16; 20 July 2006, → 4.2.1.1.48.

471

27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3.

472

18-20 October 1995, Non-Aligned Movement, Cartagena de Indias Summit, Final Document, → 3.4.2.17.

473

2 October 1997, → 3.4.3.45.

474

14 November 2007, → 4.4.2.13.

475

7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.56.

476

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

477

See, e.g., the statements of 27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.2.3; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.8; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.2.13; 24 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.3; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9.

478

22 May 1996, → 3.2.2.2.21; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.25; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9.

479

7 May 1997, → 3.2.3.26.

480

26 April 1996, → 3.2.1.2.11.

481

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

482

See, e.g., the statements of 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1, and 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.9.

483

13 November 1995, → 3.4.3.13.

484

22 May 1996, → 3.4.3.25.

485

27 August 1993, → 3.2.1.2.3; 13 November 1995, → 3.2.1.2.8; 26 April 1996, → 3.2.1.2.11.

486

von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above.

487

4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.3.9.

488

4 October 1993, → 3.2.1.1.9.

489

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

490

30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.3.10; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

491

May 1998, → 4.2.1.3.1 and 28 February 2005, → 4.2.1.3.16.

492

14 October 1994, → 3.3.12; and one session later on 15 November 1995, → 3.3.21.

493

2 March 2010, Non-Paper, → 5.3.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.3.21; 7 November 2017, → 5.3.26; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.3.21.

494

7 November 2013, → 5.3.17; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.12.

495

See, e.g., the statements of 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60, and 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.12.

496

See, e.g., the statements of 5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.3.5; 16 October 2002, → 4.2.3.7; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

497

5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60 and 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

498

5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.60 and 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

499

See, e.g., the statements of 22 June 1999, → 4.2.1.1.4; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.12; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.3.4; 31 October 2001, → 4.2.3.5; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

500

14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

501

14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.24.

502

18 November 2008, → 4.2.3.16; 9 November 2011, → 5.2.3.6.

503

See, e.g., the statements of 2 March 2010, Non-Paper, → 5.2.2.2.15; 14 April 2015, → 5.2.3.10; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.12; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.30; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.3.17; 27 February 2019, → 5.2.3.22.

504

See, e.g., the statements of 14 October 1994, → 3.4.1.1; 22 May 1996, → 3.4.1.6; 24 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.1.1; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.1.4; 16 October 2002, → 4.4.1.8; 12 July 2005, → 4.4.1.9; 20 July 2006, → 4.4.1.9; 2 March 2010, → 5.4.1.1; 9 November 2011, → 5.4.1.3; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.6; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.1.8; 6 February 2018, → 5.4.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.1.10; 27 February 2019, → 5.4.1.11.

505

2 March 2010, → 5.4.1.1.

506

2 September 2015, Press conference on the Security Council programme of work, → 5.4.1.4.

507

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1.

508

26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2.

509

12 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.41.

510

26 January 2009, Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, → 5.2.1.3.1.

511

26 July 1993, → 3.4.3.3.

512

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

513

14 October 1994, → 3.2.3.11.

514

4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.16; 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.6; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.2.8.

515

9 November 2011, → 5.2.2.2.19; 21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1.

516

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

517

For a recent statement, see 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 15-16.

518

16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.6.

519

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3.

520

9 February 1994, → 3.2.1.1.15 and 3.4.3.7; 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

521

22 February 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.8.

522

10 April 2008, OEWG, → 4.2.2.1.5; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.10.

523

9 February 1999, OEWG, → 4.2.2.4.1.

524

22 February 2007, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.8; 10 April 2008, OEWG, → 4.2.2.2.16.

525

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

526

9 February 1994, → 3.4.3.7.

527

3 November 2005, Draft Resolution of the S-5, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3; for Singapore alone: 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

528

3 November 2005, Draft Resolution of the S-5, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), Annex to a letter dated 10 May 2010 from Zahir Tanin, → 5.4.4.3; for Singapore alone: 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

529

31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.19.

530

7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15.

531

31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

532

7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.19.

533

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

534

7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.15.

535

31 October 2001, → 4.2.1.3.14; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.3.24.

536

23 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.3.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.13; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12.

537

23 March 1999, OEWG, → 4.4.3.3; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.4.13.

538

Cf. e.g. 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54 and 3.3.35; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

539

24 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.11.

540

30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.22.

541

11 November 2005, → 4.2.1.3.19.

542

18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.4.3; 27 March 1997, → 3.2.1.1.54.

543

24 September 2008, → 4.2.1.3.25.

544

9 February 2010, → 5.2.2.2.12; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

545

7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.20.

546

18 September 1995, → 3.4.3.12; 25 June 1998, → 4.4.4.3.

547

7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.51.

548

16 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.7.

549

See 14 September 2007, → 4.2.1.1.51.

550

5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.59; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

551

5 December 1997, → 3.3.41.

552

26 September 2004, → 4.2.1.1.29.

553

26 September 2014, Joint Communiqué, → 5.2.1.1.23.

554

5 December 1997, → 3.2.1.1.59; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

555

14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.21.

556

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

557

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.1.

558

28 February 1996, → 3.2.2.2.19; see also 16 November 2000, → 4.2.1.2.4.

559

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

560

30 October 2015, → 5.2.2.2.28. For a more recent statement supporting the Uniting for Consensus Group, see 7 November 2017, UN Doc. A/72/PV.42, pp. 9-10.

561

19. November 2008, → 4.2.2.3.42.

562

13 November 1995, → 3.3.15.

563

13 November 1995, → 3.2.3.16 and 3.4.3.14.

564

26 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.7.

565

30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.27.

566

See, e.g., the statements of 1 November 2001, → 4.2.2.3.19; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; 12 November 2010, → 5.2.2.3.9.

567

26 July 1993, → 3.4.2.4; 1 November 2001, → 4.4.2.7.

568

5 December 1997, → 3.4.3.51.

569

See, e.g., the statement of 18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25.

570

18 September 1995, → 3.2.1.1.25; 22 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.38; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.1.4; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.37.

571

26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2; 4 December 1997, → 3.2.1.2.14; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1; 11 November 2005, → 4.2.2.1.3.

572

22 April 1996, → 3.2.1.1.38; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1.

573

26 July 1993, → 3.2.2.1.2.

574

4 December 1997, → 3.4.4.5; 21 September 1999, → 4.4.3.4; 11 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.1.

575

20 October 2015, → 5.4.4.24.

576

April 2009, Position of the S-5 on the UN Security Council reform (S-5 Elements for Reflection), → 5.4.4.3.

577

14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13; 17 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.2; 12 June 2009, → 5.2.2.2.6.

578

See, e.g., the statements of 11 October 2004, → 4.2.1.2.9; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.1.2.12; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13; 17 March 2009, → 5.2.1.2.2.

579

11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.2.11; 11 December 2006, → 4.2.2.2.5; 14 December 2007, → 4.2.2.2.13.

580

11 July 2005, → 4.2.1.2.11.

581

12 June 2009, → 5.3.2.

582

11 October 2004, → 4.4.4.15; 3 November 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2009, → 5.4.4.2; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 12 May 2012, → 5.4.4.10.

583

11 July 2005, → 4.4.4.16; 3 November 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.4.4.17; 17 March 2006, → 4.4.4.18; 17 March 2009, → 5.4.4.2; 14 April 2011, Draft Resolution, → 5.4.4.9; 12 May 2012, → 5.4.4.10.

584

14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22.

585

23 November 1993, → 3.2.2.3.4.

586

23 November 1993, → 3.2.2.3.4; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.2.3.8; 14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22.

587

14 October 2003, → 4.2.2.3.22.

588

7 November 2016, → 5.2.3.14.

589

20 December 1999, → 4.3.7.

590

23 November 1993, → 3.4.2.7; 20 December 1999, → 4.4.3.9 and 4.2.2.3.8; 14 October 2003, → 4.4.3.19.

591

30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.11.

592

23 November 1993, → 3.2.3.3; reiterated on 30 October 2015, → 5.2.3.11.

593

17 November 2000, → 4.2.1.1.18.

594

7 November 2013, → 5.2.2.2.22; 12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.2.24; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.34; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.38.

595

12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.2.24; see also 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.2.34.

596

7 November 2016, → 5.3.22; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.2.2.38.

597

17 November 2000, → 4.4.4.10.

598

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.41.

599

30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.27; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.52.

600

24 November 1993, → 3.2.1.1.13; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.1.1.47; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

601

14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.11; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20.

602

14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.3.11; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; see also 7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11.

603

17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30; see also 7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11.

604

30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25; 17 November 2000, → 4.2.2.3.17; 15 October 2002, → 4.2.2.3.20.

605

7 November 2013, UN Doc. A/68/PV.46, pp. 19-20; 12 November 2014, UN Doc. A/69/PV.50, pp. 10-11.

606

14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.25.

607

14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.16.

608

14 November 1995, → 3.4.3.17; 31 October 2001, → 4.4.3.16; 15 October 2002, → 4.4.3.18.

609

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

610

20 July 1993, → 3.2.2.2.2. For later references to this idea see 13 October 1994, → 3.2.2.2.11, and 18 September 1995, → 3.2.2.2.14.

611

24 March 2009, → 5.2.2.2.4; 3 September 2009, → 5.2.2.2.9; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.10; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.18.

612

2 September 2009, → 5.2.1.2.4.

613

20 November 2018, → 5.4.2.18.

614

21 July 2005, → 4.2.2.2.1 and 4.4.3.22.

615

For a more recent statement supporting the Uniting for Consensus Group, see 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.2.10.

616

18 September 1995, → 3.3.14. For a size of 25-27 seats, see 7 April 2009, → 5.3.1, and for one of 30 seats, see 20 July 1993, → 3.3.1.

617

7 November 2016, → 5.4.2.10.

618

See, e.g., the statement of 14 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.25.

619

27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.2.4.

620

14 November 1995, → 3.3.20; 11 July 1996, → 3.3.28; 29 October 1996, → 3.3.29.

621

14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24.

622

11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24.

623

14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.2.2.2.23 and 3.3.28; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24.

624

6 July 2005, → 4.2.1.1.37.

625

Cf. 14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.3.16; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22.

626

7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22.

627

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.2.16; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.14.

628

27 August 1993, → 3.4.3.4; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.2.2.17; 11 July 1996, → 3.4.4.3; 29 October 1996, → 3.2.2.2.24; 5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.3.14.

629

31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.3.22.

630

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.44; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.55.

631

5 May 2015, Framework Document, → 5.1.12; 31 July 2015, Negotiation Text, → 5.1.13.

632

7 November 2016, → 5.4.4.44; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.55.

633

von Freiesleben, footnote 221 above.

634

28 March 1996, → 3.2.1.1.37.

635

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8.

636

17 October 2003, → 4.2.1.1.26.

637

See, e.g., the statements of 13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.3.24; 30 October 2015, → 5.2.1.1.26.

638

For a recent confirmation of this position see 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.42, and 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.49.

639

20 July 1993, → 3.2.3.1; 27 May 1994, → 3.3.6; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.1.33; 7 November 2017, → 5.2.1.1.42; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.1.1.49.

640

13 November 2007, → 4.2.1.3.24; 27 March 2008, United Kingdom and France, Joint Summit declaration, → 4.2.2.2.15; 1 March 2010, France and United Kingdom Joint Statement, → 5.2.1.1.8.

641

16 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.8.

642

7 November 2013, → 5.4.4.13; 12 November 2014, → 5.4.4.16; 30 October 2015, → 5.4.4.28; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.1.1.33; 7 November 2017, → 5.4.4.58; 20 November 2018, → 5.4.4.67.

643

12 July 2005, → 4.2.2.1.2; 12 November 2014, → 5.2.2.1.6.

644

See, e.g., the statements of 20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36; 12 November 2007, → 4.2.1.1.52; 18 November 2008, → 4.2.1.1.56; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.2.1.4; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.1.5; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

645

20 July 1993, → 3.2.1.1.6; 13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11; 3 April 2000, → 4.3.12; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13.

646

22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36.

647

8 November 2010, Remarks by the President to Indian Parliament, → 5.2.1.1.13.

648

14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30.

649

17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13.

650

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40; 22 June 2005, → 4.2.1.1.36.

651

17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55.

652

13 November 2009, → 5.2.2.1.1; 5 March 2010, → 5.2.2.1.3; 15 November 2012, → 5.2.2.1.5; 16 April 2015, → 5.2.2.1.7.

653

13 October 1994, → 3.2.1.1.23; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.30; 24 April 1996, U.S. Department of State, Views on Reform Measures, → 3.2.1.1.40.

654

17 July 1997, → 3.2.1.1.55; 20 December 1999, → 4.2.1.1.11.

655

3 April 2000, → 4.3.12; 5 April 2000, → 4.3.13.

656

16 April 2015, → 5.2.2.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

657

21 July 2005, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, → 4.2.1.1.43; 10 November 2005, → 4.2.1.1.44; 11 November 2010, → 5.2.2.1.4; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.9; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

658

March 1978, Report from the Carter Administration, → 2.16.

659

7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

660

14 November 1995, → 3.4.1.2; 23 May 1996, → 3.4.1.7; 23 September 1999, → 4.4.1.2; 5 April 2000, → 4.4.1.5; 16 November 2000, → 4.4.1.6; 5 March 2010, → 5.4.1.2; 7 November 2016, → 5.4.1.7; 20 November 2018, → 5.2.2.1.13.

661

16 February 2010, → 5.2.2.1.2; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8; 7 November 2016, → 5.2.2.1.12.

662

17 June 1996, → 3.4.3.27.

663

6 February 2018, → 5.4.4.63.

664

4 March 2010, Proposals, → 5.2.1.1.10 and 5.3.9; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

665

25 September 1991, → 3.4.2.1; 4 March 2010, → 5.4.3.10; 10 May 2010, Negotiation text, → 5.1.5; 23 February 2011, Third Revised Negotiation Text, → 5.1.8.

666

27 August 1993, → 3.2.2.3.3.

667

16 November 2000, → 4.2.3.3; 17 October 2003, → 4.2.3.8.

668

27 August 1993, → 3.4.2.5.

669

14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31.

670

14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31; 30 October 1996, → 3.2.2.3.23.

671

5 December 1997, → 3.2.2.3.32; 14 July 2005, Draft Resolution, → 4.2.2.3.30.

672

14 October 1994, → 3.4.2.15; 14 November 1995, → 3.2.1.1.31.

673

30 October 1996, → 3.4.3.34.