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Bureaucratic Acquiescence as an Institutional Strategy in the African Union

In: African and Asian Studies
Authors:
Lynda Chinenye Iroulo Assistant Professor, International Relations, Georgetown University, Qatar Education City – Qatar Foundation Doha Qatar

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https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8900-5630
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Oheneba A. Boateng Visiting Assistant Professor, International Relations, Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA USA

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https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7092-5824
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Abstract

The paper conceptualizes acquiescence as a strategy bureaucrats adopt to deal with contestation between themselves and political leaders. The literature on bureaucratic politics argues that policy outcomes result from a game of bargaining between bureaucrats and political leaders. These actors employ diverse strategies like bargaining for more authority, exploiting loopholes, challenging the political class, and, at other times, using the threat of resignation to implement their preferred priorities. However, we advance the above argument by introducing another strategy that bureaucrats use, acquiescence. We analyze African Union (AU) bureaucratic politics through speeches, press releases, and secondary materials. The paper argues that rather than opting for standard bureaucratic strategies, AU bureaucrats acquiesce because the institutional structure, material resources, and the AU solidarity norm make it difficult for them to do otherwise. Acquiescence is the reluctant acceptance of decisions in bureaucratic politics in the form of silence or an absence of protest. We show examples of AU institutional reform and the Burundi crisis debates, where acquiescence can explain decision-making outcomes in the organization. We conclude that acquiescence is a relevant conceptual tool in explaining the outcomes of bureaucratic politics in the AU and can be generalized to investigate institutional politics in other international organizations within and outside of the continent.

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