The burgeoning social significance borne by death inquests in Hong Kong has ushered in a string of judicial decisions that seeks to remould the interpretation and operation of provisions in the Coroners Ordinance. This article subjects attempts to marshal the right to life as an interpretive conduit to remould these provisions to scrutiny, focusing on its impact on the remit of inquests and the Court of First Instance’s power to override the Coroner’s refusal to hold one which ought to be held. It contends that such interpretive endeavours are unlikely to yield practical dividends, emerge effective, sustainable or consequential in the long run, or prove defensible on doctrinal grounds. The principal reason lies in the fact that local jurisprudence on the right to life remains thin and underdeveloped, such that it lacks the necessary doctrinal and jurisprudential arsenal to sustain such judicial efforts and furnish principled guidance to the courts on how to arm the remoulded law with real bite.
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The burgeoning social significance borne by death inquests in Hong Kong has ushered in a string of judicial decisions that seeks to remould the interpretation and operation of provisions in the Coroners Ordinance. This article subjects attempts to marshal the right to life as an interpretive conduit to remould these provisions to scrutiny, focusing on its impact on the remit of inquests and the Court of First Instance’s power to override the Coroner’s refusal to hold one which ought to be held. It contends that such interpretive endeavours are unlikely to yield practical dividends, emerge effective, sustainable or consequential in the long run, or prove defensible on doctrinal grounds. The principal reason lies in the fact that local jurisprudence on the right to life remains thin and underdeveloped, such that it lacks the necessary doctrinal and jurisprudential arsenal to sustain such judicial efforts and furnish principled guidance to the courts on how to arm the remoulded law with real bite.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 95 | 95 | 60 |
Full Text Views | 4 | 4 | 3 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 12 | 12 | 9 |