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I For this position see Nussbaum (1986, chap. 7), who maintains that in this dialogue reason's exalted status is modified and the place of "feeling, emotion, and particular love in the good life" (202) elevated. 2 On the connection to Stesichorus, see 243a, 244a, and 257a.

3 See PMG 193. 4 Translations of the Phaedrus are from Nehamas and Woodruff (1995). Citations of Greek are from the OCT editions. 5 Socrates continues to use the term \6yos to apply to both speeches treated as one (265c6 and d7). 6 See 396d-397a and 428c, cf. 399a and 407d. Interestingly, Socrates' palinode in the Phaedrus includes several alleged linguistic derivations (see 238c [cf. Crat. 420a- b], 244b-d, 251c [cf. 255c and Crat. 419e-420a], and 252e [cf. Crat. 395e-396b]). One sign that Plato is not entirely serious in Socrates' second speech is that he treats etymology as evidence in the "argument" about jiavia (244b-d; T68C J.l.7,1I ayov £7TlJ.l.apTvpacrOal, b6), although he had denied independent philosophical value to etymological analyses in the Cratylus (434-440); on the latter point, see Levin 1995. In the Cratylus (391d4-392b1), before plunging into his lengthy catalogue of etymologies, Plato cites several Homeric cases in which the gods and human beings give different names to the same entities; he also states that ovofuna assigned by the former are obviously correct (391e). Similarly, the Phaedrus points to the existence of distinctions between divine and human 6v6lAaTa for the same entities (252b, cf. 266b7-cl); with regard to the gods' superiority in matters of naming, it is worth noting that Plato attributes the derivation of t'jnepoy offered at 251c to Zeus (255c). In the Cratylus, moreover, Plato describes the makers of ollóJ.l.aTa-ironically-as

lx(Teo>po\6yoi TLYES Kal &8o,\io-Xat (401b8-9); for the phrase a8o�so-Xia Kai jHTMpo\oyta, used with a similar tone, see Phdr. 270al. 7 For an example of such a derivation, see Plato's treatment of the name "Hades" at Phd. 80d5-7.

8 For the first speech as having some value, see 265e-266a and Nehamas and Woodruff (1995, xxix). 9 For a list and brief account of the conditions on T(XvaL that are presented in the Gorgias, see Levin (1995, 100-101). 10 See his use of Eemov at c3; other relevant terminology is found at c6 (ayvowv), d5 (ayvooDvTa), and d8 (Ct86Tg).

11 This impression is promoted by a look at the context in which the above remark from p. 274 is placed: The inference [based on what happens in Socrates' recourse to dialectic in his first speech] is unavoidable, that the dialectical model by itself is no guarantee of truth; it cannot achieve success unless the process has been carried out with the discernment required to see the relevant classes and distinctions aright. So how can we secure that discernment? This dialogue offers an answer, I believe, in the brilliant account of love's effect on the soul in Socrates' second speech.... [The account] affirms that our ability to see the truth, as the gods see it, depends upon the growth of our souls' wings through love; and that means that, after all, true vision will only ever be accessible to one who has been mesmerized by love. Inspiration, and not reason, turns out to supply our ability, if we have it, to classify and divide the world, so as to reach effective definitions of what we seek to understand. (274) These remarks suggest that Socrates' first foray into dialectic went awry because, in undertaking division, Socrates did not operate with a sufficient level of non-rational discernment. 12 The prominence of i7r&o-Ti7'iAi7 in connection withstatpeo-tv is underscored in the same context (253b-e). On the prominence of rationality in the Republic's account of dialectic, see VI, 511b-e and VII, 533b-534a. t3 Tr. Skemp (1952).

14 On this point see Moravcsik (1973, 332-33). 15 On philosophy as the preeminent TiXV77, see Levin (1996, 18-20). 16 Concerning the former requirement, see 272d, 276c, 277b-c, 277e-278b, cf. 263a-b; regarding the latter, one may consult 262c, 268a-d, 276c, 277b-c, and 278b-d. At 262c Socrates states emphatically that "the art of a speaker who doesn't know the truth and chases opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thing-not an art at all!" The teachability condition also surfaces (265d, 277c). 17 See 503d-504a, 504d-e, and 521d-e. 18 As has often been observed, the Laws' Nocturnal Council (on which see XII, 963-966) is Plato's counterpart in that dialogue to the Republic's philosopher-rulers. While members of the two groups are not identical in their background and duties, as those in possession of genuine insight into the nature of àp£TJi they share the

distinction of being specially equipped to judge people's assets and shortcomings in the domain of human excellence. 19 On the interpretation suggested here, rhetoric will not become a TiXV?l in its own right. Since the practitioners of rhetoric must meet the same requirements as philosophers, assigning them to separate groups would constitute a pointless duplication. Instead of becoming a distinct TiXV77, the activity will be folded into the domain of philosophers. 20 The locus classicus in Greek literature for the broader sense of TiXv77 is Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound (442-506). In Plato see, e.g., Gorg. 448c9, Prot. 316d3-4, 317c1-2, 323a8-9, and Euthd. 289cl-4. 21 As Plato suggests by his introduction of a comparison between medicine and rhetoric (270b-272a), just as doctors must be able to explain why they choose and utilize the remedies they do in specific cases, so too those with genuine knowledge in the area of rhetoric must be able to account for why they select and employ particular types of speeches with particular people.

22 For terminology of possession used in a positive way earlier in the dialogue, see 249d2 (£v6ovcná(wv), el (£v60VcrlácrHIIV), and 253a3 (£v60VcrLlÂJVH<;). � For "aspiration" as the best rendering of gpwg in connection with the Symposium's ascent, see Moravcsik (1971, 290-91).

24 Plato's language suggests as a central idea here that people would judge philosophers to be mad because they do not fit well in the realm of ordinary experience. Cf. the Phaedo's articulation of the conventional interpretation of what it means to say that philosophers are half dead (64a4-cl). Plato is arguably concerned in the Phaedrus, as he was in the Phaedo, with a distinction between less and more accurate interpretations of what being a philosopher is all about, where the former view represents popular opinion. 25 On this issue see also Rowe, who notes (1986a, 170 and 1986b, 117) that the Phaedrus' depiction of the lover as losing control over himself is pertinent only to the beginning of the process. � On this point see Nehamas and Woodruff (1995, 35 [n. 81]). For a different view see Rowe (1986a, ad loc.) and Hackforth (1952, 83). 27 For Calliope's supreme position among the Muses, see Hesiod, Theogony 79 (11 Si 7Tpo4>áTr¡ I(TT'LV å7TaCTf.CJJV).

28 I follow Shorey (1935) in rendering €pM(nf here as "enamored of." See also 490a8-b3, where Plato notes that the genuine lover of learning has a natural capacity for gaining access to reality, and does not remain abiding among the multiple individual sensibles which are the objects of belief, but he progresses without becoming disheartened or desisting (d W iot Kal ovk åP.{3ÀVVOITO O�8' å7TOÀ7}YOI rov £PWTO!;), till he gains access to the nature of that which is in each case. Cf. Phdr. 266b3-4, where Socrates calls himself an £pacrT7}!; of collection and division.

29 Concerning the distinction between rational and non-rational, Osborne comments as follows on Plato's brief argument for the soul's immortality (245c- 246a) : Dramatically, we might say, Plato draws the limits of deductive argument for us: it can take us this far, we could take him to be saying, but no further, and as Socrates resorts to illustrations in what follows, we sense that this is not merely a shorter route to the desired conclusion (246a5) but also a more effective one for convincing those unimpressed by the formal reasoning just offered. (277) She states, in addition, that the argument is prefaced (245cl-2) by "the odd claim that it will not be believable to clever people but only to the wise" (277, n. 34). The comment is not so odd if interpreted in terms of the contrast drawn in the dialogue between simple and complicated souls, and matching discourses (277b-c). As Rowe (1986b, 113) observes, "simple" discourse would include only the sort of thing that Socrates presents at 245c-246a; this is not likely, however, to appeal to the "complex" soul of one such as Phaedrus (on his soul and the discourse appropriate thereto, see Rowe [1986b, 113], Nightingale [1995, 146-47], and Thompson [1868, 163]). Osborne does not consider the possibility that Socrates prefers myth to the sort of argument he offers here about immortality, not generally or absolutely, but simply given the complex nature of Phaedrus' psyche. On this interpretation, what follows the argument is not designed to make a stronger impact on the "unimpressed," but rather aims to target by a different route one whose temperament does not currently equip him to respond successfully to it. Underscoring what he views as Phaedrus' potential, Ferrari (1987, 39) claims that Plato depicts him "as being at risk of trivialising the philosophical life, rather than as a hopeless case....Indeed, the action of the dialogue is built around the possibility of his rescue."

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