1. The alternative approach is characterized at length in a forthcoming paper co-authored by Hilary Putnam and me, entitled "Changing Aristotle's Mind." Its elements have been developed in several of my previous publications: "Aristotelian Dualism: a Reply to Howard Robinson," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984) 197-207; "Aristotle," in Ancient Writers, ed. T.J. Luce (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982) 377-416; "The Common Explanation of Animal Motion," in Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum, ed. P. Moraux and J. Wiesner (Berlin 1983) 116-56; in a review of E. Hartman, Substance, Body, and Soul, Journal of Philosophy77(1980) 355-65; and in Essays 1 and 3 of my Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton 1978).
2. The example was used by Putnam in "Philosophy and our Mental Life," Philosophical Papers II (Cambridge 1975); by Nussbaum in Aristotles De Motu, Essay I, pp. 69-70; a similar argument is made in "Changing Aristotle's Mind."
3. The arguments in this section and the next are made at greater length in "Changing Aristotle's Mind." 4. "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?" unpublished. We refer to and cite this paper by permission in "Changing Aristotle's Mind."
5. T. Nagel, "Panpsychism," in Mortal C7uestions (Cambridge 1979) 181-95.
6. See my "Eleatic Conventionalism and Philolaus on the Conditions of Thought," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 83 (1979) 63-108.