1. Among whom, curiously, Sayre must include even Aristotle, our most important source for these disclosures. 2. Cf., among many, Moravscik "Forms, Nature, and the Good in the Philebus" Phronesis 24 1979 p.81ff and Dancy "The One, the Many, and the Forms: Philebus 15b1-8 Ancient Philosophy4 1984 p.160ff who argue that Plato is concerned in the Philebus neither with the ontologi - cal status of particulars nor their relation to forms.
3. Not that the case of forms is all that much clearer. Sayre needs to explain the prima facie incompatibility of 58a-62a with his view of unseparated, generated forms.
4. Especially since, at least on some standard accounts of Plato's development, difficulties with the definitions of moral and relational pre - dicates (and not entities capable of analysis by a measuring art) induce Plato to postulate separated forms. 5. Sayre's translation of hos touto hoion hen as "a particularly excel - lent Unity" is unduly adventurous. Even if we allow him the emendation oion, there is only Homeric attestation for the sense that he needs here. It is much more plausible to translate "as a kind of unity" and thereby not alter the somewhat tentative and hypothetical nature of this account of the good.
6. Cf. Burnyeat, "Paradoxes in Plato's Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief" PASS 1980 p18Off. For a stimulating account of this "interrelation" model of knowledge see Fine "Knowledge and Logos in the Theaetetus,"Philosophical Review 78 (1979), pp.366ff. 7. I am indebted to Gail Fine for reminding me in this connection that this is by no means a radical shift in Plato's thinking about knowledge. The Republic espouses a view of knowledge which is every bit as holistic. Given this continuity in Plato's epistemological concerns, Sayre's story of a rather sudden shift in the Philebus becomes more implausible.
8. Sayre's description of Theuth's accomplishments as "creative" is misleading, if it suggests that sensible particulars are actually created by this introduction of limit. 9. Sayre takes ton aei legomenon at 16c9 to be a reference to particulars and aei to be "merely another occurence of the 'always' at 16B6 where Socrates says he has always admired the method in question." This is extremely dubious. Surely, better parallels are to be found at 15d5 (kath' hekaston ton legomenon aei) and 15b3 (ousan aei). I follow Striker's reading of 16c9 ("things which are always said to be"), although Gosling's ("things which from time to time are said to be") is also possible. Neither, however, suggests a reference to particulars, since they are not plausibly described as being aei lagomena 10. Cf. Strawson, Individuals p. 168 for a lucid account of this distinction. His discussion of the analogies between the ways sortal and characterizing universals collect and group particulars is especially useful in this context.
11. For a similar account see Searle, "Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance" (PASS, vol.33 1959 p. 154) who argues that the concept formation of individuating (sortal) terms involves both "individuating terms which divide the world and pick out conjunctions of properties, and characterizing terms which cut across these divisions set up by individuating terms and which are not characteristically conjunctions of other properties." 12. For an opposing view, cf. Dancy (1984) p160 who denies that this distinction is relevant or useful for understanding Plato's aims in the Philebus.