The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instrument of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective parallel government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population, making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested interests in favor of Taliban domination.
Mullah ZaeefMy Life with the Taliban (London: Hurst2010) pp. 75–78; Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban / Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan 1970–2010 (London: Hurst 2012) pp. 113–24.
ZaeefMy Life with the Taliban pp. 80–90Gilles Dorronsoro “Les Taliban ou la révolution des clercs” Etudes 39 no. 6 (1999): 743–51 ; Gilles Dorronsoro “Les Oulémas afghans au 20e siècle: bureaucratisation contestation et genèse d’un État clérical” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 3 no. 115 (2001): 63–79.