The Modern Chinese State and Strategies of Control over Uyghur Islam
In: Central Asian AffairsSearch for other papers by Rémi Castets in
Current site
Google Scholar
Faithful to the principle of democratic centralism, the Chinese Communist Party does not tolerate alternative thinking or anti-colonial movements that contest its policies and its will to integrate Uyghur society into the Chinese nation-state. Over recent decades, it has implemented a wide range of policies aimed at eliminating any interpretation or instrumentalization of Islam that conflicts with its own policies. More recently, it has implemented a new set of rules through the “judiciarization” of religious activities. These rules are aimed at eradicating all forms of politicization of Islam in Uyghur mosques and the Koranic teaching system, and at defining the limits of “modern and patriotic Islam.”
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
5
Rémi Castets, “Entre colonisation et développement du Grand ouest. Impact des stratégies de contrôle démographique et économique au Xinjiang,” Outre-Terre, no. 16 (2006): 257–272.
-
11
Masami Hamada, “La transmission du mouvement nationaliste au Turkestan Oriental (Xinjiang),” Central Asian Survey 9, no. 1 (1990): 29–48.
-
15
Andrew D. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 128–163.
-
16
Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, 63–121.
-
24
Thierry Zarcone, “Le culte des saints de 1949 à nos jours,” Journal d’Histoire du Soufisme, no. 3 (2001): 160–164.
-
25
Qi and Qian, Zhongguo lishi zhongyang wangchao zhili xinjiang zhengce yanjiu, 161–168.
-
26
McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 90–100, 116–120.
-
36
Michael Dillon, Xinjiang-China’s Muslim Far North West (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 28.
-
39
Zhu and Chen, Zhonguo gongchandang yu xinjiang minzu wenti, p. 222.
-
43
Castets, “Entre colonisation et développement du Grand ouest,” 257–272.
-
49
Ying Fuk-Tsang, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: An Appraisal of Religious Legislation in China and the Regulations on Religious Affairs of 2005,” Religion, State, Society, 34, no. 4 (2006): 347–373.
-
68
Zhang Jingquan et al., “Shilun yisilanjiao xiehui de qiaoliang niudai zuoyong,” 252–255.
-
70
Jérôme Doyon, Négocier la Place de l’islam chinois. Les associations islamiques de nankin à l’ère des réformes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014).
-
72
Zhang Jingquan et al., “Shilun yisilanjiao xiehui de qiaoliang niudai zuoyong,” 252.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1395 | 193 | 19 |
| Full Text Views | 238 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 116 | 8 | 0 |
The Modern Chinese State and Strategies of Control over Uyghur Islam
In: Central Asian AffairsSearch for other papers by Rémi Castets in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Faithful to the principle of democratic centralism, the Chinese Communist Party does not tolerate alternative thinking or anti-colonial movements that contest its policies and its will to integrate Uyghur society into the Chinese nation-state. Over recent decades, it has implemented a wide range of policies aimed at eliminating any interpretation or instrumentalization of Islam that conflicts with its own policies. More recently, it has implemented a new set of rules through the “judiciarization” of religious activities. These rules are aimed at eradicating all forms of politicization of Islam in Uyghur mosques and the Koranic teaching system, and at defining the limits of “modern and patriotic Islam.”
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1395 | 193 | 19 |
| Full Text Views | 238 | 3 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 116 | 8 | 0 |