Revolution in the Counter-Revolution: Efforts to Centralize the Taliban’s Military Leadership

In: Central Asian Affairs
Claudio Franco20 Winterslow Road, London sw9 7 rs,

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Antonio GiustozziKings College London, Department of War Studies Strand, London, wc2 r2 ls, United Kingdom,

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Interviews with Taliban cadres and commanders challenge conventional views about the inherently fragmented character of the Taliban insurgency and about the role of the Quetta Taliban leadership in running the military organization of the Taliban. The so-called Haqqani network operated as a largely autonomous force from 2007 until 2015, as did the Peshawar Shura from 2009 onward. However, both the Haqqanis and the Peshawar Shura were able to impose a much greater degree of coherence and discipline among its ranks than the Quetta Shura was able to, at least until 2015.

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