Revolution in the Counter-Revolution: Efforts to Centralize the Taliban’s Military Leadership
In: Central Asian AffairsInterviews with Taliban cadres and commanders challenge conventional views about the inherently fragmented character of the Taliban insurgency and about the role of the Quetta Taliban leadership in running the military organization of the Taliban. The so-called Haqqani network operated as a largely autonomous force from 2007 until 2015, as did the Peshawar Shura from 2009 onward. However, both the Haqqanis and the Peshawar Shura were able to impose a much greater degree of coherence and discipline among its ranks than the Quetta Shura was able to, at least until 2015.
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1
Ali A. Jalali, “Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum,” Parameters, (Winter 2007–2008), 12.
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7
Antonio Giustozzi, Kuran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop (London: Hurst, 2008); Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, “The Insurgents of the Afghan North,” Afghan Analyst Network, May 2011; Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban (London: Hurst, 2009).
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10
Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Revolution in the Mountains, Part 3: Through the Eyes of the Taliban,” Asia Times Online, May 5, 2004.
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20
Bernd Horn, No Lack of Courage (Toronto: Dundurn, 2010), 31, 39; Rusty Bradley and Kevin Maurer, Lions of Kandahar (New York: Bantam, 2011); interviews with two former commanders of Dadullah mahaz in Zabul and Kandahar, summer 2011.
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24
Ron Moreau, “America’s New Nightmare: If You Thought the Longtime Head of the Taliban Was Bad, You Should Meet His No. 2,” Newsweek, August 3, 2009.
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72
Ron Moreau, “New Leaders for the Taliban,” Newsweek, January 16, 2011; communications with Taliban cadres in Peshawar and Quetta, summer 2012.
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Revolution in the Counter-Revolution: Efforts to Centralize the Taliban’s Military Leadership
In: Central Asian AffairsInterviews with Taliban cadres and commanders challenge conventional views about the inherently fragmented character of the Taliban insurgency and about the role of the Quetta Taliban leadership in running the military organization of the Taliban. The so-called Haqqani network operated as a largely autonomous force from 2007 until 2015, as did the Peshawar Shura from 2009 onward. However, both the Haqqanis and the Peshawar Shura were able to impose a much greater degree of coherence and discipline among its ranks than the Quetta Shura was able to, at least until 2015.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2662 | 244 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 286 | 7 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 97 | 11 | 0 |