The People’s Republic of China’s (prc) policy toward the Korean Peninsula can be largely characterized as the maintenance of a “stable status quo.” This has been a constant feature since the founding of the prc in 1949. Even when China was extremely radicalized and encouraged revolutions in the Third World in the 1960s, it prevented North Korea from attacking South Korea. However, the reasons behind China’s policy choices have varied over time. This paper attempts to highlight the different reasons that led the prc to maintain the same policy toward the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War. This article takes a historiographical perspective, juxtaposing the Sino-North Korean, Sino-Soviet, and Sino-US relationships, to reveal useful clues for understanding China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula and to elucidate the international political context China’s policy exists within.
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The People’s Republic of China’s (prc) policy toward the Korean Peninsula can be largely characterized as the maintenance of a “stable status quo.” This has been a constant feature since the founding of the prc in 1949. Even when China was extremely radicalized and encouraged revolutions in the Third World in the 1960s, it prevented North Korea from attacking South Korea. However, the reasons behind China’s policy choices have varied over time. This paper attempts to highlight the different reasons that led the prc to maintain the same policy toward the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War. This article takes a historiographical perspective, juxtaposing the Sino-North Korean, Sino-Soviet, and Sino-US relationships, to reveal useful clues for understanding China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula and to elucidate the international political context China’s policy exists within.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 98 | 98 | 5 |
Full Text Views | 8 | 8 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 187 | 187 | 0 |