The Light and Shadow of the Sino-North Korea Alliance: The Emergence and Dissolution of the “Northeast Rear Doctrine”
In: China and AsiaSearch for other papers by Lee Jongseok in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Since establishing diplomatic relations in October 1949, North Korea and China have forged a complex alliance characterized by both firm solidarity and mutual distrust. This paper analyzes the ups and downs of their alliance relationship by examining the “Northeast Rear Doctrine” (nrd) suggested by Mao Zedong in the early 1960s, which proposed that North Korea could utilize China’s Northeast region as its rear base in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Mao’s proposal represents the apex of the Sino-North Korean alliance, implying China’s temporary concession of its sovereignty over the northeastern territory to North Korea. However, when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, the nrd policy was virtually abolished, thereby significantly affecting Sino-North Korean relations. First, it exacerbated security threats to North Korea’s regime as Northeast China, which once served as Pyongyang’s rear base, was transformed into Seoul’s outpost for infiltration into North Korea. Second, it deepened North Korea’s distrust of China and served as a catalyst for transforming Sino-North Korean relations into normal state-to-state dynamics, rather than the traditional party-to-party relationship.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 50 | 50 | 5 |
| Full Text Views | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 162 | 162 | 0 |
The Light and Shadow of the Sino-North Korea Alliance: The Emergence and Dissolution of the “Northeast Rear Doctrine”
In: China and AsiaSearch for other papers by Lee Jongseok in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Since establishing diplomatic relations in October 1949, North Korea and China have forged a complex alliance characterized by both firm solidarity and mutual distrust. This paper analyzes the ups and downs of their alliance relationship by examining the “Northeast Rear Doctrine” (nrd) suggested by Mao Zedong in the early 1960s, which proposed that North Korea could utilize China’s Northeast region as its rear base in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Mao’s proposal represents the apex of the Sino-North Korean alliance, implying China’s temporary concession of its sovereignty over the northeastern territory to North Korea. However, when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, the nrd policy was virtually abolished, thereby significantly affecting Sino-North Korean relations. First, it exacerbated security threats to North Korea’s regime as Northeast China, which once served as Pyongyang’s rear base, was transformed into Seoul’s outpost for infiltration into North Korea. Second, it deepened North Korea’s distrust of China and served as a catalyst for transforming Sino-North Korean relations into normal state-to-state dynamics, rather than the traditional party-to-party relationship.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 50 | 50 | 5 |
| Full Text Views | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 162 | 162 | 0 |