Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement

In: Climate Law
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  • 1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies

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As parties to the un Framework Convention on Climate Change move towards developing ‘a Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force’ in Paris in 2015, they are also addressing the question whether and in what form to include a compliance mechanism in the Paris agreement. This article explores options for incorporating a compliance mechanism into a 2015 climate agreement.

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    Anke Herold, ‘Experiences with Articles 5, 7, and 8 Defining the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System under the Kyoto Protocol,’ in Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime, edited by Jutta Brunnée, Meinhard Doelle, and Lavanya Rajamani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 122–146.

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  • 10

    David G. Victor, ‘The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s Non-Compliance Procedure’, in The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, edited by David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Cambridge MA, London: MIT Press, 1998), 137–176; Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’, 56(3) International Organization (2002), at 609–643.

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  • 17

    Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Die Wirksamkeit von Verrechtlichung: Die Compliance-Mechanismen internationaler Umweltregime’, in Politik und Umwelt, edited by Klaus Jacob, Frank Biermann, Per-Olof Busch, and Peter H. Feindt (Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft, 39/2007), 73–93.

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  • 22

    Francesca R. Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-Compliance Procedures’, in Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, edited by Tullio Treves, Laura Pineschi, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni, and Francesca R. Jacur (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), 373–387.

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     See also René Lefeber, An Inconvenient Responsibility (Utrecht: Eleven, 2009), at 10–11.

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