Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law and the Paris Agreement
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The United States’ position in, and conduct of, the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement, as with almost all international diplomacy leading to reciprocal international undertakings conducted by that country, reflected not only internal politics, but also the constraints of domestic law. The United States is not unique in this respect, but it is unusual in the extent to and manner in which its municipal law constrains the creation of international commitments. This article disaggregates us international and domestic climate policy as it developed prior to the Paris negotiations and analyses how those dynamics played out on the multilateral stage, influencing the shape of the Paris Outcome, even to the name of the instrument. Among the subjects analysed are (1) the extent of the Executive’s powers in foreign relations on climate and related issues; (2) the strengths and limitations of existing federal legislation as domestic legal authority for an international agreement on limiting emissions of climate-disrupting gases; (3) domestic implementation of the us indc; (4) executive agreements as vehicles for undertaking internationally legally binding commitments on climate; and (5) the role of the courts.1
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2
See, e.g., Melissa Eddy, ‘At Climate Talks, a Few Letters That Almost Sank the Deal’, New York Times, 16 December 2015, <www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-climate-talks-three-letters-almost-sunk-the-deal>; Amitabh Sinha, ‘Paris Talks: Shall/Should: The World Between a Wrong Word’, Indian Express, 14 December 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/paris-talks-climate-change-shallshould-the-world-between-a-wrong-word/>; and John Vidal, ‘How a "Typo" Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal’, The Guardian, 16 December 2015, <www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal>. See generally, Daniel Bodansky, ‘Reflections on the Paris Conference’, Opinio Juris, 15 December 2015, <http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/15/reflections-on-the-paris-conference/>.
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40
138 Cong. Rec. 33527 (1992) (Senate resolution of advice and consent to Framework Convention).
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S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
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549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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63
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law and the Paris Agreement
In: Climate LawSearch for other papers by David A. Wirth in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
The United States’ position in, and conduct of, the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement, as with almost all international diplomacy leading to reciprocal international undertakings conducted by that country, reflected not only internal politics, but also the constraints of domestic law. The United States is not unique in this respect, but it is unusual in the extent to and manner in which its municipal law constrains the creation of international commitments. This article disaggregates us international and domestic climate policy as it developed prior to the Paris negotiations and analyses how those dynamics played out on the multilateral stage, influencing the shape of the Paris Outcome, even to the name of the instrument. Among the subjects analysed are (1) the extent of the Executive’s powers in foreign relations on climate and related issues; (2) the strengths and limitations of existing federal legislation as domestic legal authority for an international agreement on limiting emissions of climate-disrupting gases; (3) domestic implementation of the us indc; (4) executive agreements as vehicles for undertaking internationally legally binding commitments on climate; and (5) the role of the courts.1
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 741 | 148 | 5 |
| Full Text Views | 287 | 15 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 197 | 26 | 0 |
