Rorty’s Ambivalent Relationship with Kant
In: Contemporary PragmatismI argue that Kant is a key figure in understanding Rorty’s work, by drawing attention to the fact that although he is ostensibly the principal villain of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, at the end of that book Kant provides the basis of Rorty's positive proposal that we view the world “bifocally”. I show how this idea was re-worked as “irony” in Continency, Irony, and Solidarity, and became central to Rorty’s outlook. However, by allowing this Kantian influence into his thinking, Rorty made his position untenable. For Rortyan pragmatism undercuts the higher stance required by the concept of irony; and yet without this Kantian influence, Rorty would have been unable to justify his pluralism. Rorty could not live with Kant but could not live without him either.
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Geuss Raymond. 2008. “ Richard Rorty at Princeton: personal recollections,” Arion 15: 85–100.
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Rorty Richard, . 2010c. “ Reply to János Boros,” in The Philosophy of Richard Rorty, eds. Auxier Randall, and Hahn Lewis (Chicago: Open Court), pp. 266–8.
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See Richard Rorty, “Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace,” in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume Three (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 57. For critical discussion of this response, see James Tartaglia, “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” in A Companion to Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming 2016); see also James Tartaglia “Did Rorty's Pragmatism have Foundations?” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2010): 607–627, and James Tartaglia, “Does Rorty’s Pragmatism Undermine Itself?” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2012): 284–301.
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Rorty’s Ambivalent Relationship with Kant
In: Contemporary PragmatismI argue that Kant is a key figure in understanding Rorty’s work, by drawing attention to the fact that although he is ostensibly the principal villain of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, at the end of that book Kant provides the basis of Rorty's positive proposal that we view the world “bifocally”. I show how this idea was re-worked as “irony” in Continency, Irony, and Solidarity, and became central to Rorty’s outlook. However, by allowing this Kantian influence into his thinking, Rorty made his position untenable. For Rortyan pragmatism undercuts the higher stance required by the concept of irony; and yet without this Kantian influence, Rorty would have been unable to justify his pluralism. Rorty could not live with Kant but could not live without him either.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 295 | 82 | 0 |
| Full Text Views | 188 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 30 | 6 | 0 |