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A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
Author: John Capps1
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  • 1 Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, ny usa 14623 jmcgsh@rit.edu
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Even though pragmatic theories of truth are not widely held, they have advantages not found elsewhere. Here I focus on one such advantage: that a pragmatic theory of truth does not limit the range of truth-apt beliefs and thereby “block the way of inquiry.” Furthermore, I argue that this speaks for a particular formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth, one that shifts away from Peircean approaches and their emphasis on temporal independence, and toward a theory that instead emphasizes truth’s subject independence.

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