Dogmatic Evidence of “The Given”

in Contemporary Pragmatism
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This paper addresses the epistemological problem of the myth of “the given” from an evidentialist and pragmatic perspective concerning the attribution of knowledge: if the evidence supporting p may be based on «the given» for S, how can “the given” be considered the basis of the evidence if it is a myth? The principal objective is to introduce a pragmatic solution to the above question. The main thesis is that there is a dogmatic relationship between the evidence necessary for the legitimacy of our attribution of knowledge and «the given»; however, this dogma does not suggest that these attributions are irrational.

Dogmatic Evidence of “The Given”

in Contemporary Pragmatism

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References

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