Do you want to stay informed about this journal? Click the buttons to subscribe to our alerts.
Little attention is given to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views. No doubt this stems from the fact that most commentators are more interested in his metaphilosophical views; most see his metaethical views, offered in scattered passages, as just the downstream runoff from higher-level reflection. This article considers Rorty’s metaethics on their own merits, quite apart from whether his global picture works. I ultimately argue that Rorty’s metaethical outlook is attractive but beset by internal difficulties. Specifically, I contend that Rorty does not and cannot remain faithful to the methodological approach to metaethics for which he advocates. At the paper’s close, I gesture at a nearby methodological approach that best approximates Rorty’s metaethical methodology.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Boyd Richard . “How to be a Moral Realist.” In Essays on Moral Realism, edited by Sayre-McCord Geoffrey , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Dworkin Ronald . “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 87–139.
Enoch David . Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Goldman Alvin . “What Is Justified Belief?” In Justification and Knowledge, edited by Pappas George , Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979.
Hare R.M. “‘Ought’ and Imperatives.” The Language of Morals . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.
Mackie J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, 1977.
Putnam Hilary . Ethics Without Ontology. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Railton Peter . “Moral Realism.” The Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 163–207.
Rorty Richard . “Introduction,” Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982.
Rorty Richard . “Introduction,” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Rorty Richard . “Pragmatism as Anti-authoritarianism.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 (1999): 7–20.
Rorty Richard . “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism.” Consequences of Pragmatism . Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982.
Rorty Richard . “Solidarity or Objectivity.” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Scanlon T.M. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Sturgeon Nicolas . “Moral Explanations.” In Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, edited by Copp David and Zimmerman David . Lanham, md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1985.
Worsnip Alex . “Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch’s Analogy.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy (2016), accessed November 26, 2016, doi:10.1002/tht3.220.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 408 | 40 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 223 | 2 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 39 | 3 | 0 |
Little attention is given to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views. No doubt this stems from the fact that most commentators are more interested in his metaphilosophical views; most see his metaethical views, offered in scattered passages, as just the downstream runoff from higher-level reflection. This article considers Rorty’s metaethics on their own merits, quite apart from whether his global picture works. I ultimately argue that Rorty’s metaethical outlook is attractive but beset by internal difficulties. Specifically, I contend that Rorty does not and cannot remain faithful to the methodological approach to metaethics for which he advocates. At the paper’s close, I gesture at a nearby methodological approach that best approximates Rorty’s metaethical methodology.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 408 | 40 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 223 | 2 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 39 | 3 | 0 |