On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance
In: Contemporary PragmatismSearch for other papers by Marco Antonio Joven-Romero in
Current site
Google Scholar
I apply recent research on the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams (1970) statement that “beliefs aim at truth,” to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe that other agents believe the contrary. I consider three positions; an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position coordinating the first two. I apply them to pluralistic ignorance while considering the recent study of Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen (2014). I conclude that a purely epistemic approach is better for understanding pluralistic ignorance.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Bicchieri Cristina . 2005. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Bjerring Jens , Hansen Jens and Pedersen Nicolaj . 2014. “On the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance” in Synthese, 191(11), pp. 2445–2470.
-
Boon Susan , Watkins Sarah and Sciban Rowan . 2014. “Pluralistic Ignorance and Misperception of Social Norms Concerning Cheating in Dating Relationships” in Personal Relationships, 21(3), pp. 482–496.
-
Brennan Geoffrey , Eriksson Lina , Goodin Robert and Southwood Nicholas . 2013. Explaining Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Chan Timothy . (ed.). 2013. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Davidson Donald . 1974. “Belief and the Basis of Meaning” in Synthese, 27(3–4), pp. 309–323.
-
Davidson Donald . 1990. “The Structure and Content of Truth” in The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6), pp. 279–328.
-
Davidson Donald . 1996. “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth” in The Journal of Philosophy, 93(6), pp. 263–278.
-
Davidson Donald . 2000. “Truth Rehabilitated” in Truth, Language and History , ed. Davidson Donald (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 3–18.
-
Engel Pascal . 2013a. “Belief and the Right Kind of Reason” in Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, 32(3), pp. 19–34.
-
Engel Pascal . 2013b. “In Defense of Normativism About the Aim of Belief” in The Aim of Belief , ed. Chan Timothy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 43–85.
-
Gibbons John . 2013. The Norm of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Gibbons John . 2014. “Knowledge versus Truth” in Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion, ed. Littlejohn Clayton and Turri John (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
-
Haack Susan . 1996. “Concern for Truth: what it Means, why it Matters” in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 775(1), pp. 57–63.
-
Halbesleben Jonathon and Buckley Ronald . 2004. “Pluralistic Ignorance: Historical Development and Organizational Applications” in Management Decision, 42(1), pp. 126–138.
-
Hendricks Vincent . 2010. “Knowledge Transmissibility and Pluralistic Ignorance: A First Stab” in Metaphilosophy , 41(3), pp. 279–291.
-
Katz Danield and Allport Floyd . 1931. “Students’ Attitudes” in Syracuse. Cleveland: Craftsman.
-
Owens David . 2013. “Value and Epistemic Normativity” in Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, 32(3), pp. 35–58.
-
Papineau David . 2013. “There Are No Norms of Belief” in The Aim of Belief, ed. Chan Timothy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 64–79.
-
Prentice Deborah and Miller Dale . 1993. “Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(2), pp. 243–56.
-
Proietti Carlo and Olsson Erik . 2014. “A ddl Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief” in Journal of Philosophical Logic , 43(2–3), pp. 499–515.
-
Rorty Richard . 1991. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Rorty Richard . 1996. “Something to Steer by” [Review of the book John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism by A. Ryan] in London Review of Books, 18(12).
-
Rorty Richard . 1998. Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Rorty Richard . 2000a. “Universality and Truth” in Rorty and his Critics, ed. Brandom Robert (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 1–30.
-
Rorty Richard . 2000b. “Response to Donald Davidson” in Rorty and his Critics, ed. Brandom Robert (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 74–80.
-
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía . 2013. 32(3). Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo. issn: 0210–1602.
-
Unwin Nicholas . 2007. Aiming at Truth. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
-
Williams Bernard . 1970. Problems of the Self . Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
-
Whiting Daniel . 2010. “Should I Believe the Truth?” in Dialectica, 64(2), pp. 213–224.
-
Whiting Daniel . 2013a. “Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief” in Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía, 32(3), 121–135.
-
Whiting Daniel . 2013b. “Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief” in The Aim of Belief, ed. Chan Timothy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 184–203.
-
Whiting Daniel . 2014. “Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action” in Epistemic Norms New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, ed. Littlejohn Clayton and Turri John (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 219–238.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 722 | 148 | 17 |
| Full Text Views | 190 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 58 | 1 | 0 |
On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance
In: Contemporary PragmatismSearch for other papers by Marco Antonio Joven-Romero in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
I apply recent research on the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams (1970) statement that “beliefs aim at truth,” to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe that other agents believe the contrary. I consider three positions; an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position coordinating the first two. I apply them to pluralistic ignorance while considering the recent study of Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen (2014). I conclude that a purely epistemic approach is better for understanding pluralistic ignorance.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 722 | 148 | 17 |
| Full Text Views | 190 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 58 | 1 | 0 |