BeramendiPabloCusackThomas R.AndersenC.J.BeramendiP.“Economic Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality.”Democracy, Inequality and Representation: A Comparative Perspective2008NJRussell Sage Foundation127168
CusackThomas R.IversenTorbenRehmPhilippAndersenC.J.BeramendiP.“Economic Shocks, Inequality and Popular Support for Redistribution.”Democracy, Inequality and Representation: A Comparative Perspective2008NJRussell Sage Foundation203231
ImmervollHerwigRichardsenLinda“Redistribution Policy and Inequality Reduction in oecd Countries.”oecd Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 1222011OECD publishing(http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg5dlkhjq0x-en)
IversenTorbenSoskiceDavidBeramendiP.AndersenC.J.“Electoral Institutions, Parties, and the Politics of Class: Explaining the Formation of Redistributive Coalitions.”Democracy, Inequality and Representation: A Comparative Perspective2008New York93126
KitscheltHerbertRehmPhilippArmingeonK.“New social risk and political preferences.”The politics of post-industrial welfare states – Adaption of post-war social policies to new social risks2006London5282
KlingemannHans-DieterVolkensAndreaBaraJudithBudgeIanMacDonaldMichael D.Mapping policy preferences ii: Estimates for parties, electors and governments in central and Eastern Europe, European Union and oecd 1990–20032006Oxford
TóthIstvan G.HornDanielMedgyesiMartonSalverdaW.NolanB.ChechiD.MarxI.McknightA.Gy. TothI.van de WerfhorstH.G.“Rising Inequalities: Will Electorates go for Higher Redistribution?”Changing Inequalities in Rich Countries. Analytical and Comparative Perspectives2014Oxford UP195217
The data in Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) are structured according to election periods which not always fit to lis-waves. In this case a mean over the 3–5 years preceding the variable in lis was calculated.
See also Iversen and Soskice (2009b) and Immervoll and Richardsen (2011: 14–15).