III 1. For Soviet views, emphasizing such factors as the search for raw materials and markets and pressure upon the Government by capitalist elements see A. L. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevanii Srednei Azii," Isforicheskiezapiski, IX (1940), 198ff.; E. V. Bunakov, "K istorii snoshenii Rossii s sredneaziatskimi khan- stvami v XIX v.," Sovetskoevostokovedenie, II, 5ff.; Aminov and Babakhod- zhaev, EkonomicheskieipoliticheskieposledstviiaprisoedineniiaSredneiAziikRossii (Tashkent, 1966), pp. 3, 11-16; IstoriiaSSSR, II (Moscow, 1949), 580-81. The fullest Soviet account of Russia's economic relations with Central Asia before the conquest is M. K. Rozhkova, EkonomicheskiesviaziRossiisoSredneiAzii40-60-egodyXIXveka (Moscow, 1963). Some Soviet accounts also emphasize that Russian expansion was a defensive reaction to aggressive moves by England. See E. L. Shteinberg, "Angliiskaia versiia o 'russkoi ugroze' Indii," Istoricheskiezapiski, XXXIII (1950), 47ff. Western accounts generally stress political and military factors as being more significant than economic causes of expansion. An excellent recent introduction to the problem is Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russia and the Middle East," in RussianForeignPolicy, ed. I. Lederer (New Haven, 1962), pp. 489ff. See also R. A. Pierce, RussianCentralAsia1867-1917 (Berkeley, 1960), pp. 17-18; Eugene 'i Schuyler, Turkistan (New York, 1877), II, 260-65; Geoffrey Wheeler, TheModernHistoryofSovietCentralAsia (London, 1964), pp. 48-52; and W. E. Mosse, Alexander77andtheModernizationofRussia, (New York, 1958), chapter VII.
2. N. A. Khalfin, PrisoedinenieSredneiAziikRossii(60-90-egodyXIXv.) (Moscow, 1965), based on painstaking research in numerous Soviet archives, is the most authoritative account of the Russian conquest. While emphasizing the primacy of commercial motives in expansion (1860-90's), it devotes attention also to political and military factors and contains a complete bibliography (pp. 446-67). See also Seymour Becker, Russia'sProtectoratesinCenttalAsia:BukharaandKhiva,1865-1924 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 16ff. 3.Turkestanskiikrai.Sbornikmaterialovdliaistoriiegozavoevanii, compiled by Colonel A. G. Serebrennikov, I-VIII, XVII-XXII (Tashkent, 1912-16). Serebrennikov gathered material from all of the principal archives of Imperial Russia for the period, 1837-76, enough to fill seventy volumes. Only fourteen volumes were published, but XVII-XXII span the years, 1864-66, and contain hundreds of reports, memoranda and comments by Government leaders and generals who directed the process of expansion. 4. Notably Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Muzei (Moscow), Otdel pismennykh istochnikov, M. G. Cherniaev fond (henceforth GIM, Cherniaev), the general's personal archive; and Otdel rukopisei biblioteki im. Lenina (Moscow), D. A. Miliutin fond (henceforth ORBL, Miliutin). 5. The controversy over this question is suggested by differing views in Lederer's RussianForeignPolicy. Hajo Holborn asserts in "Russia and the European Political System" (p. 391) that Alexander II could have forbidden Russian generals from advancing southward, but instead he "tolerated the re- fractory attitude of his colonial proconsuls .... This colonial expansion appealed to him." And Firuz Kazemzadeh declares: "But in fact the military were tightly controlled from St. Petersburg, all their moves being decided on the highest governmental level (p. 496)." How inaccurate this statement is for the mid-1860's will be shown below. Raymond Garthoff notes correctly that contrary to the British belief that the Russians were deceiving them about advances in Central Asia, "in fact there was simply lack of control from St. Petersburg." "Instruments of Policy," p. 248.
6. For an able recent treatment of the interaction of foreign and domestic issues in these years see A. J. Rieber, ed., ThePoliticsofAutocracy:LettersofAlexander77toPrinceA.1.Bariatinskii1857-1864 (The Hague, 1966). 7. Khalfin, p. 61. 8. On July 7, 1863, writing Foreign Minister Gorchakov in behalf of a Russian advance, War Minister Miliutin reiterated the traditional argument of his ministry: "In case of a European war we should especially value the occupa- tion of [Kokand khanate] bringing us closer to the northern regions of India .... Ruling in Kokand, we can constantly threaten England's East Indian possessions. This is especially important since only there can we be dangerous to this enemy of ours." Cited in Popov, p. 211. 9. On Miliutin and his reforms see DnevnikD.A.Miliutina, 4 vols. (Mos- cow, 1947-50), especially P. A. Zaionchkovskii's "Biograficheskii ocherk," I, 5-72; Zaionchkovskii's Voennyereformy1860-1870godovvRossii (Moscow, 1952); and Forrest Miller, DmitriiMiliutinandtheReformErainRussia (Nashville, Tenn., 1968)
10. Count N. P. Ignat'ev, its director ( 1861-64), was a leading advocate of an aggressive policy in Central Asia, working closely with Miliutin to promote it. His successor, P. N. Stremoukhov (1864-75), became though perhaps the most vigorous opponent in the government of Central Asian expansion because of his native caution and close relationship with Gorchakov. 11. In a special committee, which was convened on February 23, 1863, to discuss Central Asian expansion, Reitern opposed suggestions to "close the lines", arguing that this would "divert these forces [labor and capital] from the heart of Russia." He declared that Russia must "renounce for a time offensive operations in Central Asia." His arguments carried the day. Popov, p. 209. 12. In Orenburg on the western approaches to Central Asia presided A. P. Bezak (1860-65), then N. A. Kryzhanovskii (1865-81), both ardent expan- sionists. In Omsk, capital of Western Siberia, ruled A. O. Diugamel' (1861-66), a cautious governor opposed to dangerous adventures. 13. Robert Tucker aptly states: "The policy of the [Russian] states in inter- nal and external affairs was literally the policy of the one person [the emperor], subject only to those influences to which he might prove susceptible." "Auto- crats and Oligarchs," in RussianForeignPolicy, p. 173.
14. Colonel M. G. Cherniaev (1828-98), then chief of staff in Orenburg, in the spring of 1863 commanded a reconnaissance expedition which captured Suzak and advanced to the walls of the Kokanese city of Turkestan. 15. Popov, pp. 210-12. 16. Internationaal Instituut voor sociale Geschiedenis (Amsterdam), Arkhiv Cherniaevykh, No. 17 (henceforth I. I., Arkhiv Cherniaevykh), Cherniaev to his parents, June 29, 1864.
17. Before Verevkin advanced, General Bezak requested the Government's permission to alter the plan of campaign by assaulting Turkestan and making it the administrative center of the new steppe line. The Emperor agreed pro- vided there was "a clear and certain prospect" that the city could be captured and permanently garrisoned. Turkestanskiikrai, XVII, 97-98, Bezak to Miliutin, April 4, 1864. All dates are Old Style. 18.Ibid., pp. 127-28, No. 80; pp. 156-57, No. 96. 19. Butakov to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii (1864), "Iz arkhiva Kniazia Bariatin- skago," RusskiiArkhiv, 3 (1889), pp. 137-139. 20.Turk.krai, XVII, 213-14, Cherniaev to Diugamel, July 6, 1864. 21.Ibid., pp. 214-16, Verevkin to Cherniaev, July 7; Verevkin to Bezak, July 8. Verevkin and Bezak both criticized Cherniaev's move against Chimkent as excessively risky and exhausting for the troops. P. 242, Bezak to Miliutin, July 18, telegram. 22. Cherniaev, promoted to major general, became its commander under Orenburg's jurisdiction. Ibid., pp. 238-39, Miliutin to Bezak, July 18.
23.Ibid., XVIII, 113-16, Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, August 20. In accord- ance with Cherniaev's wishes, this "private letter" was passed on to the War Minister. 24. "It brilliantly dispelled all doubts and fears here [St. Petersburg]," commented Poltoratskii, "whether or not to take Chimkent." GIM, Cherniaev, edinitsa khranenii, 49, Poltoratskii to Cherniaev, October 22, 1864. Governor General Diugamel' agreed: "The conquest of Chimkent, in my view, comprises an indispensable supplement to what has already been achieved this year." And the Emperor commented tersely: "A glorious affair." Turk.krai, XVIII, 123-24, 139, Diugamel' to War Minister, October 5, 15. 25.Ibid., pp. 116-17, Rezoliutsiia of September 29. The next day Miliutin tele- graphed Diugamel' to order Cherniaev to go no further. 26. GIM, Cherniaev, ed. khr. 49, comment on letter of Poltoratskii to Cher- niaev, October 22.
27. ORBL, Miliutin, "Moi starcheskie vospominaniia," karton 15, no. 1, liniia 126-27. General Kachalov, Cherniaev's second-in-command, opposed an advance on Tashkent but in vain. Khalfin, p. 160. 28.Tark.krai, XVIII, 221, comment of December 2. 29. GIM, Cherniaev, ed. khr. 6, 11. 27-28 reverse, Diugamel' to Cherniaev, November 12, private letter. Confirming that this reverse had been a painful blow for the Government and was unauthorized, Miliutin wrote later: "It was revealed definitely that Cherniaev had not wished to learn the Government's views and had acted on his own hook contrary to the most categoric instruc- tions from his superiors." ORBL, Miliutin, k. 15, no. 1, 11. 125ff.
30.Turk.krai, XVIII, 165-72, Gorchakov's report to the Emperor, October 31. 31. Ibid., 250. Miliutin recommended that firm orders be sent to Cherniaev not to advance one step beyond Chimkent and to determine where the frontier should be drawn between Chimkent and Tashkent. He did not know that Cherniaev had already assaulted Tashkent.
32.Ibid., pp. 196-202, Memorandum of the War and Foreign Ministers to the Emperor, November 20. 33. For the text of the November 21 circular see S. S. Tatishchev, ImperatorAleksandr11,egozhizn'itsarstvovanie, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1903), II, 115-16. 34. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 15, no. 1, 1. 128 reverse. I
35.Turk.krai, XIX, 33, Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, January 22, 1865. 36. Ibid., 26-30, Cherniaev to Miliutin, January 21. 37.Ibid., pp. 37-40, Journal of the committee examining the question of the organization of Orenburg region and Asiatic Russia, January 25. The Emperor approved its decision on February 2. Ibid., p. 59, Order of the War Minister, February 12. 38. Ibid., pp. 49-50, Miliutin to Acting Commander Orenburg (Levengof), Feb- ruary 2, telegram; pp. 91-92, Verigin to Cherniaev, February 26. 39. Khalfin, pp. 186-87.
40.Turk.krai, XIX, 81-85, Gorchakov to Kryzhanovskii, February 23. This I approach was reiterated in Kryzhanovskii to Levengof, June 5, 1865, p. 192, telegram, and likewise received the Emperor's approval. , 41. In the draft of this instruction which Kryzhanovskii sent to the War Minister after "attack in their own lands" came the phrase, "and take Tash- kent." Opposite this Miliutin wrote: "Would it not be safer not to refer to the taking of Tashkent?" And in Kryzhanovskii's instruction to Cherniaev this phrase was indeed omitted. Terent'ev, I, 307. 42.Turk.krai, XIX, 85-88, Commander Orenburg (Kryzhanovskii) to Cher- niaev, February 25. 43. Terent'ev, I, 307. ! 44. According to Kachalov, Cherniaev's second-in-command, Cherniaev feared that Kryzhanovskii "would take it into his head to lead the army to Tashkent himself, capture it, obtain a count's title and we workingmen would be made fools of." Kachalov to Danzas, August 5, 1865, cited in Khalfin, p. 192. 45. Khalfin, asserting that the Foreign Ministry's appeals to the army to halt its advances was a mere smokescreen, believes that Cherniaev's attack on Tashkent "fully corresponded with the designs of the Government and the military-feudal aristocracy of the Russian Empire as well as commercial-indus- trial circles." He suggests incorrectly that there was no basic divergence within the Government over policy in Central Asia. (p. 191). I
46.Turk.krai, XIX, 138-140, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, April 23. il 47.Ibid., pp. 146-47, May 2 (Niazbek). 48.Ibid., pp. 201-04, June 11; 244ff., July 7. 49. Cherniaev recalled, wrote his daughter, A. M. Cherniaeva, that on the !� eve of the assault this telegram arrived from the War Minister: "Do not risk an assault in view of the inadequate resources at your disposal." Hastily pocket- ing the telegram, Cherniaev informed no one fearing that some of his officers might refuse to attack. I. I. Amsterdam, "Biografiia Cherniaeva," notebook 4, pp. 161-62. 50.Turk.krai, XIX, 244ff., Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, July 7. j 51.Ibid., pp. 270, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, July 14 enclosing a copy of Cher- � niaev's report of June 17; Emperor's comment of August 9 in Voernno-isfo- fl richeskiivestnik, 2 (1915).
52. GIM, Cherniaev, ed. khr. 2, 1. 3, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich to Cherniaev, November 13, 1865. 53. The "raid" caused the Battle of Ikan (December 4-6, 1864) in which one Cossack sotnia fought Alimkul's entire army. 54.Turk.krai, XIX, 254-55, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, July 8; 265-68, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, July 13, citing Cherniaev's report of June 26. 55.Ibid., pp. 270-72, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, July 15. Soon Kryzhanovskii concluded, however, that the arrest of Bukharan merchants would damage Rus- sian trade more than Bukhara's. Ibid., pp. 278-79, July 19. 56. Ibid., p. 292, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, July 29. A letter from Orenburg j which reached the War Minister described the devastating effect of Cherniaev's "extremely ill-considered and precipitate measure" upon merchants there. Ibid., XX, 37-38. 57.Ibid., pp. 152-153, excerpt from journal of Committee of Ministers. The Emperor approved their decision October 22.
58. Ibid., XIX, 291-92, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, July 29. 59. Ibid., XX, 5, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, August 6. i 60.Ibid., p. 23, Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, August 15. 1 61. Ibid., pp. 42-43, Gorchakov to Miliutin, August 31. ' 62. Ibid., p. 63, Miliutin to Gorchakov, September 10. !
63. Ibid., pp. 66-70, "Zamechaniia na raport voennago gubernatora Turkestan- I skoi oblasti ot 6 avgusta 1865 g. No. 2962," attached to Stremoukhov to Miliu- tin, September 17.
64.Ibid., pp. 47-48, Kryzhanovskii to Stremoukhov, September 3 (Fort No. 1). 65. Before Kryzhanovskii arrived, Cherniaev wrote Poltoratskii: "Little re- mains to be done in order to consolidate the Turkestan governor's prestige in Central Asia and the Orenburg governor general's arrival in the capacity of a superior with large means will not contribute to that end ...." Ibid., p. 23, August 15. 66. D. I. Romanovskii, Zametkiposredneaziatskomavoprosu (St. Petersburg, 1867), documents, pp. 177-79. Subsequently, the War Minister suggested that the Tashkenters' rejection of Kryzhanovskii's proposal for a khanate and their praise of Cherniaev's administration might well have been arranged by Cher- niaev. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 15, no. 2, 11. 75-76. And Terent'ev (I, 327-28) intimates that the signatures of fifty-eight leading citizens of Tashkent may have been placed on a blank piece of paper. 67. While Kryzhanovskii was still in Tashkent Cherniaev wrote: "I used to fear that the governor general's arrival would weaken my prestige in the eyes of the populace ... , but my fears proved groundless. Kryzhanovski ... alarmed the city with his inappropriate proclamation about a khan. Fortunately, he ... renounced his intention ... to make a khan and form a Tashkent state during his ten day visit here." Turks,krai, pp. 79-80, Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, Septem- ber 25.
68. Ibid., pp. 81-82, Cherniaev to Miliutin, September 28. 69. Ibid., pp. 98-101, Kryzhanovskii's instructions to Cherniaev, September 29 ( Tashkent) . 70. Much later Cherniaev recalled that Kryzhanovskii had sent his assistant, D. I. Romanovskii, to him urging an immediate campaign against Kokand. Cherniaev replied that too few troops were available for this. I. I., Amsterdam, Arkhiv Cherniaevykh, "Avtobiografiia M. G. Cherniaeva," p. 13. Kryzhanovskii, notes Terent'ev, yearned for action and wrote Cherniaev Sep- tember 30: "In case of an advance, leave only three companies in Tashkent and let the inhabitants slaughter each other [rezat' drug druga] if such an occupa- tion pleases them." Terent'ev, I, 328. 71.Turk.krai, XX, 103-04, Stremoukhov to Kryzhanovskii, September 30. An advance even to the Naryn River "would raise a hullaballoo [kriku] and undermine Europe's last confidence in us. In truth the game is not worth the I candle. I am fully confident, on the basis of your letters, that the fever of conquest and the excessively broad views raging too fiercely in Turkestan oblast will not affect you and that you will direct this excessive energy into more useful activity." This warning did not reach Kryzhanovskii until he re- turned to Orenburg. 72.Ibid., pp. 111-12, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, October 5.
73.Ibid., pp. 134-40, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, October 23. 74. The Foreign Ministry was especially pleased by Kryzhanovskii's reaf- firmation of official policy, and the Emperor commented: "I approve fully all of his ideas and measures." Gorchakov informed the Orenburg governor: "At the Emperor's will all Central Asian negotiations remain exclusively in your hands." Ibid., p. 190, Gorchakov to Kryzhanovskii, November 15, secret telegram; pp. 191- 92, Stremoukhov to Kryzhanovskii, November 15. And the War Minister confirmed that the Government opposed acquiring more territory and any offensive operations. Ibid., pp. 193-96. Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, November 17. 75.Ibid., p. 102, Kryzhanovskii to Cherniaev, September 29. 76.Ibid., pp. 105-06, Cherniaev to Emir, October 1865; pp. 130-33, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, October 23, No. 3. Commented Kryzhanovskii: "This is in- compatible with the declarations and views of our Government." 77.Ibid., Cherniaev explained: "Considering it essential to ascertain on the spot the actions of the English and in order not to antagonize the Emir with another refusal, I decided to send the letter and presents to the Emir via Struve who is attached to me." 78.Ibid., pp. 187-88, Kryzhanovskii to Cherniaev, November 14, No. 24.
79.Ibid., pp. 184-86, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, November 14, No. 22. In regard to Tashkent, Kryzhanovskii wrote: "There is no doubt that Major General Cherniaev did not ... make my proclamation public so that my declaration to Tashkent's most influential citizens ... remained without results. It turns out that the Tashkent question has taken a turn incompatible with the Government's aims and very embarrassing to me." 80.Ibid., pp. 193-96, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, November 17. 81. Ibid., p. 243, excerpt from Miliutin's telegram to Kryzhanovskii of Novem- ber 26 in Kryzhanovskii to Cherniaev, December 29. 82. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 15, no. 3, 11. 122-123 reverse.
83. T'ark.krai, XX, 230-37, Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, December 20. 84. N. A. Severtsov, attached to Cherniaev's command, wrote: "Mikhail Grigorevich [Cherniaev] fears that some sort of insults from Orenburg may irritate the Emir .... Differing and contradictory relations with the Emir by Orenburg and Tashkent may make a mess of things, and then probably Mikhail Grigorevich will be blamed for others' mistakes." Ibid., p. 226, Severtsov to Poltoratskii, December 20. 85. Ibid., XXI, 26-27, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, January 20, 1866 en- ■ closing letter to Emir. I 86. Ibid., p. 60ff., Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, February 14. It is interesting that i official War Ministry accounts written soon after Cherniaev's removal exonerate him and place the entire blame on Bukhara for the hostilities of 1866. Declared Voennyisbornik, XLIX (June 1866), 167-68: "Compelled by circumstances Major General Cherniaev ordered his troops across the Syr-Dar'ia River in order by this threat to induce the Emir to satisfy his legitimate demand to free our officials." And in the next issue: "The entire course of the present
conflict with Bukhara shows that the war was not caused by us. We did every- thing possible to avoid hostile relations with Bukhara .... If the Emir dares to challenge us to fight, then we must ... protect the interests of our subjects and our trade from the Emir's arbitrary despotism." Ibid., L (July 1866), "Bukharskie dela," 48-49. For a general, and favorable, assessment of Cher- niaev's role in Turkestan see Ibid., LXIII (September 1868), 126. 87. ORBL, Miliutin, papka 36, no. 21, Miliutin to Romanovskii, May 16, 1866. 88. Romanovskii, pp. 39-40. 89.Tur/f.krai, XXII, 176-78, Memorandum of Romanovskii, November 1866. 90. In November, 1866, he brought this to St. Petersburg, confronting Kryzha- novskii who had accompanied him to protect his vested interest in Orenburg's continued control over Turkestan. N. G. Zalesov, "Zapiski," RusskaiaStarina, CXV (August 1903), 339-40. 91. In January, 1866, Kryzhanovskii urged an immediate expedition to occupy it and base ships of the Aral Flotilla on the Amu-Dar'ia River in order to forestall the English, but the War Ministry and Foreign Ministry rejected the idea because of the expense involved. Turk.krai, XXI, 36-37, Kryzhanovskii to Miliutin, January 26; pp. 56-59, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, February 8. This episode apparently made Kryzhanovskii more determined than ever to score a personal military success.
92. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 15, no. 3, 11. 126-130 reverse. 93.Turk.krai, XXII, 73-74, Miliutin to Gorchakov, September 21. "To halt now the movement of General Kryzhanovskii is already wholly impossible, since any orders from here would only reach him after a month when the whole expedition will have been completed and Kokand's fate decided. This will be a faitaccompli."94.Ibid., Gorchakov's report to the Emperor, September 23. I 95. Ibid., p. 112, Stremoukhov to Miliutin, October 8. 96. Ibid., pp. 125-25, October 25.
97.Ibid., pp. 230-32, Memorandum of the War Minister, December 12. 98. See D. MacKenzie, "Kaufman of Turkestan: An Assessment of His Administration, 1867-1881," SlavicReview,XXVI, 2 (June 1967), 266.