A CRITIQUE OF LAURENCE BONJOUR’S CENTRAL ARGUMENTS FOR A PRIORI FALLIBILISM

in Danish Yearbook of Philosophy
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This paper urges that Laurence BonJour fails to make the case for an all-out a priori fallibilism “as clear as anything philosophical could be.” Firstly, the paper introduces a number of distinctions of vital importance to the relevant debate. On the basis of those distinctions, it is argued that several interesting a priori infallibilist claims are not targeted by BonJour’s central a priori fallibilist arguments. After this, the paper confronts BonJour’s arguments on their own terms, attempts to fairly regiment them, and ensuingly brings out their weaknesses, thus regimented.

A CRITIQUE OF LAURENCE BONJOUR’S CENTRAL ARGUMENTS FOR A PRIORI FALLIBILISM

in Danish Yearbook of Philosophy

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