See, e.g., A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30.

 See, e.g., A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See, e.g., Harris (2009), 302. In Austria v. Italy, 6 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (1963), pp. 782 and 784, the Commission came close to a stance in the matter, but did still only say that it must be sufficiently strong according to law. However, it is possible that the Court, if presented with a case where criminal liability has been established on too low a standard of proof, indeed would establish a breach of Article 6(2).

 Jayawickrama et al. (2002), 29-30, argue in relation to corruption that ‘[t]he expression “reverse onus” is perhaps both unfortunate and inaccurate…. To ease the burden of proof ought not to be regarded as “shifting” the burden to the accused person. … To “ease” the burden of proof should be viewed as drawing the right balance between the rights of the accused person and the interests of the community in situations where, without eroding the rights, common sense dictates that an explanation be sought from an official of disproportionate wealth’.

 See Jayawickrama et al. (2002), 28. On different kinds of presumptions, see Rui (2012), 433-434.

 See Herlin-Karnell (2012), 111.

 See Emiliou (1996), 191-194. Also J. Vogel in U. Sieber, F. H. Brüner, H. Satzger and B. von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), Europäisches Strafrecht (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), 158.

 See A. Strandbakken, Uskyldspresumsjonen. “In dubio pro reo” (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2001), 255-256. To the extent that forfeiture concerns instrumentalities and is motivated by the danger of further criminality that it poses, Jayawickrama et al. (2002), 25 (note 7) note that forfeiture is penal (at least partly) in that a loss is inflicted on the offender.

 See A. Strandbakken, Uskyldspresumsjonen. “In dubio pro reo” (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2001), 255-256. To the extent that forfeiture concerns instrumentalities and is motivated by the danger of further criminality that it poses, Jayawickrama et al. (2002), 25 (note 7) note that forfeiture is penal (at least partly) in that a loss is inflicted on the offender.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

 See, e.g., SOU 1960:28 (H. Thornstedt), 22.

 Strandbakken (2001), 255-256. M. Matningsdal, Inndragning (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987), 115 argues that value confiscation (confiscation of the value of certain property or profit in the form of an obligation to pay a certain amount) has stronger penal features than specie confiscation and can be compared with fines.

 See, e.g., von Hirsch (1993), 9-13 and R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 86-88. Thorburn and Manson (2007), 279 describe criminal punishment as: ‘first and foremost a mechanism for the state to communicate the community’s censure of us for our violation of the criminal law. In order to provide an added incentive to obey, the censure of criminal punishment is communicated by means of hard treatment. Accordingly, the severity of the hard treatment imposed on us communicates the degree of censure the state means to convey.’

 Matningsdal (1987), 115 also points out that confiscation resembles ‘mirroring punishments’ in the sense that it is so concrete in relation to the actual offence compared to ordinary punishments. Thus it fulfils an important symbolic-pedagogical function (on this function, see Hurwitz (1930), p. 63-64).

 See, e.g., Sproat (2009), 147.