The Anti-Mercenary Norm and United Nations’ Use of Private Military and Security Companies
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsSearch for other papers by Oldrich Bures in
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Abstract
This article offers an analysis of the influence of the anti-mercenary norm on the United Nations’ use of services provided by private military and security companies (PMSCs). It follows a constructivist approach which focuses on violations of the anti-mercenary norm within the UN system and on the justifications and condemnations of these violations in official UN documents. The findings suggest that while the anti-mercenary norm is no longer puritanical, two key aspects of the norm—the lack of a proper cause and the lack of control—remain influential within the UN system. Although all parts of the UN system nowadays routinely use a wide variety of services of PMSCs and the UN Secretary-General officially sanctioned security outsourcing in 2011, the UN continues to insist that it is only using PMSCs as a last resort, when no other options are available. The continuing need to justify the use of PMSCs’ services suggests that this practice challenges both the long-established identity of the UN as a key anti-mercenary norm entrepreneur and its ontological security.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2231 | 366 | 18 |
| Full Text Views | 346 | 12 | 3 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 501 | 18 | 2 |
The Anti-Mercenary Norm and United Nations’ Use of Private Military and Security Companies
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsSearch for other papers by Oldrich Bures in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Jeremy Meyer in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
This article offers an analysis of the influence of the anti-mercenary norm on the United Nations’ use of services provided by private military and security companies (PMSCs). It follows a constructivist approach which focuses on violations of the anti-mercenary norm within the UN system and on the justifications and condemnations of these violations in official UN documents. The findings suggest that while the anti-mercenary norm is no longer puritanical, two key aspects of the norm—the lack of a proper cause and the lack of control—remain influential within the UN system. Although all parts of the UN system nowadays routinely use a wide variety of services of PMSCs and the UN Secretary-General officially sanctioned security outsourcing in 2011, the UN continues to insist that it is only using PMSCs as a last resort, when no other options are available. The continuing need to justify the use of PMSCs’ services suggests that this practice challenges both the long-established identity of the UN as a key anti-mercenary norm entrepreneur and its ontological security.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2231 | 366 | 18 |
| Full Text Views | 346 | 12 | 3 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 501 | 18 | 2 |
