Exploring the UN and OPCW Partnership in Syrian Chemical Weapons Disarmament
Interorganizational Cooperation and Autonomy
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsSearch for other papers by Karim Makdisi in
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Search for other papers by Coralie Pison Hindawi in
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Abstract
After reviewing recent literature on international organizations’ autonomy and cooperation, this article explores the unprecedented partnership between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention—and the UN Secretariat during the 2013–2014 chemical weapons disarmament in Syria. The article explores how this collaboration, embodied on the ground through the creation of a Joint Mission, evolved from hesitant, bureaucratic rivalry to an increasingly intense relationship in the aftermath of a large-scale attack near Damascus in August 2013. The research is based on wide-ranging interviews with senior OPCW and UN staff, and relevant state officials. The article shows how international shocks, high-level support from key Member States, and leadership at the Secretariat level produced requisite intra- and interorganizational consensus to mitigate turf wars. Relative autonomy of mission staff and bureaucratic flexibility further allowed skilled boundary spanners to build trust and increase the mission’s leeway, allowing it to navigate complex political challenges.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1131 | 132 | 20 |
| Full Text Views | 253 | 9 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 367 | 22 | 5 |
Exploring the UN and OPCW Partnership in Syrian Chemical Weapons Disarmament
Interorganizational Cooperation and Autonomy
In: Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsSearch for other papers by Karim Makdisi in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Coralie Pison Hindawi in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
After reviewing recent literature on international organizations’ autonomy and cooperation, this article explores the unprecedented partnership between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention—and the UN Secretariat during the 2013–2014 chemical weapons disarmament in Syria. The article explores how this collaboration, embodied on the ground through the creation of a Joint Mission, evolved from hesitant, bureaucratic rivalry to an increasingly intense relationship in the aftermath of a large-scale attack near Damascus in August 2013. The research is based on wide-ranging interviews with senior OPCW and UN staff, and relevant state officials. The article shows how international shocks, high-level support from key Member States, and leadership at the Secretariat level produced requisite intra- and interorganizational consensus to mitigate turf wars. Relative autonomy of mission staff and bureaucratic flexibility further allowed skilled boundary spanners to build trust and increase the mission’s leeway, allowing it to navigate complex political challenges.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1131 | 132 | 20 |
| Full Text Views | 253 | 9 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 367 | 22 | 5 |