The Astute and the Kindly Ones
Epistemological Remarks on Disagreements in Politics and Law
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Marc Andree Weber in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Recently, epistemologists have been much concerned with the question of whether or not we have to revise our beliefs if there are people whose epistemic position is as good as ours and who disagree with us. The results of such considerations, whatever they are, are sometimes said to be restricted to domains in which, unlike in politics or law, the relevant agents are not under any pressure to act in accordance with their beliefs, have no deeply held ideological beliefs, or have no beliefs that stem from their particular aims or desires. In response to this, and with regard to the paradigmatic cases of politics and law, this article argues that there are no genuine political or legal disagreements: what we call a political or legal disagreement is either no disagreement at all but a mere clash of interest, or it is a an empirical, moral, or practical disagreement that is not genuinely political or legal. To the latter, epistemological insights apply; to the former, they do not.
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The Astute and the Kindly Ones
Epistemological Remarks on Disagreements in Politics and Law
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Marc Andree Weber in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Recently, epistemologists have been much concerned with the question of whether or not we have to revise our beliefs if there are people whose epistemic position is as good as ours and who disagree with us. The results of such considerations, whatever they are, are sometimes said to be restricted to domains in which, unlike in politics or law, the relevant agents are not under any pressure to act in accordance with their beliefs, have no deeply held ideological beliefs, or have no beliefs that stem from their particular aims or desires. In response to this, and with regard to the paradigmatic cases of politics and law, this article argues that there are no genuine political or legal disagreements: what we call a political or legal disagreement is either no disagreement at all but a mere clash of interest, or it is a an empirical, moral, or practical disagreement that is not genuinely political or legal. To the latter, epistemological insights apply; to the former, they do not.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 126 | 126 | 13 |
| Full Text Views | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 132 | 132 | 1 |