Does Husserl Have an Argument against Representationalism?

in Grazer Philosophische Studien
Restricted Access
Get Access to Full Text
Rent on DeepDyve

Have an Access Token?



Enter your access token to activate and access content online.

Please login and go to your personal user account to enter your access token.



Help

Have Institutional Access?



Access content through your institution. Any other coaching guidance?



Connect

It is often said that by rejecting the representationalist model of mind, phenomenology makes a decisive advance over empiricism. Yet despite such pronouncements, the arguments Husserl uses to refute representationalism have received scant critical attention, and upon examination many turn out to be obscure. I argue here that some of Husserl's best known anti-representationalist arguments fail. I end the paper, however, by suggesting that if these unsuccessful arguments are paired with certain methodological considerations taken from Husserl's mature philosophy, they may provide adequate grounds for a rejection of representationalism after all.

Does Husserl Have an Argument against Representationalism?

in Grazer Philosophische Studien

Information

Content Metrics

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 26 26 4
Full Text Views 27 27 19
PDF Downloads 6 6 4
EPUB Downloads 0 0 0