The Cognitive Boundaries of Responsibility (Die kognitiven Grenzen der Verantwortung)
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienThis paper poses a new challenge to control-based theories of moral responsibility. Control-based theories – as defended, for instance, by Aristotle and John Martin Fischer – hold that an agent is responsible for an action only if she acted voluntarily and knew what she was doing. However, this paper argues that there is a large class of cases of unreflective behavior of which the following is true: (a) the persons involved did not have the kind of control required by control-based theories, yet (b) we intuitively take the persons involved to be morally responsible.
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The Cognitive Boundaries of Responsibility (Die kognitiven Grenzen der Verantwortung)
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienThis paper poses a new challenge to control-based theories of moral responsibility. Control-based theories – as defended, for instance, by Aristotle and John Martin Fischer – hold that an agent is responsible for an action only if she acted voluntarily and knew what she was doing. However, this paper argues that there is a large class of cases of unreflective behavior of which the following is true: (a) the persons involved did not have the kind of control required by control-based theories, yet (b) we intuitively take the persons involved to be morally responsible.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 349 | 49 | 1 |
| Full Text Views | 209 | 4 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 32 | 7 | 0 |