What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
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In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’ (aoa for short). The author attempts to give a substantive description of what aoa consists in in two ways, first, by listing some of its positive features, and second, by comparing it and contrasting it with introspection. The idea is that there are many different ways we can be aware of our experiences, introspection being one way, aoa being another, distinct way. By clarifying the distinction between aoa and introspection, we can get a better grasp of both phenomena.

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