An Account of Practical Decisions

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
View More View Less
Download Citation Get Permissions

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institution


Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):


This paper offers an account of practical decisions. The author argues that decisions do not need to be conscious, nor do they need to be settled by deliberation. Agents can be mistaken about what they decided and agents can decide by doing some intentional action besides deliberating. The author argues that the functional role of a decision is to put an end to practical uncertainty. A mental event is a decision to the extent that it ends practical uncertainty and to the extent that awareness of this causal role tends to reinforce that fact. This role is causal, but has systematic connections to consciousness.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 177 35 0
Full Text Views 174 3 0
PDF Views & Downloads 17 5 0