Why Intrinsicness Should Be Defined in a Non-reductive Way

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss 1
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Online Publication Date:
22 Feb 2018
In:
Volume 95: Issue 1
Article Type:
Research Article
Page Count:
1–14
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000021
Keywords:
intrinsic properties; extrinsic properties; natural properties; disjunctive properties; Langton and Lewis; reductive definition

Defining the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties has turned out to be one of the most difficult and controversial tasks in contemporary metaphysics. It is generally assumed that a definition of intrinsicness should aim to avoid as many counterexamples as possible and reduce the notion to less controversial philosophical notions. In this paper, the author argues for a new methodological approach to defining intrinsicness. Rather than trying to cover as many intuitive examples as possible, a definition of intrinsicness should reflect the crucial features of our intuitive understanding of the notion, and one of these features is that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has to be characterized in a non-reductive way.

In:
Grazer Philosophische Studien
E-ISSN:
1875-6735
Print ISSN:
0165-9227
Publisher:
Brill | Rodopi
Cover Grazer Philosophische Studien

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