The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the passive subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ cogito argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all our thoughts. Moreover, the author suggests that the cogito argument operates with the notion of a qua-object: it consists in the move from “I am thinking” to “I-qua-thinking am”. Seen in this way, the cogito argument by itself leaves entirely open what might be true of me insofar as I am not thinking.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Alanen Lilli 2016. “Self-Awareness and Cognitive Agency in Descartes’s Meditations”. Philosophical Topics 44(1), 3–26.
Almog Joseph 2002. What am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bäck Allan 1996. On Reduplication: Logical Theories of Qualification. Leiden: Brill.
Brown Deborah 2014. “The Sixth Meditation: Descartes and the Embodied Self”. In: The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations . Edited by Cunning David . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 240–257.
Burge Tyler 2000. “Reason and the First Person”. In: Knowing Our Own Minds. Edited by Wright Crispin , Smith Barry C. , and MacDonald Cynthia . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 243–270.
Campbell John 2012. “Lichtenberg and the Cogito”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(3), 361–378.
Carriero John 2009. Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chisholm Roderick 1969. “On the Observability of the Self”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30(1), 7–21.
Code Alan 1976. “Aristotle’s Response to Quine’s Objections to Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5(2), 159–186.
Cohen S. Marc 2008. “Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle’s Ontology”. Metaphilosophy 39(1), 3–19.
Cottingham John 1992. “Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science”. In: Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Edited by Cottingham John . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 236–257.
Descartes René 1996. Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Adam Charles and Tannery Paul (= AT). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin.
Descartes René 1988. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by Cottingham John , Stoothoff Robert , Murdoch Dugald , and Kenny Anthony (= CSM; vol. III = CSMK). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fine Kit 2005. Modality and Tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grimm Jacob and Wilhelm 1854–1961. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Leipzig: Hirzel.
Gupta Anil 1980. The Logic of Common Nouns. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hatfield Gary 2014. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations. London: Routledge.
Hennig Boris 2006. Conscientia bei Descartes. Freiburg: Alber Verlag.
Hennig Boris 2011. “‘Insofar as’ in Descartes’ Definition of Thought”. Studia Leibnitiana 43(2), 145–159.
Hintikka Jaakko 1996. “Cogito, ergo quis est?” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50(195), 5–21.
Hoffman Paul 1986. “The Unity of Descartes’s Man”. The Philosophical Review 95(3), 339–370.
Hume David 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Norton David Fate and Norton Mary J. . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis Frank A. 1982. “Accidental Sameness in Aristotle”. Philosophical Studies 42(1), 1–36.
Lichtenberg Georg Christoph 1994. Schriften und Briefe, edited by Promies Wolfgang . Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins.
Matthen Mohan 1983. “Greek Ontology and the ‘is’ of Truth”. Phronesis 28(2), 113–135.
Matthews Gareth 1982. “Accidental Unities”. In: Language and Logos. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha C. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223–240.
Mautner Franz H. 1968. Lichtenberg: Geschichte seines Geistes. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Menn Stephen 1998. Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge University Press.
Peacocke Christopher 2012. “Subjects and consciousness”. In: The Self and Self-Knowledge. Edited by Coliva Annalisa . Oxford University Press, 74–101.
Russell Bertrand 1967. History of Western Philosophy. New York: Touchstone.
Simmons Alison 2012. “Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered”. Philosophers’ Imprint 12(2), 1–21.
Tester Steven 2013. “G.C. Lichtenberg on Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity”. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95(3), 336–359.
Vender David . Lichtenberg’s Flash of Insight. Manuscript published via academia.edu (https://www.academia.edu/2369021/Lichtenberg_s_Flash_of_Insight).
Williams Bernard 2005. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. London: Routledge.
Zöller Günter 1992. “Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking”. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30(3), 417–441.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 2214 | 160 | 16 |
Full Text Views | 213 | 16 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 357 | 48 | 0 |
The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the passive subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ cogito argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all our thoughts. Moreover, the author suggests that the cogito argument operates with the notion of a qua-object: it consists in the move from “I am thinking” to “I-qua-thinking am”. Seen in this way, the cogito argument by itself leaves entirely open what might be true of me insofar as I am not thinking.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 2214 | 160 | 16 |
Full Text Views | 213 | 16 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 357 | 48 | 0 |