The Anti-induction for Scientific Realism

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
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In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.

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