Intrinsic Dispositional Properties and Immanent Realism

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien

Tugby (2013a) and Yates (2016) have recently argued that immanent realism is incompatible with the existence of intrinsic but (at least partially) relationally constituted genuine dispositional properties. The success of Tugby’s and Yates’ arguments depends either on a strong or on a weak assumption about the interworld identity of dispositional properties. In this paper, the author evaluates the strength of the arguments in question under those two assumptions. He also offers an alternative metaphysical picture for the fundamental dispositional properties which rejects these assumptions and, consequently, undermines the arguments themselves.

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