The Expressive Dimension and Score-changing Function of Speech Acts from the Evolutionist Point of View
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Maciej Witek in
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The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the author examines Mitchell account of the expressive power and score-changing function of speech acts; second, he develops an alternative, though also evolutionist approach to explaining these two hallmarks of verbal interaction. After discussing the central tenets of Green’s model, the author draws two distinctions – between externalist and internalist aspects of veracity, and between perlocutionary and illocutionary credibility – and argues that they constitute a natural refinement of Green’s original conceptual framework. Finally, the author uses the refined framework to develop an alternative account of expressing thoughts with words. In particular, he argues that in theorising about expressing thoughts with words – as well as about using language to change context – we should adopt a Millikanian view on what can be called, following Green, acts of communication and an Austinian approach to speech or illocutionary acts.
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Green Mitchell S. 2009. “Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States.” Mind & Language 24 (2), 139–163.
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Sbisà Marina 2019. “Varieties of Speech Act Norms.” In: Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions, edited by Witek M. & Witczak-Plisiecka I. , Leiden: Brill, 23–50.
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Searle John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Searle John R. 1979. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Witek Maciej 2015a. “An Interactional Account of Illocutionary Practice.” Language Sciences 47, 43–55.
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Witek Maciej 2019. “Coordination and Norms in Illocutionary Interaction.” In: Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions, edited by Witek M. & Witczak-Plisiecka I. , Leiden: Brill, 66–97.
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The Expressive Dimension and Score-changing Function of Speech Acts from the Evolutionist Point of View
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Maciej Witek in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the author examines Mitchell account of the expressive power and score-changing function of speech acts; second, he develops an alternative, though also evolutionist approach to explaining these two hallmarks of verbal interaction. After discussing the central tenets of Green’s model, the author draws two distinctions – between externalist and internalist aspects of veracity, and between perlocutionary and illocutionary credibility – and argues that they constitute a natural refinement of Green’s original conceptual framework. Finally, the author uses the refined framework to develop an alternative account of expressing thoughts with words. In particular, he argues that in theorising about expressing thoughts with words – as well as about using language to change context – we should adopt a Millikanian view on what can be called, following Green, acts of communication and an Austinian approach to speech or illocutionary acts.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 371 | 40 | 8 |
| Full Text Views | 25 | 6 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 31 | 12 | 3 |