Contextualist accounts of aesthetic predicates have difficulties explaining why we feel that speakers are disagreeing when they make true and compatible but superficially contradictory aesthetic judgments. One possible way to account for the disagreement is hybrid expressivism, which holds that the disagreement happens at the level of pragmatically conveyed, clashing contents about the speakers’ conative states. Marques (2016) defends such a strategy, combining dispositionalism about value, contextualism, and hybrid expressivism. This paper critically evaluates the plausibility of the suggested pragmatic mechanisms in conveying the kind of contents Marques takes to explain disagreements. The positive part suggests an alternative account of how aesthetic judgments are sources of information about speakers’ conative aesthetic states.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Barker Stephen J. 2000. “Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?” Analysis 60 (267), 268–279.
Cappelen Herman , and Hawthorne John 2009. Relativism and Monadic Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cepollaro Bianca , and Stojanovic Isidora 2016. “Hybrid Evaluatives: In Defense of a Presuppositional Account.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3), 458–488.
Chierchia Gennaro 2004. “Scalar Implicatures, Polarity Phenomena and the Syntax/Pragmatics Interface.” In: Structures and Beyond. Edited by Adriana Belletti, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 39–103.
Copp David 2001. “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2), 1–43.
Egan Andy 2010. “Disputing About Taste.” In: Disagreement. Edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 247–286.
Finlay Stephen 2005. “Value and Implicature.” Philosopher’s Imprint 5 (4), 1–20.
Franzén Nils 2018. “Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4), 669–682.
Geach Peter 1956. “Good and Evil.” Analysis 17, 33–42.
Glanzberg Michael 2007. “Context, Content and Relativism.” Philosophical Studies 136, 1–29.
Grice Paul 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Huvenes Torfinn Thomesen 2012. “Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1), 167–181.
Kant Immanuel 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karttunen Lauri 1973. “Presuppositions of Compound Sentences.” Linguistic Inquiry 4 (2), 169–193.
Korsmeyer Carolyn 2001. “Taste.” In: The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. Edited by Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, London and New York: Routledge, 193–202.
Kölbel Max 2004. “Faultless Disagreement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, 53–73.
Lasersohn Peter 2005. “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 28, 643–686.
Levinson Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press.
Lewis David 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63, 113–137.
Lopez de Sa, Dan 2008. “Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement.” In: Relative Truth. Edited by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 297–310.
Marques Teresa 2016. “Aesthetic Predicates: A Hybrid Dispositional Account.” Inquiry 59 (6), 723–751.
Menninghaus Winfried , Wagner, Valentin, Wassiliwizky, Eugen, Schindler, Ines, Hanich, Julian, Jacobsen, Thomas, and Koelsch, Stefan 2018. “What Are Aesthetic Emotions?”, https://www.aesthetics.mpg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dateien_LIT/WM_et_al__What_are_aesthetic_emotions.pdf, doi: 10.1037/rev0000135, access 1.02.2019.
Meskin Aaron , and Robson Jon 2015. “Taste and Acquaintance.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2), 127–139.
Ninan Dilip 2014. “Taste Predicates and the Acquaintance Inference.” Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24, 290–309.
Potts Christopher 2015. “Presupposition and Implicature.” In: The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Edited by Shalom Lappin and Chris Fox, 2nd ed., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 168–202.
Ridge Michael 2006. “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege.” Ethics 116 (2), 302–336.
Robinson Jenefer 2005. Deeper Than Reason – Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schaffer Jonathan 2011. “Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.” In: Epistemic Modality. Edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179–226.
Schellekens Elisabeth , and Goldie Peter (eds.) 2012. The Aesthetic Mind – Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder Mark 2009. “Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.” Ethics 119 (2), 257–309.
Shanon Benny 1976. “On the Two Kinds of Presuppositions in Natural Language.” Foundations of Language 14, 247–249.
Shusterman Richard 1997. “The End of Aesthetic Experience.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55 (1), 29–41.
Shusterman Richard , and Tomlin Adele (eds.) 2008. Aesthetic Experience. London: Routledge.
Sibley Frank 2001. Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics. Edited by Benson John , Redfern Betty , and Cox Jeremy Roxbee . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker Robert 1974. “Pragmatic Presuppositions.” In: Semantics and Philosophy. Edited by Milton K. Munitz and Peter Unger, New York: New York University Press, 197–213.
Sundell Timothy 2011. “Disagreements About Taste.” Philosophical Studies 155, 267–288.
Väyrynen Pekka 2013. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty – a Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 452 | 71 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 42 | 0 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 58 | 1 | 0 |
Contextualist accounts of aesthetic predicates have difficulties explaining why we feel that speakers are disagreeing when they make true and compatible but superficially contradictory aesthetic judgments. One possible way to account for the disagreement is hybrid expressivism, which holds that the disagreement happens at the level of pragmatically conveyed, clashing contents about the speakers’ conative states. Marques (2016) defends such a strategy, combining dispositionalism about value, contextualism, and hybrid expressivism. This paper critically evaluates the plausibility of the suggested pragmatic mechanisms in conveying the kind of contents Marques takes to explain disagreements. The positive part suggests an alternative account of how aesthetic judgments are sources of information about speakers’ conative aesthetic states.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 452 | 71 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 42 | 0 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 58 | 1 | 0 |