Victor Verdejo’s paper ‘On Having the Same First Person Thoughts’ introduces an interesting and fruitful framework for applying the type-token distinction to first person thoughts. He draws a three-way distinction between types, instantiable types, and instantiated types, and uses that distinction to open up a conceptual space for the possibility of shareable first person thoughts. This note distinguishes two types of interpersonal shareability and argues that Verdejo’s suggestions about instantiable types can only secure shareability of the first kind, but not the second. The author then shows how his own account of what he terms the token-sense of “I” (Bermúdez 2011 and 2017) succeeds in making possible this second type of interpersonal shareability, despite the criticisms in Verdejo’s paper.
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Bermúdez José Luis 2011. “Self-knowledge and the Sense of “I”.” In Hatzimoysis Anthony (Ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236–245.
Bermúdez José Luis 2017. Understanding “I”: Language and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dummett Michael 1981. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. London: Duckworth.
Evans Gareth 1981. “Understanding Demonstratives.” In Parret Herman (Ed.), Meaning and Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 280–304.
Evans Gareth 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morgan Daniel 2009. “Can You Think My ‘I’‐Thoughts?” The Philosophical Quarterly 59, 68–85.
Smiley Timothy 1996. “Rejection.” Analysis 56, 1–9.
Verdejo Victor 2018. “On Having the Same First Person Thoughts.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4), 566–587.
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Victor Verdejo’s paper ‘On Having the Same First Person Thoughts’ introduces an interesting and fruitful framework for applying the type-token distinction to first person thoughts. He draws a three-way distinction between types, instantiable types, and instantiated types, and uses that distinction to open up a conceptual space for the possibility of shareable first person thoughts. This note distinguishes two types of interpersonal shareability and argues that Verdejo’s suggestions about instantiable types can only secure shareability of the first kind, but not the second. The author then shows how his own account of what he terms the token-sense of “I” (Bermúdez 2011 and 2017) succeeds in making possible this second type of interpersonal shareability, despite the criticisms in Verdejo’s paper.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 389 | 25 | 2 |
Full Text Views | 22 | 1 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 31 | 7 | 0 |