Are Frege’s Thoughts Fregean Propositions?
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Eduardo Pérez-Navarro in
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One of the most pressing issues in contemporary semantics is whether propositions are structured entities that should be individuated in terms of their components or, contrarily, they lack structure and should be individuated in terms of their inferential relations. Another one is whether propositions should always contain all the information that is needed to deem them true or false—whether they should always be Fregean propositions. The latter debate might seem to presuppose a certain position in the former. However, it is the first aim of this paper to argue that the two debates are orthogonal. Moreover, we will use Frege’s thoughts as an example of what we would contemporarily call ‘propositions’ that, though trivially Fregean, lack structure. Since it is not uncontroversial that Frege’s thoughts are unstructured, it is the second aim of this paper to show that it follows from Frege’s writings that they are.
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Are Frege’s Thoughts Fregean Propositions?
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Eduardo Pérez-Navarro in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
One of the most pressing issues in contemporary semantics is whether propositions are structured entities that should be individuated in terms of their components or, contrarily, they lack structure and should be individuated in terms of their inferential relations. Another one is whether propositions should always contain all the information that is needed to deem them true or false—whether they should always be Fregean propositions. The latter debate might seem to presuppose a certain position in the former. However, it is the first aim of this paper to argue that the two debates are orthogonal. Moreover, we will use Frege’s thoughts as an example of what we would contemporarily call ‘propositions’ that, though trivially Fregean, lack structure. Since it is not uncontroversial that Frege’s thoughts are unstructured, it is the second aim of this paper to show that it follows from Frege’s writings that they are.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 694 | 113 | 15 |
| Full Text Views | 50 | 15 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 86 | 33 | 0 |