Arneson, Richard J . 1999. “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction.” In: Human Flourishing. Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller Jr . & Jeffrey Paul , New York: Cambridge University Press, 113–142.

Arneson, Richard J . 1999. “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction.” In: Human Flourishing . Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller Jr . & Jeffrey Paul , New York: Cambridge University Press, 113–142.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Darwall, Stephen 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Darwall, Stephen 2002. Welfare and Rational Care . Princeton: Princeton University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Fletcher, Guy 2009. “Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.” Philosophical Studies 157, no. 1, 77–91.

Fletcher, Guy 2009. “Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.” Philosophical Studies 157, no. 1, 77–91.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Fletcher, Guy 2013. “A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.” Utilitas 25, no. 2, 206–220.

Fletcher, Guy 2013. “A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.” Utilitas 25, no. 2, 206–220.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Griffin, James 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Griffin, James 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford: Clarendon Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Hartmann, Nicolai 1932. Moral Phenomena (Ethics, Vol. 1). New York: Macmillan.

Hartmann, Nicolai 1932. Moral Phenomena (Ethics , Vol. 1). New York: Macmillan.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Hartmann, Nicolai 1962. Ethik. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Hartmann, Nicolai 1962. Ethik . Berlin: de Gruyter.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Hawkins, Jennifer S. 2010. “The Subjective Intuition.” Philosophical Studies 148, 61–68.

Hawkins, Jennifer S. 2010. “The Subjective Intuition.” Philosophical Studies 148, 61–68.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Hurka, Thomas 1993. Perfectionism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hurka, Thomas 1993. Perfectionism . New York: Oxford University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

LeBar, Mark 2004. “Good for You.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85, no. 2, 195–217.

LeBar, Mark 2004. “Good for You.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85, no. 2, 195–217.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

LeBar, Mark 2013. The Value of Living Well. New York: Oxford University Press.

LeBar, Mark 2013. The Value of Living Well . New York: Oxford University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Locke, John 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by P. H. Nidditch , Oxford: Clarendon [1689].

Locke, John 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Edited by P. H. Nidditch , Oxford: Clarendon [1689].)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth: Penguin.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

McDowell, John 1997. “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” In: Moral Discourse and Practice. Edited by Stephen Darwall , New York: Oxford University Press, 215–226.

McDowell, John 1997. “Projection and Truth in Ethics.” In: Moral Discourse and Practice . Edited by Stephen Darwall , New York: Oxford University Press, 215–226.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Moore, Andrew & Roger Crisp 1996. “Welfarism in Moral Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4, 598–613.

Moore, Andrew & Roger Crisp 1996. “ Welfarism in Moral Theory .” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 4, 598–613.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Murphy, Mark C. 2001. Natural Law and Practical Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murphy, Mark C. 2001. Natural Law and Practical Rationality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Nussbaum, Martha 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Parfit, Derek 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon.

Parfit, Derek 1984. Reasons and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Railton, Peter 2003. Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Towards a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Railton, Peter 2003. Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Towards a Morality of Consequence . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Raz, Joseph 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, Joseph 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action . Oxford: Oxford University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Sumner, L. W. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon.

Sumner, L. W. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics . Oxford: Clarendon.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Sumner, L. W. 1998. “Is Virtue Its Own Reward?” In: Virtue and Vice. Edited by E. F. Paul , F. D. Miller , & J. Paul , New York: Cambridge University Press, 18–36.

Sumner, L. W. 1998. “Is Virtue Its Own Reward?” In: Virtue and Vice . Edited by E. F. Paul , F. D. Miller , & J. Paul , New York: Cambridge University Press, 18–36.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Wiggins, David 1987. “A Sensible Subjectivism?” In: Needs, Values and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 185–214.

Wiggins, David 1987. “A Sensible Subjectivism?” In: Needs, Values and Truth , Oxford: Blackwell, 185–214.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Wiggins, David 1990. “Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91, 61–86.

Wiggins, David 1990. “Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91, 61–86.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Williams, Bernard . 1995. Making Sense of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, Bernard . 1995. Making Sense of Humanity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)| false
• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation