Knowing, Knowing Perspicuously, and Knowing How One Knows
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Guy Longworth in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
In Knowing and Seeing, Michael Ayers presents a view of what he calls primary knowledge according to which one who knows in that way both knows perspicuously and knows how they know. Here, I use some general considerations about seeing, knowing, and knowing how one knows in order to raise some questions about this view. More specifically, I consider some putative limits on one’s capacity to know how one knows. The main question I pursue concerns whether perspicuity should be thought of either (i) as a condition of sensory experience, (ii) as a condition of sense-based cognition, or (iii) as an interface condition, involving interrelations between sensory experience and sense-based cognition.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Ayers, Michael 2019. Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Soteriou, Matthew 2016. Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2051 | 148 | 12 |
| Full Text Views | 578 | 8 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 91 | 18 | 4 |
Knowing, Knowing Perspicuously, and Knowing How One Knows
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Guy Longworth in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
In Knowing and Seeing, Michael Ayers presents a view of what he calls primary knowledge according to which one who knows in that way both knows perspicuously and knows how they know. Here, I use some general considerations about seeing, knowing, and knowing how one knows in order to raise some questions about this view. More specifically, I consider some putative limits on one’s capacity to know how one knows. The main question I pursue concerns whether perspicuity should be thought of either (i) as a condition of sensory experience, (ii) as a condition of sense-based cognition, or (iii) as an interface condition, involving interrelations between sensory experience and sense-based cognition.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 2051 | 148 | 12 |
| Full Text Views | 578 | 8 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 91 | 18 | 4 |