What (In)coherence Is Not

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Julian Fink University of Bayreuth Bayreuth Germany

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Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.

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