What (In)coherence Is Not
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Abstract
Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.
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Broome, John 2013. Rationality Through Reasoning. The Blackwell/Brown lectures in philosophy. Malden, Mass.: Wiley Blackwell.
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Harman, Gilbert 1986. Change in View: principles of reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
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Martin, Charles, Burton, 1994. “Dispositions and Conditionals.” Philosophical Quarterly 44, 1–8.
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Worsnip, Alex 2018. “What is (In)Coherence?”, In: Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 184–206.
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What (In)coherence Is Not
In: Grazer Philosophische StudienSearch for other papers by Julian Fink in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this article it is argued that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 166 | 69 | 10 |
| Full Text Views | 37 | 1 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 79 | 7 | 1 |